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TROUBLED TIMES: THE FARM DEBTOR
UNDER THE AMENDED BANKRUPTCY CODE
MARGARET Rosso GROSSMAN*
Introduction
For many years, debt has been an important element in the farm economy.
Recently, however, the indebtedness of American agriculture has assumed
drastic proportions.' Farmers have suffered from the effects of falling land
values, high real interest rates, and diminished international trade in agricultural
commodities. Farm firms have weakened financially from adverse weather
conditions, low commodity prices, and casualty losses. These conditions have
combined to create the most serious financial problems faced by American
agriculture in a half century. 2 As some measure of the severity of the crisis,
the deflation in farmland prices in early 1985 alone has ranged from 20 to
40 percent in midwestern farm states where the problem is concentrated. 3
Prospects for the near future are bleak. The United States Department of
Agriculture estimated net farm income for 1984 at $29 to $33 billion and the
debt that year at $215 billion. The picture for 1985 is worse-an estimated
$24 billion income compared to a debt of $213 billion. 4 The farm credit prob-
lem is not universal: two-thirds of the nation's farmers have manageable debt
loads or are debt free.' Other farmers, however, face substantial debt. In 1984,
for example, 17.7 percent of all farms (21.8 percent of cash grain farms) had
debt equal to 40 percent or more of assets. And 6.6 percent of farms (7.6
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Editor's Note: Congress made substantial revisions to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984. Because
of these changes, citation to the U.S.C. will be both to the 1982 version and to thpy Supp. II
1984. This is because the 1984 revisions must be read in conjunction with the 1979 Act, which
appears in the 1982 U.S.C.
1. During the week of February 18, 1985, the volatile issue of farm debt exploded in Con-
gress when farm-state legislators blocked Senate business in an effort to force the Reagan
administration to aid financially troubled farms. Wehr, Farm Credit Filibuster Deadlocks Senate,
43 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 335 (1985).
2. Harl, Problems of Debt in Agriculture, 6 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 689, 689 (1985).
3. Wehr, supra note 1, at 337.
4. Id. at 335.
5. Id. at 337.
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percent of cash grain farms) had debt-equity ratios of more than 70 percent.6
In the corn-belt region the number of farmers heavily in debt is particularly
high. For many of these debt-ridden and imperiled farmers, liquidation or
some type of reorganization may be almost inevitable.7 This financial crisis
has not affected only the inexperienced or small-scale farm operator. Indeed,
statistics indicatethat the average farmer who has given up his land is 47.6
years old, and has farmed about 402 acres for almost eighteen years., For
many of these established farmers, bankruptcy looms on the horizon.
Of course, every farmer who experiences financial difficulty will not enter
bankruptcy. Many will opt for private settlements or work-outs. Normally,
their creditors prefer to avoid the trustee fees, the legal fees, and the generally
higher collection costs and delays associated with bankruptcy, if they can reach
a fair out-of-court settlement.9 Struggling farmers themselves hope to avoid
the social stigma attached to bankruptcy, if they have any other realistic chance
of solving their financial problems.' 0
Many farmers, however, have done little about their increasing debt, letting
their creditors pursue state and common law remedies on a first-in-time, first-
in-right basis. Often, farmers who do nothing are waiting "just one more
year" to see if they can become profitable. Others simply cannot face the
prospect of selling or losing the land that has been in the family for genera-
tions. But this passive approach only leaves the farmer deeper in debt.
Moreover, it may leave the debtor personally liable for deficiency judgments,
crippling any prospect for a fresh start in farming or in another occupation.
In this situation, bankruptcy is often a preferable solution. A Chapter 7
6. ECON. REs. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AORic., AGRICULTURAL FINANCE, OUTLOOK AND SITUA-
TION REPORT 7-8 (AFO-25 Dec. 1984). A commercial farmer with a debt-equity ratio of 40 per-
cent or higher is quite likely to be facing financial stress. Those with a ratio of 70 percent will
probably be forced to reorganize or liquidate.
7. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
8. Winkler, Debt Crisis in America's Farmland Galvanizes University Researchers, 30 CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. 5, 6 (Apr. 10, 1985).
9. Sterling, The Workout Alternative to Bankruptcy, 13 CoLO. LAW. 620, 620 (1984). On
nonbankruptcy alternatives for the farmer, see Dole, The Availability and Utility of Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code to Farmers Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 15 TEX. TECII.
L. REv. 433, 437-40 (1985).
10. "There is certainly a social stigma applied to bankruptcy. [Bankrupt farmers are] still
going to have to go into the coffee shop and their friends may be looking at them and treating
them somewhat differently than before." Moratzka, An Attorney Discusses Farm Bankruptcies,
FARM MONEY MGMT. 14, 111 (3d Q. 1982).
On the other hand, debtors gaining bank.-uptcy discharges are protected from discriminatory
treatment by governmental units or private employers based solely on the fact of their bank-
ruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Section 525 contains exceptions to the
general rule against state discrimination on the basis of bankrupt status, but these are primarily
for the benefit of farmers and ranchers. The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930,
7 U.S.C. § 499a-499s (1982), and the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229
(1982), were enacted in part to ensure that farmers and ranchers receive true market value for
their produce and livestock. Bankrupt stockyard dealers and perishable commodities brokers cannot
object to the consideration of their past bankruptcies if their licenses or registrations are denied,
revoked, or suspended on such grounds.
11. Creditors receive fair treatment in part through the trustee's avoiding powers to be discussed
infra text accompanying notes 194-316. The debtor is assured the fresh start, not so much because
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss4/9
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liquidation can ensure creditors fair treatment and normally will guarantee
the debtor a fresh start, free from most debts."
Other farmers may have a sound farming operation that is faced with short-
term financial crisis. These farmers may not want to liquidate, but must still
deal with creditors. Short of bankruptcy, creditors may be willing to grant
extensions of time, especially if the farmer's future income has potential for
improvement. Creditors, if promised fair treatment, may even scale down the
debt to avoid court costs. But all of a farmer's creditors must assent to this
type of treatment to ensure its success.' 2 Unfortunately, no mechanism out-
side of bankruptcy exists to force an objecting creditor to approve an exten-
sion or scale-down of debt. Thus, one dissenting creditor could proceed to
seize assets of the debtor that were essential to his successful operation,
frustrating creditors who had compromised their claims and ruining the
farmer's chance for rehabilitation. This difficulty is avoided in bankruptcy.
Chapter 11, or Chapter 13 for eligible farmers, can require creditor coopera-
tion and thereby facilitate a successful reorganization, to the benefit of both
creditors and debtor.
Thus, many of the thousands of farmers in financial crisis will enter-or
have already entered-bankruptcy. Recent years have seen a significant in-
crease in reported farm bankruptcy decisions, and many other cases are
pending. In the context of an overview of farm bankruptcy, this article presents
an analysis of many of the nontax issues central to farm bankruptcy. It focuses
first on issues connected with filing a bankruptcy petition: eligibility, protec-
tion for the farmer, discharge, and the automatic stay. It then turns to prop-
erty of the estate, the debtor's exemptions, and the avoiding powers used to
enhance the estate. The article also analyzes pertinent provisions involved in
liquidation and reorganization, focusing in particular on recent decisions in-
volving agricultural bankruptcies.
I. Filing for Bankruptcy
Eligibility
The farmer who is considering bankruptcy as a solution to financial dif-
ficulties will have two, or perhaps three, forms of bankruptcy from which
to choose. Chapter 7 involves liquidation of the farm business, whereas Chapter
11 provides a means for reorganizing the farming operation, with h view toward
continued activity. In some instances, the farmer may also qualify for Chapter
13, which regulates the adjustment of debts of an individual with regular
income.
Farmers operating as individuals, partnerships, or corporations are eligible
of bankruptcy exemption provisions (state exemptions are available in any event), but because
of the discharge of unsatisfied prepetition debts pursuant to sections 727, 1141, and 1328.
12. The reorganization plan outside of bankruptcy is known as a composition. A composi-
tion is a contract between a debtor and at least two creditors in which the creditors agree to
take less than full payment or to extend time of payment in satisfaction of their claims. Two
creditors are needed to make the composition valid because the mutual benefit the creditors receive
as a result of the composition is consideration for the contract. See D. EPsTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDOR
LAW 127-28 (2d ed. 1981).
1985]
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for either Chapter 7 liquidation or Chapter 11 reorganization.'3 Chapter 13,
however, is available only to an individual, or to an individual and that in-
dividual's spouse.' Thus, farm partnerships and corporations cannot use
Chapter 13 as a means of reorganization. Moreover, Chapter 13 imposes other
eligibility requirements that may exclude farmers from qualification.
Under Chapter 13, relief is available only to "an individual with regular
income."'" Thus, it is available to an individual (or an individual and spouse)
whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to make payments according
to a plan required under Chapter 13. Some commentators had speculated that
farmers might be ineligible for Chapter 13 because the income of a farmer
who sold a single crop harvested annually might not be considered sufficient-
ly stable and regular. 6 Congress, however, indicated that the term "individual
with regular income" was intended to be interpreted expansively. 7 Likewise,
bankruptcy courts have not suggested that farmers are ineligible for Chapter
13 on the basis of irregular income. Indeed, at least one court has
acknowledged that a farmer with an annual income from farming business
qualified, although his future annual income could not be predicted
accurately."I
A more serious problem with the farmer's eligibility for Chapter 13 under
present law is that Chapter's maximum debt limitation. To be eligible for
Chapter 13, an individual, or the individual and spouse, must have noncon-
tingent, liquidated unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent,
liquidated secured debts of less than $350,000.' 9 The relatively high debt levels
that often characterize modern farming operations, in particular those opera-
tions in financial difficulty, may prevent many farmers from qualifying for
Chapter 13.20
Protection for the Farmer
The Bankruptcy Code provides mechanisms for both voluntary and involun-
tary bankruptcy. Although a Chapter 13 proceeding is always initiated by
the debtor and is thus voluntary, both Chapter 7 and Chapter I 1 filings usually
can be involuntary proceedings initiated by creditors.2 ' The farmer, however,
receives special protection. The Code provides that a farmer cannot be forced
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)(d), 101(33) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
14. Id. § 109(e) (1982).
15. Id. In In re Cole, 3 Bankr. 346 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980), the court held that a debtor
without steady income from a single job is eligible for Chapter 13 relief if he works at odd
jobs, shows that he has received some income from these jobs, and shows that his motivation
and opportunities are adequate.
16. 2 J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WVADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW 380 (1982); Lee, Chapter 13
nee Chapter XIII, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 303, 304 (1979); Looney, The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 and the Farmer: A Survey of Applicable Provisions, 25 S.D.L. REv. 507, 517-18 (1980).
17. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6277.
18. In re Hines, 7 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. S.D. 1980).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982). Thus, a person with a large but unliquidated tort claim pending
should file before the claim goes to court to keep his unliquidated unsecured claims below the
$100,000 limit of Chapter 13.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12.
21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(a) (1982).
[Vol. 38:579
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into bankruptcy through an involuntary proceeding brought by creditors.
2
The Code defines "farmer" as a person who received more than 80 percent
of gross income during the taxable year immediately prior to the taxable year
of the bankruptcy proceeding from a farming operation owned or operated
by that person.23 "Farming operation" includes "farming, tillage of the soil,
dairy farming, ranching, production or raising of crops, poultry, or livestock,
and production of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state.
' 2
Although the issue of whether the debtor is a farmer for purposes of pro-
tection from involuntary bankruptcy has not been litigated frequently under
the Code, several courts have considered the question. At one extreme, deb-
tors who received approximately $1,500 monthly income from law practice
and only $40 monthly from the farm did not qualify as farmers under the
Code.25 At the other extreme, a large farming corporation may qualify as
a farmer. For example, a corporation that earned income from processing,
packaging, and marketing of eggs and that owned all the laying hens located
on thirty or forty farms qualified as a farmer.26
The debtor's status as farmer is a question of fact. If creditors initiate an
involuntary bankruptcy case against a farmer, the farmer must appear and
plead that he qualifies as a farmer under the Code. 27 If he fails to appear,
he has consented to the involuntary proceeding. If the issue is controverted,
the creditors bringing the case bear the burden of proving the debtor does
not qualify as a farmer.28 If the debtor is a farmer under the statutory defini-
tion, the involuntary case will be dismissed. A recent decision suggests that
courts may interpret the statutory definition somewhat literally. Potmesil v.
Alexandria Production Credit Association involved debtors in an involuntary
Chapter 7 case who had received 84.9 percent of their 1982 gross taxable in-
22. Id. § 303(a). Charitable corporations also enjoy this protection. This protection also prevents
involuntary conversion of a case from Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Id. §§ 1112(c),
1307(e). See In re Cattle Complex Corp., 54 Bankr. 50 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985). Debtor feedlot,
which was paid to feed and water cattle but grew little of the feed, was held to be a farmer
engaged in a "farming operation" and thus protected from involuntary conversion to Chapter
7. The court relied on legislative history suggesting a broad interpretation of the farmer protec-
tion, and on a Tenth Circuit decision finding a feedlot to be a farmer under U.S. Treasury
regulations. High Plains Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1974).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17). The definition of "farmer" applies to determine whether the debtor is
protected from involuntary bankruptcy. But it may not apply in other determinations in the
course of the bankruptcy proceeding. For example, the definition did not apply to determine
whether the debtor could avoid liens on farm equipment under section 522 of the Code. In re
Decker, 34 Bankr. 640, 641-42 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983). See infra text accompanying notes 164-186.
Nor did it prevent a debtor from claiming the exemption for implements and other tools of
the farming trade, in a case in which the debtor earned over half his income through employ-
ment at a hospital, but nonetheless was a bona fide farmer. In re Yoder, 32 Bankr. 777, 780
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983). See also In re Pommere, 10 Bankr. 935 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) (1982). The definition of "person" includes individuals, partner-
ships, and corporations. Id. § 101(33) (Supp. 11 1984). Thus, the definition of farmer in section
101(18) includes farming corporations and agribusinesses as well as individuals.
25. In re Ballard, 4 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
26. In re Blanton Smith Corp., 7 Bankr. 410 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
27. Potmesil v. Alexandria Prod. Credit Ass'n, 42 Bankr. 731 (W.D. La. 1984); In re Johnson,
13 Bankr. 342 (D. Minn. 1981).
28. In re Jenkins, 664 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1981).
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come from farming. 29 They sold much of their farming operation in December
1982, and in September 1983 the PCA filed an involuntary Chapter 7.11 As
an affirmative defense, the Potmesils asserted their status as farmers. Despite
the fact that the debtors had sold their farm, the court looked to the Code
definition of farmer, which refers to the source of income for the preceding
year, without any reference to the debtor's status at the time of the petition.
The debtors fit within the definition, and the court dismissed the involuntary
case against them.
3 '
This exception recognizes the cyclical nature of farming. It protects farmers
from bankruptcy precipitated by the misfortunes of poor weather conditions
and low prices.32 This protection, however, is not as extensive as it might
appear. First, off-farm income, a significant component of many farmers'
total income, 33 may prevent farmers from meeting the 80 percent test. Second,
the realities of a farm financial crisis may force the farmer to file voluntarily.
The pressures of personal property repossessions, foreclosures on mortgages,
and actions seeking judgments on debts will eventually force the farmer to
come to terms with his creditors. At that point, the farmer may have no prac-
tical alternative other than bankruptcy. Some farmers determined to avoid
voluntary bankruptcy may be able to negotiate alternative arrangements, such
as an assignment for the benefit of creditors or a liquidating trust.14 In many
situations, however, voluntary bankruptcy will provide the best means for
the farmer to resolve intransigent financial problems. Bankruptcy may pre-
sent the only realistic chance for an elimination of burdensome debt or a suc-
cessful reorganization to continue the farming operation.
29. 42 Bankr. 731 (W.D. La. 1984).
30. In February 1983, the PCA had challenged the land sale to the debtors' daughter as
a sham: Id. at 732.
31. Id. at 733.
32. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 322, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD.
NEWS, at 6278. The qualifications for this exception have been criticized. For example, the lack
of limitations on amount of income and corporate form means that huge farming operations
are protected from involuntary bankruptcy. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The
Full-Employment-For-Lawyers Bill, Part III: Business Bankruptcy, 1979 UTAH L. Ray. 405, 410-11.
The protection afforded to farm corporations under the Code may not be justified, nor can
it be explained from legislative history. See Kennedy, The Commencement of a Case Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 977, 998-99 & n.124 (1979).
33. Because nonfarm income for the average farmer may exceed income from the farming
operation, many farmers will not earn 80 percent of their income from the farming operation.
Looney, supra note 16, at 514. See also Marsh, Farmers' Exemption From Involuntary Bankruptcy,
15 U.C.C. L.J. 162 (1982). Marsh concluded that because of the growing importance of non-
farm income in the farm sector, the definition of farmer in the Code does not protect a signifi-
cant number of average-size and smaller farmers from involuntary bankruptcy. It does, however,
probably protect the large farm operatiofis that provide the greater part of the nation's agricultural
production.
34. An assignment for the benefit of creditors is a voluntary transfer of assets by a debtor
to another person in trust. The duty of the assignee as trustee is to liquidate the assets and
distribute the proceeds to the debtor's creditors. The common law assignment for the benefit
of creditors does not discharge the creditor for any deficiency that is not covered by the assets
transferred. For this reason, it is generally recommended for corporate debtors, to whom the
discharge in Chapter 7 is not available. See EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 119-21.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss4/9
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Insolvency
The farmer who enters bankruptcy voluntarily need not be insolvent.
Insolvency, as defined in section 101(29) of the Code, is not a requirement
for filing under Chapters 7, 11, or 13 .3 Nonetheless, a person in bankruptcy,
though not necessarily insolvent, must owe debts.36 To prevent abuse in this
area, the court has discretion to dismiss cases of solvent debtors. Section 305
allows the court to dismiss or suspend any case if the interests of the creditors
and the debtor would be better served by suspension or dismissal.17 This deci-
sion is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court and is not subject to
appeal. 38 A farmer who is solvent is unlikely to enter bankruptcy to obtain
a discharge. But the farmer with cash flow problems may use bankruptcy
as a means of gaining time and relief from the pressure of creditors.
Initiating the Bankruptcy
The farmer who has decided to file bankruptcy voluntarily and has decided
under which Chapter to file initiates the bankruptcy case by filing a petition
under the appropriate Chapter with the bankruptcy court. Initiation of the
case constitutes an order for relief. 39 The order for relief triggers the require-
ment that the clerk of the bankruptcy court give notice to creditors and others
pursuant to bankruptcy rules."0 The debtor must file, with the petition or
shortly thereafter, a list of creditors, schedules of assets and liabilities, and
statements of financial affairs and executory contracts.4 ' To be dischargeable,
a debt must be scheduled.4 2 Moreover, intentionally omitting a debt from the
schedule of liabilities may result in complete denial of discharge. 3
35. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 732-33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984),
app. denied, 39 Bankr. (S.D.N.Y.), reargumint denied, 39 Bankr. 998 (S.D.N.Y.); Turpin v.
Maupin, 26 Bankr. 987, 989-90 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
The Code defines insolvency in terms of the traditional balance sheet test. For entities other
than partnerships, insolvent means a financial condition such that the sum of the entity's debts
exceeds the entity's property, at fair valuation. The entity's property excludes property exempt
under section 522 and property transferred, concealed, or removed to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (Supp. 11 1984).
36. In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc., 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir. 1983).
37. I1 U.S.C. § 305 (1982). Other relevant dismissal provisions are at id. §§ 707, 1112(b), 1307.
38. Id. § 305(c).
39. Id. § 301. An "order for relief" was formerly called an "ajudication." The former was
selected as a less pejorative term. See H.R. REP No. 595, supra note 17, at 321, reprinted in 1978
U.S. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6277; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5817.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 342(a) (Supp. II. 1984). See Bankr. Rule 2002(f).
41. See Bankr. Rule 1007 and official forms 6, 7, and 8. The documents must be verified
under penalty of perjury. Bankr. Rule 1008. False statements may result in prosecution for
bankruptcy crimes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1982).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1982).
43. Id. § 727(a)(4). A debtor who expects to pay a debt in full may not want to schedule
that debt. The proper approach would be to include the debt on the schedule and then reaffirm
it. On reaffirmation, see 11 U.S.C. § 524(c),(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Only the debtor may
seek court approval of a reaffirmation agreement. People's Bank of Pound v. Newsome (In
1985]
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Discharge
The availability of discharge protection against continued personal liability
on debts incurred prior to bankruptcy filing is not a prerequisite to filing
a bankruptcy petition. Indeed, the Code restricts both the kinds of debtors
eligible for discharge and the kinds of debts that can be discharged. The pro-
visions affecting discharge vary somewhat, depending on whether the bank-
ruptcy proceeding is a liquidation, a reorganization, or an adjustment of debts.
Under Chapter 7, a discharge is available only to an individual. Corpora-
tions and partnerships that liquidate cannot receive a discharge." In addi-
tion, even the individual debtor faces obstacles to discharge through both
objections and exceptions to discharge. 4 For example, under section 727, cer-
tain conduct of the debtor may provide creditors with an objection to
discharge."6 If an objection is proved successfully, discharge will be denied,
and all creditors will be able to attempt collection of their debts. These objec-
tions focus, for the most part, on fraudulent or negligent behavior with respect
to property of the debtor or of the estate. For example, discharge can be
denied to a farmer-debtor who has intentionally concealed his property (within
one year before the bankruptcy) or property of the estate.47 A farmer who
has unjustifiably failed to keep accurate financial records of his farm opera-
tion can likewise be denied discharge." Moreover, a debtor who has been
granted a discharge in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case commenced within
six years before the date of the filing of the new petition cannot receive a
discharge. 49 At the outset of the case, therefore, the farmer and his attorney
must ascertain whether a discharge will be available to avoid the embarrass-
ment of making the discovery at a later stage in the proceedings. 0
Even if no objection to discharge is successful, certain debts are excepted
from discharge. When a debt is excepted from discharge, the creditor to whom
that debt is owed (but not all other creditors) will be able to attempt collec-
tion. Section 523 of the Code" lists the debts that cannot be discharged."
These include certain taxes and other government debts, debts incurred through
false pretenses, unscheduled debts, maintenance or child support, certain educa-
tional loans, and liability incurred through the debtor's operation of a motor
vehicle while legally intoxicated. Also nondischargeable are debts for the
debtor's willful and malicious injury to another entity or its property. But
re Newsome), 3 Bankr. 626 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980). Court approval is not necessary for agreements
regarding nondischargeable debts. In re Trimble, 8 Bankr. 227 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982).
45. Id. §§ 727(a)(2)-(9); 523(a)(1)-(10) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
46. Id. §§ 727(a)(2)-(7); 727(c).
47. Id. § 727(a)(2) (1982).
48. Id. § 727(a)(3).
49. Id. § 727(a)(9).
50. Sommer, Gathering the Facts in a Consumer Bankruptcy Case, 1982 Prac. Law., Apr.
15, 1982, at 11.
51. The exceptions to discharge listed in 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) apply to
discharges under sections 727, 1141 or 1328(b) of the Code.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)-(10) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
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the mere failure to pay over money received from the sale of secured proper-
ty (for example, farm products subject to a security interest), does not always
constitute willful and malicious conversion under this provision.13 Moreover,
several recent cases have suggested that the sale of property subject to a security
interest and use of the proceeds for subsistence is not willful and malicious
conversion that will bar discharge. 5
If a thorough examination indicates that an individual farmer will be in-
eligible for discharge under section 727, then that farmer should consider
Chapter 11. The farmer who has numerous debts-or even one large debt-
that cannot be discharged under section 523 should probably consider Chapter
13, if he is eligible.
Under Chapter 11, the rules for discharge are somewhat different than under
Chapter 7. Section 1141 provides that confirmation of a plan of reorgani-
zation" discharges the debtor from debts arising before the date of the con-
firmation, with some limitations. 51 Under Chapter 11, this discharge is available
to partnerships and corporations, as well as individual debtors. For individual
debtors, however, the exceptions under section 523 continue to apply.57
Moreover, discharge can be denied, even under Chapter 11, if the plan pro-
vides for the liquidation of all (or substantially all) of the property of the
estate, the debtor does not engage in business after the liquidating plan is
consummated, and one of the section 727 objections would apply if the case
were a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 58 Thus, the objections to discharge may remain
relevant to some farmers using Chapter 11 reorganization.
The farmer who uses Chapter 13 will receive a discharge after completion
of all payments under the plan." This discharge, called the section 1328(a)
discharge, will not be subject to most of the exceptions listed in section 523.
But a Chapter 13 debtor cannot be discharged from debts arising from claims
for maintenance or child support." In addition, certain debts on which
payments are due after the completion of the plan are not discharged. 6'
A Chapter 13 debtor can also receive a "hardship" discharge under section
53. Id. § 523(a)(6) (1982); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Graham (In re Graham), 7 Bankr.
5 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980). See Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Cline (In re Cline), 52 Bankr. 301
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (allegation of secret sale of cattle to deny discharge under section 523(aX6);
birth and death projections as means of proving conversion rejected as too speculative; no proof
of malicious or willful conversion). Contra, Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Boren (In
re Boren), 47 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (farmer who failed to apply proceeds of crop
sale to debt and deceived secured creditors demonstrated malice; debt held nondischargeable
though proceeds were applied in part to living expenses).
54. E.g., In re Belzer, No. 5-83-39 (Bankr. Minn. June 25, 1984); In re Lloyd, 11 B.C.D.
1297 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Simpson, 29 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 585-589.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1982).
57. Id. § 1141(d)(2).
58. Id. § 1141(d)(3)(A)-(C). In addition, discharge can be withheld if provided in the plan
or in the order confirming the plan. Id. § 1141(d)(l).
59. Id. § 1328(a).
60. Id. §§ 1328(a)(2); 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
61. Id. §§ 1328(a)(1); 1322(b)(5) (1982).
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1328(b). This discharge is available when the debtor has not completed
payments under the plan if his failure to complete payments is due to cir-
cumstances beyond his control, unsecured claimants have received at least the
amount they would have received under a Chapter 7 liquidation, and modifica-
tion of the plan is not practicable. 2 A debtor who receives a hardship discharge
will not be discharged from those debts excepted from discharge under sec-
tion 523,3 or those on which payments are due after completion of the plan."
Under all three Chapters, a debtor can waive discharge. Waiver, which must
be approved by the court, is accomplished by a writing executed by the debtor
after the order for relief." The requirement prevents creditors from imposing
waiver of discharge as a condition for extending credit to the farmer. Moreover,
a discharge may be revoked, normally for debtor fraud or failure to
cooperate."
Automatic Stay
The filing of any bankruptcy proceeding stays the commencement or con-
tinuation of all judicial and nonjudicial actions against the debtor or the
debtor's property.67 The automatic stay prevents the debtor's property from
being seized by the debtor's most aggressive creditors and helps ensure an
orderly and equitable distribution of the debtor's assets to all creditors. Ac-
tions by creditors affected by the stay included judicial, administrative, or
other proceedings against the debtor; the enforcement of prebankruptcy
judgments; acts to obtain possession or control of property; acts to create,
perfect, or enforce liens against the estate and liens securing prepetition claims
against the debtor's property; acts to collect, assess, or recover prepetition
claims; certain setoffs; and proceedings before the U.S. Tax Court." Although
the list of actions stayed seems extensive, the automatic stay does not apply
to every action against the debtor. Among the exceptions are criminal actions
or proceedings against the debtor,69 and the collection of alimony, maintenance,
or support from property not part of the estate.70 Several other exceptions,
some focusing on the actions of governmental entities, are also included.7"
Normally, the automatic stay against property of the estate continues until
62. Id. §§ 1328(b)(1)-(3).
63. Id. § 1328(c)(2).
64. Id. §§ 1328(c)(1); 1322(b)(5).
65. Id. §§ 727(a)(10); 1141(d)(4); 1328(a).
66. Id. §§ 727(d), (e); 1328(e) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). A creditor or trustee must object
to a discharge obtained through fraud within one year.
67. Id. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 362(b)(1).
70. Id. § 362(b)(2).
71. Id. § 362(b)(1)-(1 1). Actions excepted from the stay include the commencement or con-
tinuation of an action by a governmental unit to enforce police or regulatory power; the enforce-
ment of a government judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in a police or regulatory
proceeding; setoffs of claims that are commodity futures contracts, options, or warrants; perfec-
tion of a purchase money security interest or a mechanic's lien; and the issuance of notices of
tax deficiencies.
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the property is no longer part of the estate." The stay against other actions
continues until the case is dismissed, closed, or a discharge is granted or
denied. 3 But in appropriate circumstances, a party in interest-normally a
creditor-may request relief from the automatic stay. The relief available in-
cludes terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning the stay. 74 In litiga-
tion over a motion to lift an automatic stay, the creditor must establish that
he has a valid and perfected security interest in the debtor's property." Under
section 362(d)(1), the court must grant relief from the stay "for cause."
76
Although the Code does not define "cause," the Code states that "cause"
does include lack of adequate protection. 77 Under section 362(d)(2), the court
must also grant relief from a stay against property if the debtor has no equity
in the property and if the property is not necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion. 78 For example, in a Chapter 7 case, if a secured creditor had a lien on
farm property in which the debtor had no equity, the court would terminate
the stay to allow the creditor to proceed against the property. 79 In a Chapter
II case, the court would be less likely to terminate the stay for the same creditor
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, added
two exceptions from the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(10), (11) [erroneously designated as
(9), (10)]. The more important, for agricultural purposes, states that the stay does not apply
to an act by a lessor of nonresidential real property to obtain possession of that property, when
the lease has terminated by the expiration of its stated term before or during a bankruptcy case.
This provision may prove helpful to lessors of farmland, who will enjoy more certainty about
the status of the lease if the debtor declares bankruptcy. See infra note 477. The other new
exception applies to presentment of a negotiable instrument and giving notice of and protesting
dishonor of the instrument.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
73. Id. § 362(c)(2).
74. Id. § 362(d). The bankruptcy court has exclusive authority to grant relief from the automatic
stay. Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1983).
75. In re Irving A. Horns Farms, Inc., 42 Bankr. 832, 836 (Bankr. D. Iowa 1984) (unsecured
creditor on equipment and livestock not entitled to have stay lifted or to receive adequate
protection.)
76. I1 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
77. Id. § 362(d)(1). On the meaning of adequate protection, see infra notes 94-105, 410-438,
467-470.
78. Id. § 362(d)(2). A creditor, however, may obtain relief from the automatic stay under
section 362(d)(1) (the "for cause" provision) even if the debtor had equity in the collateral.
Bamerical Mort. & Fin. Co. v. Paradise Boat Leasing Corp. (In re Paradise Boat Leasing Corp.),
5 Bankr. 822 (D.V.I. 1980).
79. If a bankruptcy court has agreed to lift the automatic stay and the debtor plans to appeal
that decision, the debtor should seek a stay pending the appeal. In Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle,
Inc. v. Lamb, 735 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1984), the debtor's primary asset was 2,700 acres of
land. Creditors with mortgages on the land requested that the automatic stay be lifted pursuant
to section 362(d). The bankruptcy court agreed, but stayed its order pending appeal to the district
court. The district court affirmed, but refused to grant a stay pending appeal. The appellate
court also refused to grant a stay. The property was sold to the creditors at a foreclosure sale.
Arguing that the bankruptcy court's lifting of the automatic stay was in error, the debtor asked
that the sale be rescinded and the property returned. The Eleventh Circuit, however, dismissed
the appeal. The failure to obtain a stay and the subsequent sale of the property made the case
moot. The court was powerless to grant relief. See generally Greylock Glen Corp. v. Community
Say. Bank, 656 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1981); Miller v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 16 Bankr. 875 (9th Cir. 1982).
1985]
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if the property were necessary for an effective reorganization of the farm
business and if the creditor were assured of adequate protection.80 But even
if the property is vital for the reorganization, the stay will be lifted when
the debtor has no equity and offers no protection to the creditor. In re Tinsley
& Groom involved claims of $638,458 against property worth at most $600,000,
but more likely $515,000.81 The debtor made no attempt to offer adequate
protection, and the court lifted the stay.
Several recent decisions have considered the meaning of the standard that
the property should be "necessary for an effective reorganization." This re-
quirement could be interpreted to refer either to the total impossibility of
reorganization, or to the debtor's bald assertion that the property is needed
to enhance the interest of the estate. Normally, however, the standard of proof
is "a reasonable probability of a successful rehabilitation within a reasonable
time and that the property sought to be foreclosed be critical to that effort.""
The standard should not require proof that a plan of rehabilitation can be
achieved. Indeed, an effective reorganization could result in a liquidation.8"
Nonetheless, though the debtor need not prove that rehabilitation is a cer-
tainty, the debtor must show a reasonable probability that he will propose
a successful plan of reorganization in a reasonable time.14 The property in-
volved is necessary for the reorganization if "it is necessary either in the opera-
tion of the business or in a plan, to further the interests of the estate through
rehabilitation or liquidation. 8"
Courts have disagreed over whether the section 362(d)(2) provision for re-
80. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Holt County Grain Storage, Inc. (In re Holt County
Grain Storage, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982), where the plaintiff, which had the
first mortgage on the farm debtor's land, sought relief from the automatic stay under section
362(d) to proceed with a foreclosure sale. The court found that the debtor had no equity in
the land because the land was valued at between $1.7 million and $1.8 million and was subject
to liens of more than $1.9 million. Nonetheless, the court found that the land was necessary
for an effective organization and that the plaintiff had adequate protection of its interest in
the land. The plaintiff's mortgage was for approximately $1,664,000. With approximately $83,000
in cash held in escrow plus the potential accrual of up to $55,000 in proceeds from the sale
of the 1982 crop, money was available to pay the $10,000 of unpaid real estate taxes. The court
rejected the creditor's argument that the debtor would be unable to reorganize and thus refused
to grant relief from the automatic stay.
Some courts have held the property must be necessary for an effective reorganization and
there thust also be a reasonable possibility of an effective reorganization within a reasonable
time. See, e.g., Guaranty-First Trust Co. v. Accent Assocs., Inc. (In re Accent Assocs., Inc.),
8 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
81. In re Tinsley & Groome, 38 Bankr. 457 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984).
82. In re Hutton, 45 Bankr. 558, 561 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
83. In re Keller, 45 Bankr. 469, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
84. In re Hutton, 45 Bankr. 558, 561-62 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984). In Hutton, the court lifted
the stay because the debtors,-who had no farm equipment and had leased out their land, had
no reasonable prospect of reorganization.
85. In re Keller, 45 Bankr. 469, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984), quoting In re Koopmans,
22 Bankr. 395, 407 (Bankr. Utah 1982). Keller found 1,709 acres of farmland in which debtors
had no equity necessary to an effective reorganization. The court found adequate protection
to the creditor because the land would not decline in value in the immediate future and did
not require the Chapter II debtors to pay rents to the creditor to ensure the benefit of the bargain.
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fusing to terminate a stay when property is necessary for reorganization ap-
plies to Chapter 13 cases . 6 The absence of the term "reorganization" anywhere
but in Chapter 11 has led some courts to the conclusion that section 362(d)(2)
applies only to Chapter 11 cases and not to Chapter 13 cases.8 7 Other courts
have rejected this rationale, concluding that Congress could not have intended
part of section 362(d) to apply to Chapter 13 cases and part not to apply.8
Thirty days after a request for relief from the stay, the stay is terminated
with respect to the party making the request, unless the court orders the stay
continued in effect, pending, or as a result of, a final hearing and determina-
tion. 9 The thirty-day hearing may be a preliminary hearing, or it may be
consolidated with a final hearing. 9' If the hearing is a preliminary hearing,
the court must order the stay continued if the party opposing relief from the
stay is reasonably likely to prevail at the final hearing. 9' In addition, the final
hearing must be commenced within thirty days of the preliminary hearing. 92
The court may grant emergency relief from the stay without a hearing if a
property interest will suffer irreparable damage before the opportunity for
a notice and a hearing.
93
The crucial issue in many hearings where a creditor seeks to terminate the
stay under section 362(d)(1) is whether the creditor's property interest has
been given adequate protection.9" The Code defines three standards for pro-
45 Bankr. at 473. The court refused to follow In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1984), discussed infra note 434.
Another decision focusing on the unlikeliness of depreciation of farmland as a form of ade-
quate protection is In re Price, 40 Bankr. 578 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984). Price involved both
senior and junior lienors on ranch property. Recent declines in the value of farmland make both
of these decisions somewhat questionable.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
87. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Feimster (In re Feimster), 3 Bartkr. 11, 14 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1979). See also Capienter v. Youngs (In re Youngs), 7 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
88. In re Zellmer, 6 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1980). See also EMB Realty Corp. v. Pitt-
man (In re Pittman), 7 Bankr. 760 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court applied section
362(d)(2) to a Chapter 13 case without discussing the issue.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. But using its equitable powers under section 105(a), the court can continue a stay
beyond the statutory deadlines if necessary to protect the debtor's property. See John Deere
Co. v. Kozack Farms, Inc. (In re Kozack Farms, Inc.), 47 Bankr. 399 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stay
on combine continued).
93. Id. § 362(0. In all hearings concerning relief from the stay, the party requesting relief
has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in the property; the party opposing
the relief has the burden of proof on all other issues. Id. § 362(g) (1982).
94. On adequate protection, see generally Greene, Adequate Protection Becomes a Creditor's
Tool, 21 WILuAMEmrr L. REv. 149 (1985); Molbert, Adequate Protection for the Undersecured
Creditor in a Chapter 11 Reorganization: Compensation for the Delay in Enforcing Foreclosure
Rights, 60 N.D.L. REv. 515 (1984); Marshack, Adequate Protection for the Undersecured Creditor
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 88 CoM. L.J. 621 (1983); Price, Adequate Protection Under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 71 Ky. L.J. (1983); Comment, Adequate Protection and the Automatic
Stay Under the Bankruptcy Code: Easing Restraints on Debtor Reorganization. 13 U. PA. L.
REv. 423 (1982).
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viding adequate protection in section 361. 9- One involves a cash payment,
or periodic cash payments, to the extent that the stay under section 362 results
in a decrease in the value of the creditor's interest in the property.9 6 The second
is providing an additional or replacement lien to compensate for the diminished
value of the existing creditor's lien.9 7 The third includes other relief that will
let the creditor realize the "indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the pro-
perty.98 Courts have shown flexibility in determining what constitutes ade-
quate protection under section 362. 99 Adequate protection is affected, of course,
by the value of the creditor's security interest, which depends on the value
of collateral. Value may vary according to the purpose of valuation. 00 Fair
market value has been used in deciding whether a creditor was adequately
protected for purposes of evaluating the stay under section 362.03 If the ade-
quate protection does not completely compensate the creditor for any diminu-
tion in its property interest, the creditor has an administrative expense prior-
ity for the shortfall; under section 507(b) that claim has priority over other
administrative claims.1
02
An informative analysis of adequate protection of a creditor's interest in
farmland appears in In re Greiman.'" In a Chapter 11 proceeding, a creditor,
secured by a properly recorded deed of trust, asked relief from the automatic
The existence of adequate protection is a question of fact. In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472, 474
(8th Cir. 1985). But see, e.g., In re Schaller, 27 Bankr. 959, 962 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). This section defines adequate protection for
the purposes of sections 362, 363 (use, sale, or lease of property), and 364 (obtaining credit).
For further discussion of adequate protection in the context of sections 363 and 364, see infra
text accompanying notes 410-438, 467-470.
96. Id. § 361(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
97. Id. § 361(2) (1982).
98. Id. § 361(3).
99. See, e.g., Pagni v. Pleasant Valley, Inc. (In re Pleasant Valley, Inc.), 6 Bankr. 13 (Bankr.
D. Nev. 1980), where the court found that adequate protection existed when the property subject
to the lien was increasing in value; Diversified Mort. Inv. v. Lake Tahoe Land Co. (In re Lake
Tahoe Land Co.), 5 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980), where the court held that a cushion be-
tween the amount of the debt and the market value of the land of 40 to 50 percent of the value
constituted adequate protection; City Stores Co. v. A.L.S., Inc. (In re A.L.S., Inc.), 3 Bankr.
107 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980), where the court held that paying the lessor all rents and charges
as they became due under the lease and depositing with the lessor security equal to three months'
rent provided the lessor with adequate protection; Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Feimster
(In re Feimster), 3 Bankr. II (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979), where the court held that when the creditor
had retained a lien on the secured property and under the debtor's Chapter 13 plan was to receive
payments exceeding the value of the property, the creditor has been provided with adequate
protection.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) ("Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of
the valuation."). See Greenfield, Distribution of Property of The Estate, in G. BRODY, W. TAGoART
& G. LEE, PRACTICING UNDER THE BANKRUPTcY REFORM ACT § 11.05 (1979).
101. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of McDonough v. Shockley Forest Indus., Inc. (In re Shockley
Indus., Inc.), 5 Bankr. 160 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980), where the court held that when there was
a reasonable likelihood of reorganization, the standard of valuation for determining adequate
protection under section 362 was the fair market value of the collateral.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1982).
103. 45 Bankr. 574 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
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stay or adequate protection of its interest in Missouri farmland owned by
the debtors in possession. Greiman, a highly educated farmer, owed the creditor
approximately $1 million in principal and interest. At the time of the financ-
ing transaction, the property was valued at approximately $7 million; its fair
market value during the bankruptcy proceeding was approximately $538,000,
far less than the debt against the property.
The debtors had no equity in the farmland and did not prove that the land
was necessary for an effective reorganization. In addition, they did not offer
the creditor adequate protection. In making its determination on adequate
protection, the court focused on the decline in the value of Missouri agricultural
real estate and on the somewhat marginal Greiman farmland in particular.
Testimony indicated that high interest rates, along with depressed crop and
livestock prices, would result in a continued decline in the price of farmland,
with marginal land suffering even greater decline." ' Two additional factors
pointed toward further decrease in the value of the Grieman property.
Although the best use of their land was livestock production, the Griemans
devoted much of the land to row crop production. Despite the significant
slope of the land (up to 20 percent), crops were planted, albeit using no-till
techniques, up and down the hill rather than on the contour. Severe erosion
was thus likely to waste the farmland and diminish its value. Further diminu-
tion in value was expected through deterioration of the improvements on the
property. Having abandoned their livestock operation, the debtors had little
incentive (or money) to make the necessary repairs on the buildings.' 5 The
combination of declining land values, erosion, and deterioration indicated to
the court that the creditor was not adequately protected. Thus, the court lifted
the automatic stay, permitting the creditor to foreclose on the deed of trust.
II. The Estate
Property of the Estate
The concept of the estate is central to federal bankruptcy law. The estate
includes the property available to satisfy claims of creditors against the farm
debtor. Many provisions of the Code focus on maximizing the property con-
stituting the estate. In a Chapter 7 case, the proceeds of the estate are
distributed to the creditors; under Chapters 11 and 13, the reorganization plan
either vests the estate in the debtor or describes the portion tor be distributed
to creditors.
An estate is created at the commencement of a bankruptcy case, that is,
at the time the petition is filed.' 6 Subject to a few exceptions, the estate in-
cludes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case."' 7 Section 541 of the Code defines property
104. Id. at 576.
105. Id. at 577.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
107. Id. § 541(a)(1). This definition includes all the debtor's causes of action. In re Smith,
640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1981).
19851
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broadly, though only the debtor's interest is part of the estate.'08 The estate
also includes property that the trustee recovers through the "avoidance
powers."'0 9 In addition to tangible and intangible property acquired before
the filing of petition, the estate also includes property that the debtor acquires
or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after the petition by inheritance,
as the result of a property settlement or a divorce decree, or as the beneficiary
of a life insurance policy."10 It also includes earnings from the property of
the estate"' and property acquired after the commencement of a Chapter 13
case but before conversion to a Chapter 7 case." 2 In a sense, the estate is
the debtor's successor to the property that constitutes the estate. As such the
estate has the benefit of any defenses that would have been available to the
debtor. These include statutes of limitation, statutes of fraud, and other per-
sonal defenses.' 3
The Code excludes several types of property interests from the estate. Any
power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of another entity
besides the debtor need not be included in the estate."" Moreover, the Code,
as amended in 1984, excludes from the estate the debtor's interest as lessee
of nonresidential real estate when the stated term of the lease has expired
before commencement of the case. When the lease term expires during the
case, the debtor's interest in the lease ceases to be part of the estate." This
provision may prove relevant in cases involving a debtor who is a tenant under
a farm lease.'" The Code excludes interests in spendthrift trusts from the
estate, to the extent that the restrictions the trust imposes on the transfer of
the debtor's interest are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."
Normally, if a trustee is serving in a case, the trustee will assemble the
property of the estate."18 The debtor must cooperate and relinquish to the
trustee all estate property in his possession. "9 A farmer, like any other debtor,
must turn over to the trustee all property, even property that can later be
exempted. Both items of crucial practical importance (for example, farm im-
108. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (Supp. I 1984). See § 541(a)(2), regarding community property. See
also Missouri v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1162 (1982) (possession and minute ownership interest gives preliminary jurisdiction to
bankruptcy court).
109. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-551 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The trustee's avoiding powers will be discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 194-316.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
111. Id. § 541(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1984).
112. Id. § 1306(a)(1) (1982).
113. Id. § 558 (Supp. I 1984). Any waiver made by the defendant after commencement of
the case does not bind the estate.
114. Id. § 541(b)(1).
115. Id. § 541(b)(2).
116. See generally Grossman & Fischer, The Farm Lease in Bankruptcy: A Comprehensive
Analysis, 59 NOTRE DmE L. REV. 598 (1984).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984). Many other types of restrictions on property transfer
will not protect a debtor's property from inclusion in the estate. See id. § 541(c)(1).
118. Id. § 521(4).
119. Id.
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plements) and articles of great sentimental value (for example, family
heirlooms) must be made available to the trustee. Strict compliance with this
requirement is essential. The debtor who refuses to comply may be denied
a discharge ' or face prosecution for a bankruptcy crime.'
The trustee must also receive property of the estate that is in the possession
or control of other individuals or entities. 22 This rule includes property that
the trustee may use, sell, or lease for benefit of the estate and its creditors
23
and property that the debtor will eventually exempt. 2 Several exceptions to
this requirement exist. Property that has inconsequential value or benefit to
the estate need not be delivered to the trustee.' 25 In addition, an individual
or entity without actual notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy case may,
in good faith, transfer property of the estate or pay a debt owed to the debtor
without incurring liability to the estate. 26 Normally, however, those who
transfer property of the estate after the bankruptcy petition has been filed
will be liable to the estate for the value of the property.'27
Though the trustee must receive all the property of the estate, the trustee
is not required to retain all of that property. After notice and hearing, the
trustee may abandon any property that is burdensome or of inconsequential
value to the estate. 28 At the request of a party in interest, the court may
order the trustee to abandon such property.'29 For example, if a tractor is
subject to valid liens that secure claims greater than the value of the tractor,
the trustee can abandon it, allowing the creditors with valid liens to proceed
against it. Of course, the assessment of value of property to the estate will
vary according to the goal of the bankruptcy. In a farm reorganization, equip-
ment that is totally encumbered may be of critical importance to the debtor's
continued operation.
120. Id. § 727(a)(3) (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
121. 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1982).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1982).
123. See id. § 363 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
124. See id. § 522.
125. Id. § 542(a) (1982). For example, in a situation where the debtor's interest in property
was limited to the right of redemption of the property before sale and the right to receive notice
of the sale, but did not include possession of the property, the property did not have to be
turned over to the trustee. Winfrey Structural Concrete Co. v. I.R.S. (In re Winfrey Structural
Concrete Co.), 5 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1982). But see § 549, dealing with avoidance of postpetition property
transfer. Due to the interrelationship of sections 542(c) and 549(a), although the transferor may
be protected, the transferee is not. The trustee may avoid the transfer under section 549(a)(2)
and recover the property under section 550.
In addition, an entity that owes 'a debt to the estate need not pay the debt to the trustee to
the extent that the entity is entitled to a setoff under section 553. Id. § 542(b). A life insurance
company may transfer property of the estate or the debtor to itself if the transfer is to pay
a premium or to carry out a nonforfeiture insurance option that must be made automatically
under a prepetition life insurance contract. Id. § 542(d).
127. See id. §§ 549, 550 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
128. Id. § 554(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
129. Id. §,554(b).
19851
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Exemptions
In bankruptcy proceedings involving an individual debtor, the estate in-
itially includes all the debtor's interest in property. All of this property,
however, will not be available for distribution to creditors. Instead, pursuant
to Code section 522, the individual debtor is entitled to certain exemptions. 10
These exemptions permit an individual debtor or the debtor and spouse to
retain a limited amount of property free of prepetition claims of creditors."'
The exemption provision is designed to facilitate the "fresh start" envisioned
by the drafters of the Code. The exemptions are available only to individuals
and not to partnerships or corporations.
Federal or State Exemptions
The federal exemptions available to the farmer who has declared bankruptcy
are set out in section 522(d).' 32 Some of the more significant exemptions are
130. Id. § 522 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
131. Exempt property is, however, subject to some debts. See id. § 522(c). These include claims
for taxes, under § 523(a)(1), and for alimony, maintenance, or support under § 523(a)(5).
132. Id. § 522(d). Section 522(b) provides an alternative: property exempt under federal non-
bankruptcy law or certain state or local law, and certain exempt property held in joint tenancy
or tenancy by the entirety. Id. § 522(b)(2)(A), (B).
The federal nonbankruptcy exemptions include foreign service retirement and disability payments
(22 U.S.C. § 11.04) (repealed); Social Security payments (42 U.S.C. § 407); injury or death com-
pensation payments from war risk hazards (42 U.S.C. § 1717); wages of fishermen, seamen,
and apprentices (46 U.S.C. § 601); Civil Service retirement benefits (5 U.S.C. §§ 729, 2265);
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits (33 U.S.C.
§ 916); Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions (45 U.S.C. § 228(1)); veteran's benefits
(45 U.S.C. § 352(e)); and federal homestead land on debts contracted before issuance of patents
(43 U.S.C. § 175). Cohen, Properly of the Estate and Exemptions, in BRODY, TAcGERT & LEE,
supra note 100, § 7.01.
The treatment of jointly held property will also vary widely from state to state for debtors
who have selected, or who are limited to, the federal nonbankruptcy and state exemptions. These
debtors may exempt any interest in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety property, to the
extent that the interest is exempt under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B)
(1982 & Supp. 111984). This exemption extends to personal as well as real property. See Ackerly,
Tenants by the Entirety Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv.
701, 704 (1980). The property that falls under this exemption will be primarily tenancy by the
entirety property. A tenancy by the entirety is a joint tenancy between spouses, and traditionally
one of its characteristics has been that neither spouse can subject the property to individual
debts. Id. at 702-03. As of 1980, twenty-six states recognized some form of tenancy by the entirety,
Id. at 703. This exemption provision, however, applies only in those states following the tradi-
tional rule that tenancy by the entirety property cannot be subjected to individual debts. As
of 1980, seventeen states still followed the traditional rule. Id. In those states, tenancy by the
entirety property should be exempt from the bankruptcy proceeding if only one of the spouses
is in bankruptcy. See also Grilliot & Yocum, Tenancy by the Entirety: An Ancient Fiction Frustrates
Trade and Creditors, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 341, 347 (1979).
See Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc., 674 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982). Ragsdale involved a prebankruptcy
judgment against husband and wife, with a judicial lien filed against tenancy in entireties property.
The spouses' effort to use section 522(b)(2)(B) to protect the property in their joint bankruptcy
failed. The property could be reached under Virginia law because both spouses were liable to
the creditor; thus it could be reached in the joint bankruptcy proceeding. See also 3 Bankr.
Serv. (L. Ed.) § 22.31 (1983).
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the debtor's interest, not to exceed $7,500, in real or personal property used
as a residence (the homestead exemption),'3 3 and an interest, not to exceed
$1,200, in one motor vehicle.' 34 The debtor can exempt his interest, up to
$200 in value for particular items with an aggregate maximum of $4,000, in
household or personal goods, animals, and crops held primarily for personal,
family, or household use.' 35 Also exempt is an aggregate interest up to $500
in jewelry. 3 6 The debtor can exempt his interest in any property, up to $400
plus up to $3,750 of any unused amount of the homestead exemption. 3" Im-
plements or tools of the trade are exempt, up to $750 in aggregate value.
3 8
The Code also exempts several other types of tangible and intangible proper-
ty interests. 
39
The Code provides that an individual debtor may choose between its rather
generous exemptions and the exemptions established under state law. 4 But
a debtor cannot maximize the available exemptions by selecting some from
the federal list and some from state law. Instead, the debtor must use either
the federal or the state exemptions.'' When husband and wife are both
debtors, each individual is entitled to select his or her exempt property.'
42
When the spouses' estates are jointly administered, the spouses must choose
the same set of exemptions.'
4 3
The Code provides that individual states may prevent their domiciliaries
from choosing the federal exemptions.' In states that have exercised this
option, the debtor must choose exempt property pursuant to state exemp-
tions. A significant majority of states have mandated that debtors use state
exemptions.14  Two generous provisions of the federal Code, as originally
enacted, help to explain why so many states have "opted out" of the federal
exemptions. First, federal law allowed a debtor to exempt any interest, not
133. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1982).
134. Id. § 522(d)(2) (1982).
135. Id. § 522(d)(3) (Supp. 11 1984).
136. Id. § 522(d)(4) (1982).
137. Id. § 522(d)(5) (Supp. 11 1984).
138. Id. § 522(d)(6) (1982). This exemption also includes professional books. See In re Yoder,
32 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983). The debtor in Yoder did not come within the section
101(17) definition of farmer because he did not earn 80 percent of his income from farming.
Nonetheless, he could exempt tools of the farming trade because he was a bona ide farmer.
139. These items are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7)-(11) (1982).
140. Id. § 522(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). But see infra text accompanying note 144.
141. The debtor can change his exemption list choices so as to improve his position with regard
to exemptions, so long as the final choice is made before others can be hurt by reliance on
the debtor's initial choice. In re Cobb, 3 Bankr. 150 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. 11 1984).
143. Id. § 522(b) (1982 & Supp. 111984). This provision was added as part of the 1984 amend-
ments. If the parties fail to agree, the Code provides that section 522(b)(1) (the federal exemp-
tions, unless the relevant state has decided otherwise) will apply.
144. Id. § 522(b)(1).
145. See the state-by-state listing in 3 Bank. Serv. §§ 22:120-:172 (1983 & Supp. 1985). See
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.02, at 522-11 n.4a (15 ed. 1983). See also Comment, Exemp-
tions Under the Bankruptcy Code: Using California's New Homestead Law As a Medium for
Analysis, 72 CALiF. L. REV. 922, 926 nn.27-29 (1984).
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to exceed $200 per item, in household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, or musical instruments held for the personal family
or household use of the debtor. " 6 Before the July 1984 amendments to the
Code, there was no cumulative dollar limit to this exemption. A farmer who
owned a number of animals held primarily for household use, for example,
could have exempted all the animals if each had a value of $200 or less. This
potential for abuse was eliminated by the July 1984 amendments that provide
a $4,000 ceiling on the small item exemption. 4 7 Second, the so-called "wild
card" provision in federal law allowed a debtor to exempt the value of any
property not to exceed $400 plus any of the unused amount of the $7,500
exemption for residential property.'" In joint cases, where the husband and
wife held no homestead, the spouses could exempt up to $15,800 in any prop-
erty they chose. Often this meant that the petitioners could exempt all their
property. The July 1984 amendments have capped the "wild card" exemp-
tion at $400 plus up to $3,750 of the unused portion of the homestead ex-
emption. 119
Although the liberal federal exemptions have now been tempered somewhat,
many states still require their resident debtors to use state exemptions. The
state exemptions vary considerably, and the relevant state exemptions must
be studied carefully to ensure that the farmer-debtor can keep the maximum
amount of property. Some of the state exemption laws have provisions quite
similar to the federal provisions, although nothing requires the state provi-
sions to provide analogous protection. 50 Illinois, for example, is a state that
requires debtors to use state exemptions.'' Like the Code, Illinois allows a
$7,500 homestead exemption.' Other exemptions closely track the federal
list, but are somewhat less generous.5 3 For example, Illinois permits only
$2,000, rather than $4,000, in miscellaneous personal property,'" and does
not permit any of the unused homestead exemption to be used for personalty.
Some state exemption laws include provisions that are particularly attrac-
tive to farm debtors. The Iowa exemption statute, for example, provides that
a resident debtor who is head of a family may exempt:
17. [The proper tools, instruments, or books of the debtor,
if a farmer . . .
18. If the debtor is a . . . farmer, . . . a team, consisting of
not more than two horses or mules, or two yoke of cattle, and
the wagon or other vehicle, with the proper harness or tackle by
the use of which he habitually earns his living, .. .
146. 11 U.S.C. § 523(d)(3) (1982).
147. Id. § 523(d)(3) (Supp. II 1984).
148. Id. § 523(d)(5) (1982).
149. Id. § 523(d)(5) (Supp. 11 1984). Apart from the changes in these two exemptions, the
July 1984 amendments did not affect the exemptions listed in § 522(d).
150. In re Gauntt, 36 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984).
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-1201 (1983).
152. Id. § 12-901.
153. Id. § 12-1001.
154. Id. § 12-1001(b).
155. IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6 (Supp. 1985).
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The Iowa exemptions place no dollar limitation on the tools and instruments
of a farmer. Thus, in In re Hahn,' S6 a farm-debtor electing the Iowa exemp-
tions was permitted to exempt a wide range of personal property such as tools
and instruments. In addition, he was permitted to keep either a tractor-wagon
combination or a truck-and-trailer combination.' 7
Other state exemption laws also include helpful provisions. Oklahoma, for
example, permits a homestead with a maximum size of 160 acres outside city
limits' 58 and exempts "all implements of the husbandry used upon the
homestead."'' 9 Minnesota permits a homestead of 80 acres located in a rural
area and imposes no monetary limit on its value.'6 Texas law provides for
a 200-acre rural homestead exemption.' 6' Clearly a farm debtor in a state
that has not yet elected to opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions should
scrutinize the state exemptions carefully to determine if the federal bankruptcy
exemptions protect more property. And even if the state requires the farmer
to use its exemptions, the farmer may find that essential property can be
protected.
The debtor's property that is protected by either federal or state exemp-
tions is generally not liable for any debt that arose before commencement
of the case. In essence, this means the exempt property is not liable for any
prepetition unsecured debt.' " Consensual liens on exempt property normally
survive bankruptcy. 6
Avoiding Liens on Exempt Property
Pursuant to section 522(f), however, the debtor may avoid some liens against
exempt property.' 64 First, the debtor may avoid judicial liens on personal or
real property.' 6 5 Of course, a state court will not normally impose a lien on
property exempt under state law, so the power to avoid judicial liens is rele-
vant primarily when the federal exemptions apply and protect property not
exempt under state law. Second, a debtor may also avoid nonpossessory, non-
purchase money security interests in several types of property.' 66 These in-
156. 5 Bankr. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980). The property exempt as tools and instruments
included: special mechanic's tools, construction tools, carpenter tools, an li-foot John Deere
disk, a 4-section harrow and cart, a Lillston rear cultivator, a barge box and wagon, a side
dump and wagon, a New Holland #68 baler, a New Holland #50 bale thrower, oil and antifreeze,
farrowing houses, hog houses, a hog shelter, hog feeders, a pig creep, pig feeders and waterers,
a hog waterer, a cattle lick tank, and an electric fence set.
157. Id.
158. 31A OKLA. STAT. §§ 1, 2 (1981).
159. Id. § 1(4).
160. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.01, 510.02 (West 1947 & Cum. Supp. 1985).
161. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (Vernon 1982-83). See In re Barnett, 33 Bankr.
70 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). But see supra note 131, explaining that exempt
property remains liable for undischarged taxes and family support obligations.
163. Id. § 522(c)(2).
164. Id. § 522(0.
165. Id. § 522(0(1). See Hughes, Code Exemptions: Far-Reaching Achievement, 28 DEPAuL
L. REv. 1025, 1037 (1979). See also Dole, supra note 9, at 459.
166. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1983), holding that section 522(0(2)
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clude general household items, as well as animals and crops held primarily
for personal, family, or household use;"6 7 implements, professional books,
or tools of trade;'6 8 and professionally prescribed health aids. 69 A debtor
cannot, however, avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security. interests
on automobiles, houses, or realty. 7 '
One issue of potential importance to farm debtors is what type of property
constitutes exempt tools of the farming trade, on which nonpossessory, non-
purchase money liens can be avoided. A threshold issue is whether one who
seeks to use section 522(f) to avoid liens on farm equipment must meet the
section 101(17) definition of "farmer." In Flick v. United States,'7 ' the debtor
wanted to avoid liens on a corn planter, two wagons, a haybine, a silo, and
a barn cleaner. The debtor did not qualify as a farmer under the 80 percent
of gross income test. Agreeing with other decisions,' the court believed it
may not apply retroactively to property rights (liens acquired before enactment of the 1978 Code).
But see In re McFarland, 38 Bankr. 370 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983), aff'd 38 Bankr. 374 (N.D.
Iowa 1984), holding that section 522(f) may apply to liens created in the gap period between
enactment and effective date of the section. McFarland also focused on the nature of possession.
The creditor's security interest is possessory only if the agreement between debtor and creditor
states that the creditor will possess the collateral; it is not possessory (therefore making the lien
not avoidable under section 522(0) merely because the creditor has repossessed the collateral.
Id. at 373.
It has been held that a debtor may avoid such liens regardless of his equity in the property.
Conkling v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Conkling), 54 Bankr. 972, 974 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1985); Rasmussen v. Green Hills Prod. Credit Ass'n (In re Rasmussen), 54 Bankr. 965 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1985); Lovett v. Beneficial Fin. Co. (In re Lovett), 11 Bankr. 123 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1981); Kursh v. Dial Fin. Co. (In re Kursh), 9 Bankr. 801 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
When the value of the property is greater than the allowed exemption, the debtor may only
avoid the lien to the extent of the exemption, and the secured creditor cannot be prevented from
enforcing the remainder of his lien. In re Morelock, 35 Bankr. 518 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983);
Sioux Falls Veterans Admin. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Gorkum (In re Gorkum), 4 Bankr.
689 (Bankr. S.D. 1980).
Section 522(f) applies against government lienors. Flick v. United States, 47 Bankr. 440 (W.D.
Pa. 1985).
167. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). These include "household furnishings,
household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or
jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor." Id.
168. Id. § 522(f)(2)(B). Possessory liens on farm equipment are not avoidable. See McFarland
v. Farmers Prod. Credit. Ass'n, 38 Bankr. 374 (N.D. Iowa 1984), aff'g 38 Bankr. 370 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1983). On the question of the nature of the lien, see supra note 166.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(C) (1982).
170. One court has held that this section does not empower the debtor to avoid a lien on
the debtor's automobile because the automobile is not considered part of the debtor's household
goods. Abt v. Household Fin. Co. (In re Abt), 2 Bankr. 323 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980). Generally
courts have construed "household goods" broadly to include nonessential items such as televi-
sion sets, stereo systems, and home entertainment systems, as well as necessities. See General
Fin. Corp. v. Ruppe (In re Ruppe), 3 Bankr. 60 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); Coleman v. Lake
Air Bank (In re Coleman), 5 Bankr. 76 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
171. 47 Bankr. 440 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
172. E.g., In re LaFond, 45 Bankr. 195, 199-200 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Decker, 34
Bankr. 640 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983); In re Yoder, 32 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983). Other
courts have considered whether a debtor may exempt farming tools without reference to section
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unfair to deny the exemption to those who actually farmed, but who could
not meet the 80 percent test because of nonfarm income. Nonetheless, the
court emphasized that the debtor had to be legitimately engaged in farming
to be able to exempt and avoid liens on farming tools under section 522(f).
Some farmers have attempted to characterize large farm machinery as tools
of the trade to avoid liens under section 522(f). The Code does not provide
a definition of tools of the trade, and courts have reached inconsistent con-
clusions. Some courts have stated that section 522(f)(2)(B) allows avoidance
of liens only on hand tools and small implements with nominal commercial
resale value, and not on farm implements of high value. In re O'Neal,'" for
example, applied this interpretation to a debtor who was a farmer and a peach
grower. Other courts, defining tools of the trade less restrictively, have per-
mitted avoidance of liens on large farm machinery.'74 Indeed, one court noted
that a narrow construction of section 522(f) "punishes the farmer for being
inadvertently dependent on expensive tools of the trade as compared to other
trades more dependent on smaller hand tools."' 75 And some courts, applying
a tools of the trade exemption in state law, have permitted lien avoidance
on large implements under section 522(f)(2)(B).
A recent case decided by the Eighth Circuit illustrates the application of
the section 522(f)(2) lien avoidance provisions to nonpurchase money security
interests in livestock. In re Thompson involved a voluntary Chapter 11
reorganization filed by an Iowa farm couple. 77 Iowa law requires Iowa debtors
to use the state exemptions in bankruptcy.' 78 Under Iowa law, a debtor may
101(17): In re Lipe, 36 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re Hanks, 11 Bankr, 706 (Bankr.
W.D. La. 1977); In re Pommerer, 10 Bankr. 935 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); In re Hahn, 5 Bankr.
242 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980).
See In re Oetinger,-49 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985). Wife, who worked part-time for
an insurance agency, claimed to be a farmer, and sought to avoid liens on $5,000 worth of
farm equipment. Under Kansas law, a debtor who has more than one trade or profession may
exempt articles relevant for his or her primary occupation. Id. at 42. The court found the wife's
primary occupation to be farming; thus, she was entitled to the tools of the trade exemption.
Id. at 43. See also Johnson v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Johnson), 54 Bankr. 976 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1985) (debtor wife who worked both on and off the farm, and applied her off-farm
income to the farm, was a farmer).
173. 20 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982). (This decision was later superseded by statute).
See In re Lipe, 36 Bankr. 597, 599 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983). See also Roberts v. John Deere
Co. (In re Roberts), 40 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Yparrea, 16 Bankr. 33, 35
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (for policy discussion).
174. E.g., Augustine v. United States, 675 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1982). Augustine involved use
of the "wild card" exemption to avoid liens in excess of the $750 permitted by section 522(d)(6).
See Kunkel, Farmers' Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code: Preserving the Farmers' Property,
29 S.D.L. REV. 303, 314 (1984).
175. Middleton v. Farmer State Bank, 41 Bankr. 953 (D. Minn. 1984). See also In re LaFond,
45 Bankr. 195 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
176. In re Currie, 34 Bankr. 745 (D. Kan. 1983) (farmer wife of nonfarmer entitled to lien
avoidance on pickup and trailer to haul cattle and hay); In re Liming, 22 Bankr. 740 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1982) (John Deere tractor).
177. 750 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1984).
178. IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (Supp. 1985).
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claim an exemption on all pigs under six months.' 19 The Thompsons had 210
pigs under six months, but the pigs were subject to a security interest taken
by a Production Credit Association (PCA). Because the security interest was
not a purchase money interest, the Thompsons tried to use section 522(f)(2)
to avoid the PCA's lien on their exempt pigs. The bankruptcy court ruled
that the Thompsons could not avoid the lien,'8 and the Thompsons appealed
to the Eighth Circuit.'
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Although the
Thompsons were subject to the Iowa exemptions, federal law determines the
availability of lien avoidance. The court examined the legislative history of
section 522(f)(2), noting that its primary purpose was to protect consumer
debtors from coercive creditors who take security interests in all the debtor's
property and threaten repossession.' 82 Avoidance of the security interest in
the Thompsons' pigs did not further this purpose. The Thompsons were
farmers and raised livestock on a commercial scale." 3 The animals were not
held for the "personal, family, or household use of the debtor,"' 8 4 as required
by section 522(0(2).
The Thompsons argued that the pigs were for personal use because some
would have been consumed by the family and others sold to provide income
for a fresh start. But they presented no evidence that the pigs were not part
of a commercial enterprise. They also argued that the pigs represented the
farmer's "unrealized wages," and that these "animal wages" should be exempt
because they were necessary for a fresh start. ' In response, the court agreed
that the exemption statutes were intended to facilitate the fresh start, but noted
that the lien avoidance statute has a somewhat different objective: to prevent
creditors from forcing debtors to reaffirm consumer debts. The PCA's security
interest was not consumer debt. Thus, the court rejected the Thompsons'
animal wages argument. The Eighth Circuit concluded that
179. Id. § 627.6(5).
180. In re Thompson, 46 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1984).
181. The parties agreed to a direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to the court of appeals.
The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to the transition provisions of Pub. L. No. 95-598,
tit. IV, § 405(c)(1)(B), 92 Stat. 2685 (1978). 750 F.2d at 630 n.l.
182. 750 F.2d at 630. See H.R. RaP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 126-27, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws, at 6087-88.
183. The court quoted with approval the bankruptcy judge's observation:
The debtor is engaged in the business of farming. He is raising livestock on a
commercial scale, and it cannot be argued that the livestock or animals are used
as pets or for personal slaughter to be consumed by his family. The debtor is ask-
ing the court to effectively eliminate the requirement that these items be held for
personal, family or household use for the debtor.
The hogs of this debtor are a capital business venture, financed as such.
750 F.2d at 630, quoting In re Thompson, 46 Bankr. 1, 2 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1984).
184. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (1982). This section applies to a limited selection of property,
not to all property otherwise exempt. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,
83 (1982) (Blackman, J., concurring).
185. 750 F.2d at 631.
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only those personal goods necessary to the debtor's new beginning
and of little resale value fit the federal bankruptcy philosophy
embodied in section 522(f)(2) .... [Tihe Thompsons' pigs were not
the sort of low value personal goods in which "adhesion contract"
security interests are taken. The ... nonpurchase-money security
interest in the 210 pigs is not avoidable.8 6
Another issue connected with section 522(f)(2)(B) lien avoidance is related
to state exemptions. Even after the July 1984 amendments to the Code, states
can continue to opt out of section 522(d).18 7 But section 522 does not make
clear how opting out under section 522(b) affects section 522(f) lien
avoidance.'"" As some courts suggest, a state that opts out of the federal ex-
emptions normally defines its own exemptions in terms of a debtor's equity
interest in certain property.' 9 By definition, a debtor's equity interest is not
subject to a lien. Thus the lien avoiding provision, section 522(f), will never
be applicable because debtors can avoid liens only on property the states have
declared exempt. The Fifth Circuit took this approach in In re McManas,'9'
and the Sixth Circuit accepted it in In re Pine.'9' The Eleventh Circuit, however,
in In re Maddox, 92 said in dicta that it probably would not follow McManas
because under the supremacy clause any conflict between state lien conserva-
tion provisions and the federal lien avoidance provision must be resolved in
favor of federal law. The Code gives the states the choice of opting out of
the federal exemptions, but not the lien avoidance provisions of section 522(0.
Indeed, In re Thompson asserts that "federal law determines the availability
of a lien avoidance."'
93
186. Id. The court's emphasis on goods of "little resale value" and of "low value" raises
some question about the value of goods on which liens may be avoided. The 210 pigs were
worth only $4,500. Id. Under many exemption statutes that limit the value of exempt property,
the question may not arise.
187. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
188. "T]he debtor may avoid ... alien ... to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption
to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b)." Id. § 522(f) (1982).. Subsec-
tion (b) in effect is the state exemption provision.
189. Some Illinois exemptions, for example, exempt only the debtor's equity interest. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 110, §§ 12-1001(b), (d) (1983). The farmer may exempt his equity interest up to $750
in implements or trade tools.
190. In re McManas, 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).
191. Pine v. Credithrift of Am., Inc. (In re Pine), 717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983).
192. Maddox v. Southern Discount Co. (In re Maddox), 713-F.2d 1526 (lth Cir. 1983).
193. 750 F.2d at 630, citing In re Wright, 34 Bankr. 643 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983). The Maddox
court further pointed out that section 522(0 applies "notwithstanding any waiver of exemp-
tions." A consensual lien could be construed as the equivalent of a waiver, in which case section
522(0 would still operate even though a state defined exempt property in terms of equity in-
terests. On state law efforts to limit the use of section 522(0, see Nowka, Debtor's Right to
A void Nonpossessory, Nonpurchase-Money Security Interests: Effect of State Lien Conservation
Statutes, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 127 (1985); Parkinson, The Lien Avoidance Section of the Bankruptcy
Code: Can It Be Avoided by State Exemption Statutes?, 11 OHio N. L. REV. 319 (1984).
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Avoiding Powers
One of the goals of bankruptcy is to make as much property as possible
available to satisfy claims of creditors or to aid in an effective reorganiza-
tion. Moreover, creditors are to be treated equitably, normally in light of
their rights under nonbankruptcy law. Thus, it is important to ensure that
the more aggressive creditors, perhaps fearing the debtor's financial instability,
cannot seize the debtor's property shortly before bankruptcy to the detriment
of other creditors.' 94 Nor should the debtor be permitted to pay some pre-
ferred creditors while ignoring others who may be owed similar debts. In light
of these considerations, the trustee (or the debtor in possession)'"9 enjoys a
number of avoiding powers under the Code.'96 These permit the trustee to
recover certain property of the debtor that has been transferred to other en-
tities or individuals before the bankruptcy. When a transfer is avoidable, the
trustee can recover the property transferred or its value for the benefit of
the estate.'97 Any interest in the property then becomes property of the estate.'11
Avoiding powers involve a number of complexities that are beyond the scope
of this article. 99 Nonetheless, it is important to provide an overview of these
powers and their relevance in a farm bankruptcy. They can play a significant
role in the trustee's efforts to maximize the property available for the farmer's
creditors. In addition, avoiding powers may help the farmer reorganizing under
Chapter I I or Chapter 13 to recover property that will make successful
reorganization possible."'
Section 544(a)-The Strong-Arm Clause
Section 544(a) of the Code is the so-called "strong-arm clause." It permits
the trustee to avoid liens that are "secret" because they have not been perfected
properly. Section 544(a)(1) gives the bankruptcy trustee the status of a
hypothetical judicial lienholder who extends credit to the debtor and obtains
a judicial lien on the debtor's property at the time of the bankruptcy peti-
tion.20 ' The trustee enjoys this power, regardless of whether such a creditor
194. Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 Am. BANKR. J. 173 (1979).
195. The "debtor in possession," a term used in connection with Chapter 11, is the debtor,
except when a trustee is serving in the case. I 1 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1982). The debtor in possession
has most of the rights, functions, and duties of the trustee. Id. § 1107(a) (Supp. 11 1984). Thus,
the debtor in possession can normally exercise the trustee's avoiding powers.
196. Strictly speaking, the avoiding powers are those granted in Code sections 544-549. But
other Code sections are also relevant.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
198. Id. § 541(a)(3) (Supp 11 1984).
199. A number of articles have provided comprehensive discussions of avoiding powers. See,
e.g., Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725 (1984), and the references
cited therein.
200. See Landers, Reorganizing a Farm Business Under Chapter 11, 5 J. AGRIC. TAx'N &
L. 11, 27 (983), for the suggestion that Chapter 11 debtors, who will need cooperation from
creditors to ensure a successful reorganization, may be reluctant to challenge voidable transfers.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). Section 544(a)(2) gives the trustee the power of
a creditor who has an execution against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied.
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actually exists (that is, he has the status of a "hypothetical" creditor), 2 and
regardless of any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor. 0 3 The trustee's
status under section 544(a) depends in part on the effect of applicable state law.
As a practical matter, the most significant effect of section 544(a) is to
allow the trustee to defeat valid security interests that have not been perfected
as of the date of the bankruptcy petition.2 0 4 Thus the trustee will be able
to defeat an unperfected security interest under article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC), as well as other interests over which a judicial lien creditor
would prevail. For example, a farmer might borrow $25,000 from a machinery
dealer to buy a tractor under a contract of purchase that gives the machinery
dealer a security interest in the tractor. If the dealer fails to perfect that in-
terest prior to the farmer's bankruptcy petition (or within the ten-day grace
period for purchase money security interests),2"' the trustee can defeat that
dealer's security interest pursuant to the strong-arm clause, even though the
security interest on the tractor was valid as between the dealer and the farmer.
This result can be justified because the machinery dealer's failure to record
and thus give notoriety to the "secret lien" may have prejudiced other creditors
who extended credit to the farmer on the basis of his ownership of the trac-
tor.2
06
A recent decision involving a farm debtor illustrates the application of sec-
tion 544(a). In re Pirsig Farms, Inc. was a Chapter 11 case,2 7 filed by a
Minnesota family farm operation doing business in corporate form. During
a three-year period prior to the bankruptcy, the debtor had purchased farm
equipment from John Deere dealers. The dealers took purchase money security
interests in the equipment and later assigned the security agreements to the
John Deere Company. The debtors had signed twenty-two financing
statements, which Deere filed. At the time of the filing, Minnesota law pro-
vided that financing statements on farm equipment of a corporation had to
be filed with the Secretary of State. 8 Deere, however, filed only three of
the statements with the Secretary of State and filed the other nineteen with
the county recorder.
After filing a Chapter 11 petition, the debtor filed a motion under section
363 of the Code to use cash collateral in which two banks had security in-
202. Id. § 544(a)(1)(2).
203. Id. § 544(a).
204. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(I)(b), 9-301(3) (1978), which state that an unperfected security in-
terest is subordinate to the rights of someone who becomes a lien creditor (defined to include
a trustee in bankruptcy) before perfection of the security interest. See also U.C.C. § 9-301(2),
which gives the holder of a purchase money security interest ten days in which to perfect and
retain priority.
205. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1978).
206. Even if the machinery dealer in the example did record his lien before the filing of the
petition, it still might be avoided as a preference. See infra text accompanying notes 250-287.
207. 46 Bankr. 237 (D. Minn. 1985).
208. MINN. STAT. § 336.9-401(1)(a) (1982). This law was later amended. Id. § 336.9-401(1)(b)
(1984). See 46 Bankr. at 239 n.l.
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terests.20 9 The banks and the debtor entered a stipulation for the use of cash
collateral. The court-approved stipulation required the debtor to seek to avoid
Deere's liens on the farm equipment so that the debtor could then grant liens
on the equipment to the banks. As agreed, the debtor then sought to have
Deere's liens avoided under section 544(a). The bankruptcy court approved
the lien avoidance; the liens were unperfected because they were filed impro-
perly. Deere appealed from this decision to the district court.
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The debtor in
possession, using the powers of the trustee, had asserted section 544(a), the
strong-arm clause, for the benefit of the estate. Deere's liens, improperly filed
under Minnesota law, were not perfected and thus fit under the literal inter-
pretation of section 544(a). Deere asserted that equitable considerations should
block application of section 544(a). It argued that the court should have treated
the debtor as an individual because the debtor was "actually just a family
farm, with family members owning all the outstanding stock." ' Yet Deere
could make no showing that the debtor failed to observe corporate for-
malities.21' Deere also argued that it did not know it was dealing with a cor-
poration when it sold the farm equipment. This argument, however, was
unrealistic in light of the evidence, including corporate signatures on the
financing documents. Deere also argued that the lien avoidance was not
necessary for the debtor to continue operating its farm. But, as the court
noted, section 544(a) does not require any showing that the lien avoidance
is necessary for continued operation. Indeed, section 544(a) is intended to
benefit the debtor's entire estate. As fiduciary of the estate, the debtor in
possession has an obligation to seek lien avoidance.2' ' Deere also argued that
the banks, which would benefit from lien avoidance, had knowledge of the
Deere liens. But, as the court emphasized, the debtor, rather than the banks,
was using section 544(a), a section which prescribes statutorily that the deb-
tor did not have notice.
2
1
3
Although Deere would lose more than $500,000 through the section 544(a)
lien avoidance, the district court refused to use its equitable powers to pre-
vent that result. The equities did not justify contravention of clear statutory
provisions. Deere's own failure to perfect its security interests properly caused
it to lose its liens under section 544(a).21'
An analogous strong-arm provision focuses on real property. Section
544(a)(3) gives the trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser of real property
from the debtor, who has perfected the transfer at the time of bankruptcy
filing. Again, the status is that of a hypothetical buyer; no actual purchaser
need exist. ' This status permits the trustee to avoid transfers of the debtor's
209. On section 363, see infra text accompanying notes 393-457.
210. In re Pirsig Farms, Inc., 46 Bankr. 237, 240 (D. Minn. 1985).
211. Id. at 241. The court believed it irrelevant that the bankruptcy cases of the individual
Pirsig debtors were consolidated with the corporate bankruptcy.
212. Id. at 241.
213. Id. at 242.
214. Id. at 244. Deere also raised a fifth amendment taking issue, which the court rejected.
215. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1984).
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real property that have not been perfected pursuant to state recording statutes.
Under section 544(a)(3), the trustee can defeat the interest of a lender who
extends credit secured by a farmer's land, but who fails to record the mortgage
pursuant to the state recording statute. ' 6 The trustee can defeat the creditor's
mortgage in bankruptcy, even though the mortgage on the farm was valid
as between the farmer and the lender.
The strong-arm provision allows the trustee to avoid unperfected consen-
sual liens on both real estate and personal property. In addition, the trustee
can exercise other powers, discussed in the following sections, that enhance
the estate in bankruptcy.
Section 545-Avoiding Statutory Liens
Section 545 of the Code permits the trustee to avoid the fixing of a number
of types of statutory liens on property of the debtor. The trustee can avoid
liens that first become effective against the debtor upon bankruptcy, insolvency,
or failure to meet certain financial standards."1 7 State statutory liens that
become effective only at bankruptcy or other financial exigency are little more
than state attempts to reorder federal priorities set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code. Thus the Code negates these attempts.2 1 8 In addition, the Code gives
the trustee power to avoid other statutory liens on property of the debtor
when those liens are not perfected as against a hypothetical bona fide pur-
chaser who purchases the property at the commencement of the case. 219 This
power to affect statutory liens is analogous to the strong-arm power to avoid
consensual liens.
In addition, the trustee may avoid the fixing of statutory liens on the debtor's
property that are liens for rent, or liens of distress for rent.22 This avoiding
power assumes special significance in the farm bankruptcy context because
it acts to invalidate the landlord's lien when a farm tenant files bankruptcy.
This is particularly important in light of the fact that a substantial percentage
of the farmland in the United States is rented.22 '
Many states protect the landlord's interest in a farm lease with a lien on
the crop for rent2 2 and advances. 22 3 The Illinois lien on crops is typical:
216. See, e.g., Leonard v. Lyens (In re Hastings), 4 Bankr. 292 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980), in
which the court allowed the trustee to avoid the creditor's mortgage because it had not been
filed at the county record office.
217. 11 U.S.C. §§ 545(l)(A)-(F) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
218. Levin, supra note 194, at 178-79.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
220. Id. §§ 545(3), (4).
221. According to the 1978 Census of Agriculture, approximately 40 percent of the land in
farms in the United States is rented. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1978 CENsus oF AGRICULTURE
pt. 51, at 124 (1981). In some states, the percentage is even higher; for example, in Illinois more
than 55 percent of land in farms is rented. Id.
222. E.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9-30 (1975); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-316 (1983); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 60.12.020 (1961). See also statutes cited in 2A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, REAL
PROPERTY 26[2] n.11 (1983).
223. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-203 (1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 441.290 (Vernon 1952); WAsH.
1985]
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Every landlord shall have a lien upon the crops grown or growing
upon the demised premises for the rent thereof, whether the same
is payable wholly or in part in money or specific articles of prop-
erty or products of the premises, or labor, and also for the faithful
performance of the terms of the lease. 2 '
The Illinois lien attaches at the time the crops begin to grow and continues
for six months after expiration of the lease term. It must be enforced in an
action of replevin, distress for rent, or foreclosure.
Though the high priority given the landlord's lien normally ensures that
the landlord can collect rent for the premises, '225 this lien will not protect the
landlord when the tenant enters bankruptcy. Sections 545(3) and (4) of the
Code apply to empower the trustee to avoid the statutory lien. The definition
of "statutory lien" in section 101(45)226 makes it clear that the trustee can
avoid both statutory and nonstatutory liens of distress for rent. 2 7 Therefore,
when a farm tenant enters bankruptcy, the trustee (or the tenant, as debtor
in possession) will use section 545 to avoid the statutory lien for rent and
any liens of distress for rent in the crops. The trustee can avoid the lien,
even if it has been perfected prior to the bankruptcy.22 Moreover, merely
filing the lease in the county office for real estate records will not negate
the trustee's avoiding power.
2 29
Although the trustee can avoid these statutory liens for rent under section
545, landlords can be protected by obtaining consensual liens in the crops
growing on their land.23 0 Section 101(45) of the Code specifically excludes
security interests from the definition of statutory lien.23 ' Using a security in-
terest to ensure the landlord's receipt of rent does not contravene section 545.
REV. CODE ANN. § 60.12.020 (1961). See also statutes cited in 2A POWEL & ROHAN, supra
note 222, 26[2] n.l1.
224. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, § 9-316 (1983). Later amendments did not affect the quoted
material, but require written notice to purchaser. On operation of the lien, see Harvey v. Hamp-
ton, 108 IIl. App. 501, 503 (1903); Watt v. Scofield, 76 Il1. 261, 264 (1875).
225. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Cooksville Grain Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 454 N.E.2d 357 (1983)
(landlord's lien has priority over U.C.C. security interest).
226. 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (Supp. I 1984).
227. Relevant House and Senate committee reports indicate that the trustee can avoid the
lien even if it has been enforced by sale prior to the bankruptcy petition. H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 17, at 371, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6327; S. REP. No.
989, supra note 39, at 85, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5871.
228. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.23[2], at 290-91 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978). See In
re Harrell, 55 Bankr. 203 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) (landlord lien defeated by section 545(3),
although statute vested all crops in lessor until rent was paid; section 545(3) applies to postpeti-
tion leases).
229. Neither the Code nor its legislative history indicates that the trustee's power to avoid
statutory liens for rent is conditioned on the lack of perfection or the failure to file the lease
in the county real estate record office. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 116, at 611-12.
230. See U.C.C. § 9-203, 9-303, 9-401 (1978). See also Meyer, Should Farm Leases Include
an Article 9 Security Interest?, 5 J. AGRc. TAX'N & L. 60, 61-65 (1983), for an explanation
of how to create and perfect a security interest in crops for rent, either in the lease itself or
in a separate document.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (Supp. II 1984).
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The rationale of that section is that a preference given to a particular class
of creditors by state statute is unfair to general creditors. Nonetheless, creditors
who act within the law to protect themselves should not lose that protection
in bankruptcy. Of course, the security interest must be properly perfected
to withstand the trustee's strong-arm power under section 544(a).
2 32
Sections 548 and 544(b)-Fraudulent Conveyances
A farmer who is considering bankruptcy may want to transfer unencumbered
property to family members to protect that property from the reach of
creditors. If an insolvent farmer, for example, gives an unencumbered tract
of land to a family member or sells that land at a substantial discount from
its fair market value, the transfer can probably be characterized as a fraudulent
conveyance. Fraudulent conveyances deprive creditors of rights to property
that might otherwise be available to satisfy their claims. Normally, creditors
who are defrauded by such transfers can set aside or void fraudulent con-
veyances under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act2 33 or other applicable
provisions of state laws.1
3
1
Like certain creditors under state law, the trustee in bankruptcy has the
power to avoid fraudulent conveyances. The trustee's power is governed by
the Bankruptcy Code and differs in some respects from the rights of a creditor
under state law. Both section 548 and section 544(b) give the trustee the power
to avoid fraudulent conveyances, 233 but the sections govern somewhat different
situations.
Section 548 gives the trustee broadly applicable power to avoid fraudulent
transfers. This power does not depend on the actual existence of an unpaid
creditor who was defrauded by the conveyance.236 Conveyances that can be
232. See supra text accompanying notes 201-206.
233. See UNIFORm FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4, 7 (1918). "Every conveyance made
and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent
as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation
is incurred without a fair consideration." Id. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985). "Every conveyance
made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed
in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both
present and future creditors." Id. § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1985). Fraudulent conveyances can be
set aside or ignored by creditors." Id. §§ 9, 10, at 577, 630. A new law, the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1984. 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). For discussion, see Alces & Dorr, A Critical Analysis
of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 527.
234. Many state fraudulent conveyance laws are based on the Statute of 13 Elizabeth (1570).
An example of a modern state fraudulent conveyance statute is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 4
(1983): "Every gift, grant, conveyance, assignment or transfer of, or charge upon any estate,
real or personal . . .. made with the intent to disturb, delay, hinder or defraud creditors or
other persons, .... shall be void as against such creditors, purchasers and other persons." Under
id., § 5, the title of a good faith purchaser for valuable consideration is not affected.
235. A fraudulent conveyance may result in denial of discharge to an individual debtor under
II U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1982), when that conveyance is made within a year before filing of
the bankruptcy petition.
236. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Generally under state fraudulent conveyance
law, only actual creditors can set aside conveyances. See supra notes 233-234.
19851
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avoided under section 548(a) are those made voluntarily or involuntarily, within
one year of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.2" The trustee
can avoid transfers made (or obligations incurred) with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor to whom the debtor was or became indebted."'
In addition, the trustee can avoid transfers for which the debtor received less
than a reasonably equivalent value, 39 if the debtor was insolvent on the date
of the transfer or became insolvent because of the transfer.24  Under this pro-
vision, the insolvent farmer's sale of land at a discounted price would con-
stitute a voidable fraudulent conveyance under section 548 if the transfer
occurred within one year of bankruptcy. If the transferee of the farm paid
value and took the property in good faith (unlikely, in the case of a family
member), he would have a lien on (or retain) any interest transferred to the
extent that the transferee gave value.2 ' The Code, as amended in 1984, defines
"transfer" broadly to include every method of disposing of property, "in-
cluding ... foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." 2 2 Under this
definition, a foreclosure sale of real estate at less than a "reasonably equivalent
value" may be thought to fall within the definition of fraudulent conveyance.
Indeed, a number of decisions have so held. 243 Courts have disagreed on this
237. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). This section refers to "any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property." This evidently includes exempt as well as nonexempt prop-
erty. See id. § 548(d)(1), on when a transfer is made.
238. Id. § 548(a)(1). One court has held that absent actual intent, a finding of constructive
intent is sufficient to permit the trustee to void a transfer pursuant to this section. In re Castillo,
7 Bankr. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). Another court has held that while actual intent to
defraud cannot usually be found solely because a transfer was between insiders, the circumstances
and actions of the parties involved may show intent to effect a fraudulent transfer. Loftis v.
Minar (In re Montanino), 15 Bankr. 307, 312 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981).
239. Under I 1 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 111984), value is defined as "property, or satisfac-
tion or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unper-
formed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor." Thus, value
need not be present value but can include satisfaction of an antecedent debt. But such a transfer
may constitute a preference under section 547.
240. Id. §§ 548(a)(2)(A) and (B)(i) (Supp. 11 1984). The trustee can also avoid transfers when
the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value, id. § 548(a)(2)(A); and the debtor
was engaged in business or a transaction for which remaining property was unreasonably small
capital, id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii); or the debtor intended to incur debts beyond the ability to pay
as the debts matured, id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1982).
241. Id. § 548(c) (Supp. 11 1984).
242. Id. § 101(48) (Supp. 11 1984). The equity of redemption phrase was added in 1984.
243. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A). The leading case is Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d
201 (5th Cir. 1980), decided under the Act, but reaffirmed under the code in Abramson v.
Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
Durrett held that a sale commanding less than 70 percent of the fair market value of the property
has been made for less than a reasonably equivalent value and may be avoided as a fraudulent
transfer. Although the 70 percent rule has been abandoned in favor of a case-by-case analysis,
Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985), a
number of decisions have followed the reasoning of Durrett. E.g., In re Garrison, 48 Bankr.
837 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
For discussion of the issues raised by Durrett, see Henning, Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact
on Real and Personal Property Foreclosure: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. REv.
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issue, however, and some decisions have suggested that the consideration
received at a noncollusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale will satisfy
the "reasonably equivalent value" standard.
24 4
In section 544(b), the Code gives the trustee a complementary power to
avoid fraudulent conveyances. That section gives the trustee the status of an
unsecured creditor holding an allowed claim in bankruptcy. 4 5 The trustee may
avoid any transfer of a property interest or any obligation incurred if the
transfer or obligation could be avoided by the creditor under applicable law.
246
Thus section 544(b) incorporates state fraudulent conveyance law into the Code.
Under section 544(b), unlike section 548, however, the trustee takes the status
of an actual creditor. But under section 544(b), the trustee is not limited by
the one-year requirement of section 548. Instead, any time period that applies
under state law (even if it is longer than one year) will apply. Moreover, once
the trustee assumes the standing of the actual creditor to avoid the transfer,
the trustee can avoid the conveyance completely, even if the conveyance was
fraudulent as to the creditor only in part.2 4 1 Thus the trustee has more power
than the actual creditor, who normally can void a transfer only to the extent
of its claim. When the trustee avoids a fraudulent conveyance under section
544(b), the entire amount recovered will be available for the benefit of creditors
of the estate.
248
Section 544(b) might be used, for example, to avoid a farmer's transfer
of farmland to a family member at less than fair market value. If the transfer
had occurred more than one year before the farmer filed the bankruptcy peti-
tion, section 548 would not apply. But if there were a creditor in bankruptcy
who held an unsecured claim at the time of the conveyance, section 544(b)
becomes relevant. The trustee can avoid the conveyance by assuming the status
of the unsecured creditor and that creditor's rights under state fraudulent con-
veyance law. Even if the creditor could have avoided the conveyance only
257 (1984); Nelson, The Impact of Mortgagor Bankruptcy on the Real Estate Mortgagee: Cur-
rent Problems and Some Suggested Solutions, 50 Mo. L. REV. 217, 237-50 (1985).
244. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984). The bankruptcy
appellate panel held that the consideration received at a noncollusive, regularly conducted
foreclosure sale is reasonably equivalent value under section 548(a)(2). In affirming, the Ninth
Circuit held that the transfer effectuated by a foreclosure sale took place when the deed of trust
was perfected under state law, not at the time of the sale itself. The Ninth Circuit used reasoning
similar to that in Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 14 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. Alaska 1981), aff'd,
22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982). The 1984 Code amendments, making the definition of transfer
under section 101(48) include the foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption, may have
invalidated the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Madrid. See also In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758
F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Strauser, 40 Bankr. 868 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
245. The creditor's claim must be allowed under section 502 (or not allowable only under
section 502(e)). 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
246. Id. § 544(b).
247. Section 544(b) thus continues the rule of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). See H.R.
REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 370, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS, at 6326.
See Jackson, supra note 199, at 742-50 for a discussion of section 544(b) and Moore v. Bay.
248. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
in part, the trustee can avoid it completely. So, for example, if the creditor
had an unsecured claim for only $20,000 and the discount to the family member
amounted to $100,000, the trustee would recover the whole $100,000 for the
benefit of the estate.
24 9
Section 547-Preferences
Fraudulent conveyance law is intended in part to regulate the relationship
between the debtor and his creditors, especially by discouraging debtor
misbehavior. Other law, for example, the law governing preferences, deals
with the relationship among the several creditors who may have interests in
the debtor's property. 2"° A farmer who has a number of creditors might have
some reason for wanting to make a payment to one of those creditors, rather
than to the others. The payment is not fraudulent because the creditor has
given consideration. 21 Nonetheless, when the farmer does not have enough
property to pay every creditor, the transfer does benefit one creditor at the
expense of the others. Outside of bankruptcy, such payments, called
preferences, are normally permissible. But in bankruptcy, one of the policies
is to ensure that creditors who are situated similarly receive similar treatment.
Permitting creditors who are particularly aggressive in pressing their claims
or who are especially favored by the debtor to receive superior treatment con-
travenes this policy. Thus, the Code includes section 547, which gives the trustee
authority to avoid certain preferential transfers made before bankruptcy.
2 2
A preference is simply a statutorily defined transfer of property that prefers
one creditor over another. The purpose of section 547 is "to prevent a creditor
from changing, alone or with the debtor's help, his existing position vis-d-vis
other creditors in anticipation of a bankruptcy proceeding." ' 2"3 If a creditor
has improved his position in relation to other creditors, the trustee can avoid
the transfer that made the improvement if the transfer fits within the re-
quirements of section 547. "Transfer" is defined quite broadly to include
every mode of parting with an interest in property.2"4 Section 547 establishes
rather technical criteria by which voidable preferences can be identified.
249. Under state fraudulent conveyance law, the result as to the family member will depend
on his or her good faith. If the family member purchased in good faith, then he would have
a lien on the property as security for repayment. See, e.g., UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
ACT § 9 (1918), 7A U.L.A. 665 (1985).
250. See Jackson, supra note 199, at 756-58, 777 (distinguishing between the purposes of
preference and fraudulent conveyance law).
251. Even if the payment is on account of an earlier debt, the creditor has given consideration-
the extension of credit in the past. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, for example, defines
fair consideration to include satisfaction of an antecedent debt. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CON-
VEYANCE ACT § 3(a) (1918), 7A U.L.A. 448 (1985).
252. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
253. Jackson, supra note 199, at 759.
254. 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (Supp. 11 1984). "'transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or
with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure
of the debtor's equity of redemption."
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When a farmer who files bankruptcy has made a prebankruptcy transfer
of an interest in property that prefers some creditor, the trustee (or the deb-
tor in possession) may avoid the transfer if it meets five specific requirements. 2"
First, the transfer must be to or for the benefit of a creditor.'- Second, the
transfer must be for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before the transfer was made.21 7 Third, the transfer must have been made
while the debtor was insolvent.3 The debtor is presumed to have been insol-
vent on and during the ninety days immediately preceding the date of the
bankruptcy petition. 2 9
The fourth requirement focuses on the timing of the transfer. To constitute
a preference, the transfer must have been made on or within ninety days of
the date of the bankruptcy petition.26 This period is extended to a year,
however, if the creditor to whom the payment was made was an "insider"
at the time of the transfer. 26 ' The Code defines insider in section 101(28).262
Essentially, an insider is one with such a relationship with the debtor that
their dealings cannot be considered arm's-length transactions. 63 In the farm
situation, a lending institution that is heavily involved in advising, and perhaps
even directing, the financially troubled farmer's operation may face
characterization as an insider and become subject to the one-year preference
avoidance period.
264
The fifth, and final, criterion in the characterization of a transfer as a
preference is its effect on the status of the creditor. To constitute a voidable
255. Id. § 547(b)(I)-(5) (1982 & Supp. I 1984). The trustee bears the burden of proving the
existence of the five factors. Id. § 547(g) (Supp. 11 1984).
256. Id. § 547(b)(1) (1982). Transfers to noncreditors are either unobjectionable sales for value
or they are gifts or sales for less than adequate consideration, to which fraudulent conveyance
law applies.
257. Id. § 547(b)(2). Transfers of the debtor's property in exchange for new value normally
do not prejudice other creditors. In those instances, the debtor transfers property but also gains
something of equal or greater value.
258. Id. § 547(b)(3). When the debtor is solvent (see id. § 101(29) (Supp. 11 1984)), payment
to a given creditor does not normally harm other creditors.
259. Id. § 547(0.
260. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. 11 1984).
261. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). Under the Code, as applicable before the 1984 amendments, the in-
sider also had to have reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
transfer. (Id. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1982), before 1984 amendments). The 1984 amendments eliminated
this requirement.
262. Id. § 101(28) (Supp. I 1984). If the debtor is an individual, the definition of insider
includes a relative of the debtor or a general partner of the debtor; a partnership in which the
debtor is a general partner; a general partner of the debtor; or a corporation of which the debtor
is a director, officer, or person in control. Id. § 101(28)(A). Subsections (B) and (C) define in-
sider for corporate and partnership debtors. A managing agent of the debtor is also an insider.
Id. § 101(28)(F).
263. See, e.g., Loftis v. Minar (In re Montanino), 15 Bankr. 307 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981). See
also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 311-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEvs, at 6268-71.
264. See, e.g., In re Brame, 23 Bankr. 196 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (involving a full proceeds
loan) and discussion in Kunkel, supra note 174, at 325-26.
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preference, the transfer must have enabled the creditor to receive more than
that creditor would have received if the transfer had not been made, the deb-
tor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7, and the creditor received pay-
ment of the debt under the provisions of the Code. 261 A creditor who receives
no more than he would have received in Chapter 7 has not been favored at
the expense of the other creditors. Thus it is unnecessary for the trustee to
avoid the transfer to protect other creditors and the estate.
Having set forth the criteria for avoidable preferences, the Code then lists
transfers that cannot be avoided as preferences under section 547.266 The first
exception is not an exception at all but merely restates the rule. Transfers
for new value are not voidable. 267 Such exchanges for new value do not decrease
the value of the estate, nor do they injure other creditors. The second excep-
tion is intended to permit the debtor to carry on normal business activities.
Ordinary credit transactions, such as purchases of fuel and feed, are treated
as if they were exchanges for new value. Payment of these debts incurred
in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs is not voidable if made
according to ordinary business terms. 68
The third exception is for a security interest granted in exchange for an
enabling loan (that is, a purchase money security interest). The loan must
be given at or after the signing of the security agreement and must in fact
be used by the debtor to acquire the collateral. The security interest must
be perfected no more than ten days after the debtor receives possession of
the property." 9 The fourth exception is for a transfer to a creditor, but only
to the extent that the creditor thereafter replenishes the estate. Such a creditor
normally receives a preference and then extends credit (new value) to the deb-
tor. The new value given must not be secured by an otherwise unavoidable
security interest. The amount of the unsecured new value is offset against
the preference amount, and the trustee can avoid only the difference..27
265. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1982). See In re Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
266. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)()-(7) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
267. Id. § 547(c)(1) (1982). The transfer must be part of a substantially contemporaneous
exchange. Id. § 547(c)(1)(b). One court has held that an exchange is not substantially contem-
poraneous when there is a two-month gap between the extension of credit and perfection of
the security interest that secures the loan. Independence Land Title Corp. v. National Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Independence Land Title Corp.), 9 Bankr. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
268. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984). Prior to the 1984 Code amendments, these payments
had to be made not later than forty-five days after the debt was incurred. The 45-day require-
ment no longer applies. Payment must be made "according to ordinary business terms." Id.
§ 547(c)(2)(C).
269. Id. § 547(c)(3). For example, suppose that on April 1, farmer borrows $30,000 from
creditor to buy a new tractor and signs a valid security agreement describing the tractor. Soon
after, creditor files a financing statement to perfect the security interest. On April 20, farmer
buys the tractor with the $30,000. On May 1, farmer files a bankruptcy petition. This transaction
meets the requirements for an enabling loan under section 547(c)(3), and the trustee cannot avoid
creditor's security interest, even though it was perfected within ninety days of bankruptcy.
270. Id. § 547(c)(4) (1982). For example, assume that on July 1, creditor advances debtor
$25,000. On July 20, debtor becomes insolvent. On August 1, debtor repays the $25,000 to creditor.
On September 1, creditor makes another advance of $15,000, which is totally unsecured. On
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The fifth exception protects secured creditors with a "floating lien" in in-
ventory or a receivable, or their proceeds. Under a floating lien, individual
units of collateral are substituted on an ongoing basis. This exception pro-
tects secured creditors whose security interests in inventory or accounts in-
cludes after-acquired property pursuant to section 9-204 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.27' As used in section 547, inventory includes "farm products
such as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease." ' 272 Without this exception,
the substitution of inventory or accounts could be characterized as a preferential
transfer. This exception applies to secured creditors with floating liens in in-
ventory or accounts who do not improve their position within the ninety days
preceding bankruptcy.2 73 To determine if the creditor has improved his posi-
tion, it is necessary to analyze the creditor's position at two points: ninety
days before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition and on the date
of bankruptcy. If the creditor improves his position, a voidable preference
has occurred to the extent that the deficiency of the collateral to pay the
outstanding loan is less at bankruptcy than it was ninety days before the
bankruptcy. 274 In addition, the decrease in the deficiency must be prejudicial
to unsecured creditors. 2"
Section 547(c) includes two further transfers that are not avoidable
preferences. The fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section
545 is not considered a preference. 276 In addition, the 1984 Code amendments
added a new exception. When an individual debtor with primarily consumer
debts files bankruptcy, a transfer is not an avoidable preference when "the
aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer
is less than $600. 1277
September 25, debtor files a bankruptcy petition. The repayment on August 1 was a preferential
transfer, but under section 547(c)(4) the trustee can only recover $10,000 because creditor's advance
on September I replenished the estate and is offset against the preferential transfer of August 1.
271. Id. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. II 1984). See U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (1972). See also U.C.C. § 9-108,
which specifies when after acquired property is deemed to be taken for new value and is not
security for an antecedent debt. Insofar as section 9-108 conflicts with bankruptcy law, it is revelant.
272. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(1) (1982). Note, however, that under the U.C.C., crops or livestock
in the possession of the debtor farmer are "farm products." They are not inventory. U.C.C.
§ 9-i09(3).
273. Id. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. It 1984). For creditors who are insiders, the period is one year.
Id. § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii).
274. Id. For example, suppose that ninety days (or one year, in the case of an insider) before
bankruptcy, a $50,000 debt was secured by a floating lien on collateral worth $40,000. Suppose
also that at bankruptcy the debt remained $50,000 and the collateral was worth $45,000. Under these
facts, the creditor has improved his position; the debt exceeded the collateral by $10,000 at ninety
days before bankruptcy, but only by $5,000 at bankruptcy. Thus, there has been a $5,000 voidable
preference to that creditor. Fluctuations in the value of collateral on dates between the two points
of analysis are irrelevant to the determination of whether the creditor has improved his position.
275. Id. For the suggestion that section 547 is not a "potent weapon" against inventory and
accounts lenders, see Ross, The Impact of Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code upon Secured
and Unsecured Creditors, 69 MINN. L. REv. 39, 57-63 (1984).
276. I1 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (Supp. 11 1984).
277. Id. § 547(c)(7).
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The "floating lien" exception in section 547 may raise some issues when
a creditor has a security interest in the farmer's crops or livestock. "" The
nature of such agricultural collateral makes it entirely possible that the value
of the collateral will increase between the ninetieth day before bankruptcy
and the date of bankruptcy, thereby reducing the creditor's deficiency.279 These
changes arise from two related situations: increases in market value of the
agricultural commodity and natural increases in the commodities themselves.
The question of an increase in value may arise when crops subject to a
perfected security interest are harvested within the ninety-day period preceding
bankruptcy, or when market fluctuations increase the value of those crops.
Agricultural lenders hesitate to assign specific value to crops still in the field.
Thus the dramatic increase in value at harvest, it might be argued, improves
the secured creditor's position and is a voidable preference. At least one com-
mentator has argued vigorously against this interpretation.1 0 Although the
creditor's position has been improved, there has been no "transfer" as re-
quired by section 547(a) because the debtor has made no disposition of the
property.2"' Moreover, no prejudice to general creditors has occurred, 8 and
no bankruptcy policies have been contravened. It is difficult to imagine that
the increase in crop value that occurs at harvest is the type of improvement
in position that Congress intended the trustee to recover for the benefit of
general creditors.
This analysis was supported by a recent decision, In re Nivens,82 in which
the trustee had alleged that the increase in value of crops constituted a preferen-
tial transfer. The bankruptcy court rejected this argument and recognized the
unique nature of crops as inventory. Although the crops normally increase
in value between their embryonic stages and maturity, a security interest
represents the same lien on the same crop.28 The court noted that "if there
is only an increase in value of the inventory due to market fluctuations, without
an accompanying increase in volume of inventory, there is no avoidable
preference."2Is
The question of a natural increase in the collateral may also be relevant
in a farm bankruptcy. For example, livestock subject to a security interest
may continue to breed without regard for the bankruptcy preference period.
The increase in number of animals will result in enhanced value and support
278. These constitute inventory under id. § 547(a)(1) (1982).
279. Id. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. I 1984).
280. See Clark, Preferences Under the Old and New Bankruptcy Acts, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 154,
180 (1979). See also Mann & Philips, Floating Liens as Preferential Transfers Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 85 CoM. L.J. 7 (1980).
281. CLARK, supra note 280, at 180. See 11 U.SC. § 101(48) (Supp. H 1984).
282. This presumption, of course, ignores the cost of harvest. On the formula for ascertaining
whether general creditors have suffered prejudice, see Professor Kripke's remarks quoted in I
REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 210 (1973).
283. (First State Bank v. Holder), 22 Bankr. 287 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
284. Id. at 293.
285. Id.
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the argument that the secured creditor's position has improved. In re Fair-
child,'2 6 which involved a creditor's security interest in hogs, addressed this
issue. Pigs were born during the bankruptcy preference period, enhancing the
value of the lender's collateral. In addition, the hogs' value increased as they
continued to eat and grew closer to market weight. In this situation, the court
recognized, no transfer resulted. It was "the very nature of the collateral to
increase in value. '2 7 Indeed, the terms of the credit arrangement are likely
to anticipate this natural increase in value, for example, by including progeny
as collateral.
Section 549-Postpetition Transfers
The above discussion of avoiding powers has focused on transfers made
prior to bankruptcy. In some instances, however, the debtor's property may
have been transferred, by the debtor or another entity, after the initiation
of bankruptcy. The Code gives the trustee the power to avoid certain of these
postpetition transfers. Section 549 permits the trustee to avoid transfers of
property of the estate that occur after the commencement of the case, if those
transfers are not authorized by the Code. 288 In addition, the trustee can avoid
postpetition transfers of estate property that are authorized only by section
303(f) or section 542(c) of the Code.28 9 But special protection is granted to
section 303(f) creditors.
Section 303(f), which applies in involuntary cases, could be of special
relevance to a farmer. If creditors file an involuntary petition against a farm
debtor, who must establish his status as a farmer to defeat the involuntary
petition, the debtor will be concerned with his ability to control his operation
until the order for relief is granted or denied. Section 303(f) gives a debtor
in this situation the authority needed to continue to control his operation free
of any restrictions.2 90 Creditors would refuse to deal with such a farmer, if
any transactions authorized by section 303(f) could be avoided by section
549(a). Thus section 549(b) provides for protection of section 303(f) trans-
actions that occur after the case is filed but before any order for relief, to
the extent they are made for fair postpetition value.29 ' Without section 549(b)
protection for creditors, the capacity of the farmer to challenge an involun-
tary petition would be severely reduced.
The trustee can also avoid postpetition transfers authorized by section 542(c).
Section 542(c) allows an entity with no actual knowledge or notice of the com-
286. Fairchild v. Lebanon Prod. Credit Ass'n, 31 Bankr. 789 (Bankr S.D. Ohio 1983).
287. Id. at 794. See also 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
288. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(l)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
289. Id. § 549(a)(2)(A) (Supp. I1 1984).
290. "Notwithstanding section 363 [dealing with use, sale, or lease of property], . . . the debtor
may continue to use, acquire, or dispose of property as if an involuntary case concerning the
debtor had not been commenced." Id. § 303(0 (1982).
291. "[To the extent any value, including services, but not including satisfaction or securing
of a debt that arose before the commencement of the case, is given ... in exchange for such
transfer." Id. § 549(b) (1982).
19851
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mencement of a case involving the debtor to transfer property of the estate
or pay a debt owed to the debtor to another entity besides the trustee without
incurring any liability to the estate.2 92 Although under section 542(c) the
transferor is not liable, section 549(a) permits the trustee to hold the transferee
liable for what he has received.
The Code also places limits on the trustee's power under section 549(a)
to avoid postpetition transfers of real property. The trustee may not avoid
a transfer of real estate to a good faith purchaser without knowledge of the
commencement of the case and for present fair equivalent value, or to a pur-
chaser at a judicial sale of real property located outside the county in which
the case is commenced. These transfers may be avoided, however, if a copy
of the bankruptcy petition is filed in the recording office of the county where
the real property is located before the transfer is perfected as against a bona
fide purchaser. 293 In addition, if the trustee avoids a transfer simply because
the transfer was for less than present fair equivalent value, the good faith
purchaser without knowledge of the commencement of the case has a lien
on the property to the extent of any present value given, unless a copy of
the petition was filed before the transfer was perfected.
2 94
Section 553-Setoffs
As a general rule, the Code does not affect any right of a creditor to offset
a mutual debt as long as both the debt and the credit arose before the com-
mencement of the case. 295 Of course, the right of the creditor to use the setoff
is stayed under section 362 when a bankruptcy petition is filed.2 96 Although
the trustee normally cannot recover or avoid a setoff,297 some requirements
qualify the right to setoff. First, the creditor's claim must be allowable.
2'1
Second, the claim must not have been transferred to the creditor (by someone
other than the debtor) after the commencement of the case, or within ninety
days before the date of the filing of the petition while the debtor was in-
solvent. 299 Finally, the debt owed to the debtor must not have been incurred
by the creditor within ninety days before the date of the filing of the petition,
while the debtor was insolvent, and for the purpose of obtaining a right of
setoff against the debtor.30 These requirements prevent the creditorwho off-
292. Id. § 542(c) (1982). See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
293. 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (Supp. 11 1984).
294. Id.
295. Id. § 553(a) (Supp. 11 1984). In Framingham Winery, Inc. v. J.A.G., Inc. (In re J.A.G.,
Inc.), 7 Bankr. 624 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980), the court held that when the creditor's liability
to pay rent to the debtor did not accrue until after the bankruptcy petition was filed, the mutuality
of obligation at the time of filing necessary for setoff did not exist.
296. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (Supp. I 1984). See id. § 506(a), regarding the creditor's secured
claim to the extent of the amount subject to setoff.
297. Id. § 553(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
298. Id. § 553(a)(1).
299. Id. § 553(a)(2) (1982).
300. Id. § 553(a)(3).
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sets a debt from eluding preference law. A debtor is presumed to be insolvent
during the ninety days preceding bankruptcy.3"'
The trustee has the power to avoid a setoff that occurred on or within ninety
days before bankruptcy, to the extent that the creditor improved his position
because of the setoff." 2 The two relevant dates for the analysis of the creditor's
position are the ninetieth day before bankruptcy and the date of the setoff.
30 3
This power to recover from the creditor is similar to the trustee's power to
avoid a floating lien preference under section 547(c)(5).
Section 546(c)-The Seller's Right of Reclamation
In section 546, the Code places some limits on the trustee's avoiding powers.
One limitation relevant in a farm bankruptcy is found in section 546(c). Pur-
suant to section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the seller has the
right to reclaim goods sold to an insolvent debtor within 10 days of the debtor's
receipt of the goods."' Under section 546(c) this statutory right of reclama-
tion enjoys some protection from the trustee's avoiding powers.310 Generally,
the trustee cannot avoid any transfer made under the seller's right of reclama-
tion by using powers under section 544(a) (the strong-arm clause), section
545 (statutory liens), section 547 (preferential transfers), or section 549
(postpetition transfers).30 6 For a seller to exercise the right of reclamation,
however, the sale must be in the ordinary course of the seller's business, and
the seller must demand reclamation in writing within ten days after the deb-
tor's receipt of the goods. 7 The court may deny actual reclamation of the
goods, but must grant the seller an administrative expense priority or secure
the seller's claim with a lien.308
Section 550-Liability of Transferees of Avoided Transfers
As the above discussion has indicated, the trustee (or the debtor in posses-
sion) has broad authority to avoid many types of prebankruptcy and postpeti-
tion transfers of property of the debtor or the estate. Section 550 of the Code
is essential to the successful application of the avoiding powers because it
authorizes the trustee to recover property for the benefit of the estate from
301. Id. § 553(c).
302. Id. § 553(b)(1) (Supp. H 1984).
303. Id.
304. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1972).
305. The protection extends also to a common law right of reclamation. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)
(Supp. I 1984). Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act:
Resolution or Renewal of an Old Conflict?, 33 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1 (1980); Weintraub &
Edelman, Seller's Right to Reclaim Property Under Section 2-702(2) of the Code Under the
Bankruptcy Act: Fact or Fancy, 32 Bus. LAW. 1165 (1977).
306. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (Supp. 11 1984).
307. Id.
308. Id. § 546(c)(2). See id. § 503(b) (1982 & Supp. H 1984). Section 546(c) does not alter
a trustee's power under section 544(b) to avoid a transfer made through a seller's reclamation.
Thus the trustee could still avoid a reclamation voidable under state law by a general unsecured
creditor.
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transferees." 9 The trustee may recover the property transferred (or on court
order, the value of the property) from the initial transferee or from the entity
for whose benefit the transfer was made.310 Alternatively, the trustee may
recover from any immediate or successive transferee of the initial transferee,
but not if that transferee takes for value (including satisfaction or securing
of a present or antecedent debt), in good faith, and without knowledge of
the voidability of the transfer avoided. 32 If the trustee recovers from a good
faith transferee, that transferee receives a lien on the property. The lien secures
the lesser of the cost of any improvements made after transfer decreased by
the amount of any profit realized from the property, 32 and any increases
in value of the transferred property as a result of the improvement." ' The
trustee who recovers transferred property is only entitled to a single satisfac-
tion 4.31
Section 550 and an interrelated provision, in section 522(g), could be crucial
if the debtor is to receive all the exemptions to which he is entitled. For
example, a trustee in a Chapter 7 liquidation case might want to include all
the property recovered through the avoiding powers in the assets to be
distributed to creditors, even though some of the property may also qualify
for an exemption. But section 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property that
the trustee has recovered under various sections, including property recovered
under section 550, if the debtor did not voluntarily transfer the property and
if the debtor did not conceal th6 transfer.2 ' Because section 550 includes prop-
erty recovered under most'of the trustee's avoiding powers, the debtor has
power to claim as exempt the property recovered for the estate from avoided
transfers.
In addition, if the trustee does not attempt to avoid a transfer recoverable
under sections 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 553 regarding setoffs, the debtor
himself can avoid the transfer to the extent that he could exempt that prop-
erty. 36 In some instances, a trustee might be reluctant to exercise the power
to recover an avoidable transfer if the transfer involved exempt property that
would not augment the estate. Under section 522(h), the debtor has the power
to avoid the transfer and recover the exempt property.
III. Chapter 7: Liquidation
A farmer whose financial condition leaves no choice other than liquidation
309. Id. § 550(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The power applies to transfers avoided under sec-
tions 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a).
310. Id. § 550(a)(1).
311. Id. §§ 550(a)(2) and 550(b)(1). Under section 550(b)(2), the trustee cannot recover from
an immediate or mediate good faith transferee of the subsection (a)(2) transferee.
312. "Improvement" is defined broadly. Id. § 550(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
313. Id. § 550(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
314. Id. § 550(c) (1982).
315. Id. § 522(g). Also included is property recovered under sections 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 551,
and 553.
316. Id. § 522(h).
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of the farm business will use Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. This Chapter
is appropriate for the farmer who can negotiate no further with creditors and
who faces personal property repossessions, mortgage foreclosures, and judicial
actions seeking judgments on debts. Ultimately, these often lengthy and com-
plex proceedings may liquidate the farmer's operation. But even after his prop-
erty is gone, the farmer may remain liable on judgments that he does not
have the assets to satisfy. Thus the farmer may look at Chapter 7 because
most debts remaining after the proceeds of the estate are distributed will be
discharged.
31 7
Chapter 7 proceedings are relatively quick and efficient, because the various
claims against the debtor are resolved in a single forum. Moreover, despite
their adverse interests, creditors generally benefit from the orderly procedure
of bankruptcy, which frees creditors from the need to act hastily and
aggressively to foreclose or collect ahead of other creditors. A Chapter 7
bankruptcy may benefit the secured creditor in particular because it offers
protection from self-help measures taken by unsecured creditors or by secured
creditors with conflicting liens. In addition, the bankruptcy proceeding may
offer a more efficient and less expensive forum in which to pursue a secured
claim.
The Farm Debtor's Role in Chapter 7
A farmer commences a case under Chapter 7 by filing a voluntary petition3 '
and paying a filing fee of $60. 3'9 A farmer who has initiated a case under
Chapter 7 is not bound to liquidate. Instead, the debtor maintains the right
to convert the case to a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 proceeding at any time.
32 °
The debtor's role in a Chapter 7 liquidation is rather limited. Section 521
of the Code lists five duties of Chapter 7 debtors. First, the debtor must file
a list of creditors; unless otherwise ordered, there must also be a schedule
of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and expenses, and a
statement of financial affairs.32 ' Second, the debtor who has consumer debts
secured by property of the estate has special responsibilities to indicate his
intentions regarding retention or surrender of the property, exemption and
redemption, or reaffirmation of the debts secured by the property. The debtor
must indicate these intentions within thirty days of the bankruptcy petition,
or by the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, and perform
317. See supra text accompanying notes 44-54.
318. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
319. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (1982). The filing fee may be paid in installments. See BANKR. R. PRAc.
& PROC. 1006 and Official Forms 2 and 3.
320. 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1982). A debtor who discovers that discharge is not available under
Chapter 7 may want to convert to Chapter 11 or Chapter 13. See infra text accompanying notes
381-628 and 629-676 on Chapters 11 and 13. But the debtor has only one chance to convert
the case. A case already converted to Chapter 7 under sections 1112 or 1307 cannot be reconverted.
Id. § 706(a).
321. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (Supp. II 1984). See also BANK. R. PRAc. & PROC. 1007. See supra
text accompanying notes 39-43.
19851
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the intentions within forty-five days after the notice of intent.2 2 Third, the
debtor must cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to
perform his duties.2 3 Fourth, the debtor must surrender to the trustee all
property of his estate and any recorded information (books, documents,
records, and papers) relating to property of the estate.3 24 Fifth, the debtor
must appear at the discharge hearing required under section 524(d).
32'
In addition, pursuant to section 343, the debtor must appear and be
examined under oath at the meeting of creditors prescribed by section 341(a).12 6
Attendance at this meeting is restricted. The bankruptcy judge is not per-
mitted to preside over, or even attend, the meeting of creditors. 2 7 This provi-
sion ensures the impartiality of the judge, who may later be asked to resolve
objections to discharge that arose at the meeting. 32 The scope of the examina-
tion at the meeting of creditors includes all questions relating to the financial
affairs of the debtor.329 The debtor who invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination at the meeting can receive use immunity.
330
Assuming that no objections to discharge are sustained, the debtor will
receive a discharge sixty days after the section 341 meeting. 3 For most pur-
poses, this is the end of the case for the debtor. The debtor will have sur-
rendered his property to the trustee, exempt property will have been set apart
for the debtor, and the property of the estate will be available for distribu-
322. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. I 1984).
323. Id. § 521(3).
324. Id. § 521(4). The debtor must surrender the property regardless of whether he receives
use immunity under section 344 of the Code.
325. Id. § 521(5).
326. Id. § 343 (Supp. 11 1984). The meeting of creditors must be held a reasonable time after
an order for relief in a case. Id. § 341 (1982). In a voluntary bankruptcy, the order for relief
is automatic upon the commencement of the case. The section 341(a) requirement of a meeting
of creditors also applies to cases filed under Chapters 11 and 13.
The bankruptcy court may also order a meeting of all equity security holders. Id. § 341(b).
Section 101(15) (1982) defines an equity security as:
(A) share in a corporation, whether or not transferable or denominated "stock,"
or similar security;
(B) interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership; or
(C) warrant or right, other than a right to convert, to purchase, sell, or subscribe
to a share, security, or interest of a kind specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
this paragraph; ...
An "equity security holder" is the "holder of an equity security of the debtor." Id. § 101(16).
327. Id. § 341(c).
328. Aaron, supra note 32, at 226.
329. Id.
330. 11 U.S.C. § 344 (1982). See also 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
The issue of use immunity arises most frequently in bankruptcy because of the debtor's refusal
to file the required schedules. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 344.03[l] (L. King, 15th ed. 1979).
The debtor, for example, may have refused to file the required schedules because he fraudulently
concealed property prior to bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court must decide whether the debtor
has reasonable grounds to believe that his answer may incriminate him. Id. 344.03[l].
331. Bankr. Rule 4004(a) and (c). On discharge, see supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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tion to creditors. 332 The debtor may receive a discharge even before property
is distributed to the creditors.
Although a discharge is generally available to the individual debtor, a debtor
may not desire the discharge of a debt. The farmer who believes that a par-
ticular creditor will be essential to his fresh start after bankruptcy may want
to cultivate the good will of that creditor. In addition, the farmer may not
want the discharge of a debt to a relative or a debt on which a friend or
relative is a cosigner. To accommodate these situations, the Code permits debt-
ors to reaffirm their debts under certain circumstances. Any agreement to
reaffirm a debt must be entered before the discharge is granted.33 Further-
more, the debtor may rescind the reaffirmation agreement within sixty days
or any time before discharge. 334 The attorney representing the debtor must
declare that the debtor's agreement was voluntary, based on full disclosure,
and that it does not impose undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent.335
When the debtor is an individual, the Code offers special protection against
hasty reaffirmation. The court must hold a hearing regarding the discharge,
and the debtor must appear.33 6 At this hearing, the court informs the debtor
why the discharge has been granted or denied. 337 If the debtor wants to enter
into a reaffirmation agreement, the judge must inform the debtor that reaf-
firmation agreements are not required under bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy
law, and must explain the legal, effect and consequences of both the agree-
ment and default. 338 If the individual debtor was not represented by an attorney
during negotiation of a reaffirmation agreement and the debt being reaffirmed
is not secured by real property, additional protection is mandated. The court
must approve the agreement as being in the best interest of the debtor and
not imposing undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent.
3 9
The Creditors and the Trustee in Chapter 7
Immediately after the farmer has filed a Chapter 7 petition, the court
appoints an interim trustee, who serves until election of the permanent
trustee. 340 The creditors have the authority to elect a permanent trustee at
the meeting held pursuant to section 341 of the Code.34 ' The creditors may
elect any individual to serve as trustee in the farmer's case, as long as the
332. See infra text accompanying notes 360-379.
333. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
334. Id. § 524(c)(2).
335. Id. § 524(c)(3).
336. Id. § 524(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
337. Id.
338. Id. § 524(d)(1).
339. Id. §§ 524(c)(6), (d)(2). The 1984 Bankruptcy Code amendments made it somewhat easier
for creditors to get reaffirmation agreements from consumers. See id. §§ 524(c) and (d) (1982)
(preamendment).
340. Id. §§ 701(a), (b) (1982).
341. Id. § 702 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Section 702(a) lists qualifications of creditors who
may vote for trustee.
1985]
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elected individual is qualified"4 2 and bonded. 3 If the creditors fail to elect
a trustee, the interim trustee appointed by the court will serve for the dura-
tion of the case.
4 4
The trustee plays an extremely important part in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
The trustee is the official representative of the debtor's estate. " , As such,
the trustee collects and reduces to money the assets of the estate; he must
close the estate expeditiously, but with consideration for the best interests
of the parties.34 6 The trustee must account for all property received and in-
vestigate the financial affairs of the debtor. 47 Additional duties may include
examining proof of claims and, if any purpose would be served, objecting
to the allowance of any improper claim.34 8 The trustee may also oppose the
discharge of the debtor.34 9 Ultimately, the trustee must make a final report
and file a final account of the administration of the debtor's estate with the
court.
310
As the nature of these duties suggests, the trustee's major responsibility
focuses on maximizing the property of the estate for creditors. The interests
of the creditors will not always coincide with the best interests of the debtor.
Accordingly, the farm debtor must ensure that his interests are represented
by his own attorney.
In Chapter 7 cases, the creditors may choose to assume an additional role.
At their section 341 meeting the creditors may elect a creditors' committee,
consisting of three to eleven creditors, each holding an allowable unsecured
claim of a kind entitled to distribution. 35 ' This elected committee may consult
with the trustee in connection with the administration of the case, make recom-
mendations to the trustee about the performance of his duties, and submit
to the court any question that affects administration of the estate."'
Naturally, creditors also hope to participate in the ultimate distribution of
the Chapter 7 estate. When the Chapter 7 petition is filed, the "automatic
stay" prevents secured creditors from proceeding against property subject to
liens and unsecured creditors from collecting on their claims. 3 After the debtor
342. Id. § 321. A person who has also served as an examiner in the case is disqualified from
serving as trustee. Id. § 321(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
A natural person or a corporation may act as trustee. A corporation must be authorized to
act as trustee in its charter or bylaws, and must have an office in or adjacent to the district
where the case is pending. Id. § 321(a) (1982).
343. Id. § 322 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The court determines the original amount of bond.
A proceeding on a trustee's bond must be commenced within two years after the trustee was
discharged.
344. Id. § 702(d) (Supp. 11 1984).
345. Id. § 323(a) (1982).
346. Id. § 704(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
347. Id. §§ 704(2), (4).
348. Id. § 704(5).
349. Id. § 704(6).
350. Id. § 704(9). See also subsections (3), (7), and (8) for additional duties.
351. Id. § 705(a) (1982). See BAN R. R. PRAC. & PROC. 2003(b)(1).
352. 11 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1982).
353. See supra text accompanying notes 67-105 for an explanation of the automatic stay.
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files a list of creditors pursuant to section 521, 354 notice is sent to those creditors
who are listed.3"1 An unsecured creditor who wants to participate in the ultimate
distribution of the estate must file a proof of claim. 356 Distribution of the
assets of the estate is made only to creditors whose claims are allowed.
357
Unless an objection is entered, a claim for which proof has been filed is
allowed. 3 8 If an objection is made, then the court must determine the allowable
amount of such claim as of the date of the filing of the petition.
359
Distribution of the Estate
The heart of a Chapter 7 liquidation is the process by which the trustee
distributes proceeds from the sale of the farm debtor's property (that is, the
property of the estate) to creditors with allowed claims. This distribution
follows strict statutory guidelines. Moreover, not all property of the estate
is available for distribution to creditors. Some property will have been set
aside to the debtor as exempt property, 360 and some proceeds of the estate
will be used to satisfy administrative expenses of the bankruptcy proceeding.
36'
Creditors who have allowed secured claims are assured of receiving the full
value of their claims. 362 Secured claimants are satisfied before the trustee
distributes property of the estate to general creditors. 363 A secured claim exists
if the creditor has a lien on property of the estate. But a creditor's claim
is secured only to the extent of the value of the creditor's interest in the prop-
erty. A creditor may be partially secured if the value of the creditor's claim
exceeds the value of the collateral. In such a case, the creditor has a secured
claim to the extent of the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for
the balance. 3" A creditor who has loaned money on farmland at inflated values
354. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (Supp. 11 1984). See also Bankr. Rule 1007.
355. 11 U.S.C. § 342 (Supp. 11 1984).
356. Id. § 501(a) (1982). The debtor or trustee may file proof of the creditor's claim, if the
creditor does not file it on time. Id. § 501(c).
357. Id. § 726(a)(2).
358. Id. § 502(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
359. Id. § 502(b) (Supp. 11 1984). Section 502(b)(l)-(8) lists some limitations on allowable
claims. Subsection (b)(6) may be particularly relevant in some farm bankruptcies. It limits the
size of an allowable claim of a lessor for damages from termination of a lease of real property.
Damages are limited to rent reserved for the greater of one year, or 15 percent of the lease
term (not exceeding three years). These periods follow the earlier of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition or the date on which the lessor repossessed (or the lessee surrendered) the property.
In addition, damages may include unpaid rent due under the lease. Id. §§ 502(b)(6)(A), (B).
360. See supra text accompanying notes 130-93.
361. See infra text accompanying note 367.
362. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. I 1984). Moreover, if the value of the collateral exceeds the
amount of the claim, the claimant may receive interest, plus reasonable fees, costs, or charges
provided for in the loan agreement. Id.
363. Id. § 725.
364. Id. § 506(a) (1982). Under section 506(c), the trustee may recover from the collateral
the reasonable, necessary expenses of preserving or disposing of the property, to the extent of
the benefit to the holder of the claim. Id. § 506(c).
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may be in this situation when the farmer goes bankrupt, particularly if declining
farmland values have reduced the value of the collateral below the outstand-
ing balance of the debt owed to that lender.
After setting aside property subject to liens, 36- the trustee distributes the
proceeds of the estate in the order prescribed by the Code. In section 726(a),
the Code specifies six classes of claimants, including the debtor as the last
class. Under this statutory scheme, each class must be paid in full before
members of the next class receive any distribution. Moreover, if the property
of the estate is insufficient to satisfy an entire class, creditors within the class
share in the available property on a pro-rata basis. 6
The section 726 scheme gives first place to claims specified in section 507.
Section 507 establishes the bankruptcy priorities that must be paid before any
other unsecured claimants receive proceeds of the estate.3 67 Under section 507,
first priority is assigned to administrative expenses and fees and charges against
the estate. 3 8 Second priority applies in involuntary cases and has limited
relevance in farm bankruptcies.3 6 9 It covers unsecured claims arising in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business after commencement of the case but
before the appointment of a trustee or the order for relief, whichever is
earlier.37" Third and fourth priorities focus on the claims of employees. Allowed
unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commissions earned by an individual
within ninety days of the filing of the petition (or the cessation of the deb-
tor's business, if that occurred first) receive priority, up to $2,000 for each
365. Id. § 725 (Supp. 11 1984). Under section 552(a) of the Code, property acquired by the
estate or the debtor after commencement of the case is not subject to prepetition security in-
terests. Section 552(b) provides an exception to this general rule for security interests extending
to proceeds, products, and offspring of prepetition property. On the effect of section 552(b)
on milk produced after filing, see Pigeon v. Prod. Credit Ass'n of Minot (In re Pigeon), 49
Bankr. 657 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (milk was newly acquired property). Contra, In re Nielsen,
48 Bankr. 274 (D.N.D. 1984). Pigeon noted that the district court deciding Nielsen did not con-
sider the legislative history of section 552(b).
366. Id. § 726(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
367. Subordination may change the order of priorities and may also affect liens. The Code
requires enforcement of subordination agreements that are enforceable under nonbankruptcy
law. Id. § 510(a) (1982). Moreover, after notice and a hearing, the court may order equitable
subordination. The court may subordinate all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another
allowed claim, or may transfer a lien securing a subordinated claim to the estate. Id. § 510(c).
Generally, a showing of fraud or inequitable conduct is required before the court can order
equitable subordination. Katz v. Department of Justice (In re Bellucci), 29 Bankr. 814, 815 (Bankr.
1st Cir. 1983). A farm lender that manipulates the farmer's financial status to its own advantage
and to the detriment of other creditors may be vulnerable to a decision subordinating its claims.
See In re Osborne, 42 Bankr. 988 (W.D. Wis. 1984), in which a PCA that was an operating
lender of a Chapter 7 farm debtor was subordinated to a feed supplier because of its inequitable
conduct toward the supplier.
368. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982). Under section 507(b) some creditors may enjoy a superpriority.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 21-34.
370. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2), 502(0 (1982). See also section 502(d), which disallows certain
claims from a postpetition transferee subject to sections 549 and 550, unless the transferee has
turned over property for which it is liable to the trustee. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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individual. 7 In addition, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an
employee benefit plan, for services within 180 days of the petition or cessa-
tion of business, receive limited priority.372 The fifth priority under section
507(a) is new, having been added in 1984. It applies when the debtor owns
or operates a grain storage facility. Each individual with an allowed unsecured
claim for grain or grain proceeds against the debtor has a priority, but only
to the extent of $2,000. 313 Sixth priority applies to individuals who have made
deposits, of up to $900, for purchase of property or services for personal,
family, or household use.3 7' The seventh priority focuses on unsecured tax
claims of governmental units.
3
1
5
When a farm debtor's property is liquidated under Chapter 7, these priority
claims will be paid first under section 726. After the priority claimants are
paid in full, general creditors without priority receive payment. Creditors
holding allowed unsecured claims that were filed on time receive payment
after the section 507(a) priorities. 3716 These creditors are followed by the
creditors with allowed unsecured claims that were filed late.377 Next, claims
representing fines, penalties, forfeitures, or punitive damages (that is, claims
not representing actual pecuniary loss to the creditor) are paid. 378 Next, the
trustee may pay postpetition interest on prepetition claims.3 79 Finally, if any
property remains after all claimants have been paid, the debtor receives the
property.38
0
IV. Chapter 11: Reorganization
Every farmer who faces financial difficulty may not view liquidation under
Chapter 7 as the only possible option. Those farmers who believe that their
operation could survive, given some restructuring of debt and perhaps new
management strategies, may prefer to reorganize the farm business using
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11 involves a number of the
concepts already discussed, such as the automatic stay and the power to avoid
prebankruptcy transfers. But under Chapter 11, the farmer will generally con-
tinue to operate the business as the "debtor in possession." 38' The Code gives
the farmer special opportunities to continue to use the farm property and
371. Id. § 507(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
372. Id. § 507(a)(4). The priority for each employee benefit plan is limited to the number
of employees multiplied by $2,000, less the aggregate amount paid to such employees under sec-
tion 507(a)(3) and the aggregate amount paid by the estate to any other benefit plan.
373. Id. § 507(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1984). Other provisions for grain storage facility bankruptcy
have also been added. See id. §§ 546(d), 557.
374. Id. § 507(a)(6).
375. Id. § 507(a)(7).
376. Id. § 726(a)(2) (1982).
377. Id. § 726(a)(3). Bankr. Rule 3002(c) establishes the time limit for proofs of claim in Chapter
7.
378. Id. § 726(a)(4).
379. Id. § 726(a)(5).
380. Id. § 726(a)(6).
381. Id. § 1101(1).
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to obtain credit. Ultimately, the goal for the Chapter 11 farm debtor is to
devise a workable plan of reorganization that will be confirmed by the creditors
and that will allow continued operation of the farm business."'
The Chapter 11 debtor initiates the bankruptcy proceeding by filing a peti-
tion.3"3 Chapter 11 requires a filing fee of $200.84 The farmer who has filed
under Chapter 11 has specific duties to perform. These, which have already
been discussed in connection with Chapter 7,3s1 are listed in section 521 of
the Code. In addition, the farmer must attend the meeting of creditors pre-
scribed by section 341. The significant role of the creditors in a Chapter 11
case will be discussed below in connection with the reorganization plan.3 '
Normally, the debtor remains in control and possession of his farming opera-
tion throughout the Chapter 11 proceeding. A trustee need not be appointed.
Indeed, the debtor in possession exercises most of the powers of the trustee. 81 7
Nonetheless, at the request of a party in interest, the court may appoint a
trustee who can operate the debtor's farm.388 Fraud, dishonesty, incompetence,
or gross mismanagement of the debtor's affairs will justify appointment. 9
In addition, the court can appoint a trustee if appointment is in the interest
of creditors, equity security holders, or other interests of the estate.3 90 If a
trustee is not appointed, the court also has the authority to appoint an examiner
to investigate the debtor.3 9' The appointment of a trustee does not signal the
debtor's permanent loss of control of his operation. At any time before con-
firmation of a plan, the court may terminate the trustee's appointment and
restore the debtor to possession and management of the estate property and
operation of the farm business.
3 92
382. See generally Landers, supra note 200; Anderson & Rainach, Farmer Reorganizations
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 28 Loy. L. REV. 439 (1982).
383. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
384. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (1982). The court can dismiss a case under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). See,
e.g., In re Anderson, 52 Bankr. 159 (D.N.D. 1985) (unrealistic farm reorganization plan is cause
for dismissal).
385. See supra text accompanying notes 321-326.
386. See infra text accompanying notes 567-584.
387. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
388. Id. § 1108.
389. Id. § 1104(a)(l) (1982). The trustee's duties are set out in section 1106 (1982 & Supp.
11 1984).
390. Id. § 1104(a)(2) (1982). For cases in which the facts justified appointing a trustee, see,
e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.),
4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Trustees of Central States SE &
SW Areas Pension Fund (In re Hotel Assocs., Inc.), 3 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980);
Dardarian v. LaSherene, Inc. (In re LaSherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
391. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1982).
392. Id. § 1105 (Supp. 11 1984). In the case of In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 Bankr. 506
(Bankr. D. Utah 1981), the court refused to use its powers under sections 1105 and 1108 to
interfere with the trustee's operation of the debtor's farm. The debtor, an agribusiness, owned
a 24,000-acre farm in northern Utah and southern Idaho. The farm's principal crops were alfalfa,
hay, alfalfa seed, barley, and wheat. The trustee decided to substitute hay baling for hay cubing.
The debtor objected, arguing that baling was an agronomically unsound method that would result
in a $500,000 loss of crop proceeds, and would defeat the debtor's opportunity to confirm a
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The Interim Period
Although the ultimate goal of Chapter 11 is the confirmation and successful
completion of a reorganization plan, the debtor will normally continue to
operate the farm business during the time after the petition is filed and before
the plan is negotiated and confirmed. During this interim period, the debtor
needs protection from aggressive creditors, authority to use property of the
estate, and aid in obtaining the credit necessary to continue farming.
Section 363-Use, Sale, or Lease of Property of the Estate
Use of Estate Property
When the debtor files a bankruptcy petition, section 362 operates to im-
pose an automatic stay on creditors' efforts to collect on their claims.393 But
that section does no more than stay creditors; it does not authorize the deb-
tor to continue to use the encumbered property that makes up the estate.
The debtor in possession does, however, have authority to continue to operate
the farm business.3 94 Moreover, section 363(c)(1) gives the debtor in posses-
sion the power to use the property of the estate in the ordinary course of
business without notice or a hearing. 39" In addition, the debtor in possession
has the power to sell or lease property of the estate, in the ordinary course
of business, without notice or a hearing.
396
Thus, under section 363(c), the farmer in Chapter 11 will be able to use
his tractor for spring planting, even though the tractor is subject to a perfected
security interest and despite the fact that each hour of use will reduce the
value of the tractor as collateral. The Code, however, provides two different
mechanisms by which the creditor can protect himself in this situation. 397 The
plan based on cubing. The debtor sought an injunction under section 1108 against the trustee's
substitution of hay baling for hay cubing; in the alternative, the debtor requested under section
1105 that the court terminate the trustee's appointment and restore the debtor to operation of
the farm.
The court denied relief. First, the court held that under section 1108, "[Tlhe court will not
entertain objections to a trustee's conduct of the estate where that conduct involves a business
judgment made in good faith, upon a reasonable basis, and within the scope of his authority
under the Code." 14 Bankr. at 513-14. The court went on to hold that it would not terminate
the trustee's appointment under section 1105 because the debtor did not allege either that the
appointment of the trustee was improvident in light of evidence that was unavailable earlier,
or that a change in circumstances (such as fraud or mismanagement) required the trustee's
termination.
Farm debtors who want to control the operation of their farms should make every effort to
manage their farms carefully so as to avoid the appointment of a trustee. As this case demonstrates,
once appointed, the trustee has extremely wide latitude in the operation of the farm.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 67-105.
394. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
395. Id. § 363(c)(1) (1982).
396. Id.
397. Id. §§ 363(d), (e) (1982 & Supp. H 1984).
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protection is not automatic; the creditor must take affirmative steps to receive
protection.
Section 363(d) states that the right to use, sell, or lease property of the
estate exists only to the extent that it is not inconsistent with any relief that
the court gives from the automatic stay. " 8 Thus, a creditor can seek relief
from the automatic stay under section 362. As earlier discussion has in-
dicated, 00 a creditor may obtain relief from the stay if the creditor lacks ade-
quate protection of his position, as defined in section 36l."°' If the court lifts
the stay, the creditor can foreclose against the collateral (in the example above,
the tractor), removing it from the use of the debtor in possession.
The creditor can also invoke section 363(e), which provides that the court
can prohibit or condition the use, sale, or lease or property of the estate as
necessary to provide adequate protection of the creditor's interest.40 2 The trustee
(or debtor in possession) has the burden of proving that the creditor's interest
is adequately protected °.4 3 The creditor's interest in the collateral, rather than
the collateral itself, must be adequately protected. If the court denies the
creditor's request to prohibit or condition the use of the collateral, and the
protection offered proves to be inadequate, the creditor may receive special
priority for his claim.
40 4
Cash Collateral
An exception to the trustee's power to use, sell, or lease property in the
ordinary course of business is made for "cash collateral." This is defined
broadly to include cash, as well as proceeds, products, or offspring of prop-
erty subject to a security interest. 45 The debtor in possession (or the trustee)
may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral in the ordinary course of business
unless each entity with an interest in the cash collateral consents. Alternatively,
cash collateral can be used if the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes
the use, sale, or lease in accordance with the adequate protection provisions
of section 363(e).4 0 6 Until the debtor in possession (or the trustee) receives
consent or authorization, he must segregate and account for any cash col-
lateral in his possession, custody, or control.40 7 Accordingly, a farm debtor
398. Id. § 363(d) (1982). This section refers to relief granted under sections 362(c), (d), (e), or (f).
399. Id. § 362 (1982 & Supp. N 1984).
400. Adequate protection is discussed more fully supra in text accompanying notes 94-105.
401. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
402. Id. § 363(e) (Supp. I 1984).
403. Id. § 363(o)(1).
404. Id. § 507(b) (1982). This priority, although not as advantageous to a creditor as being
secured, at least places the objecting creditor ahead of all other unsecured claims. Upon liquida.
tion, there may not be anything to distribute to unsecured creditors of any type, in which case
the creditor would have completely lost his collateral.
405. Cash collateral means "cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit
accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other
than the estate have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits
of property subject to a security interest." Id. § 363(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
406. Id. § 363(c)(2) (1982).
407. Id. § 363(c)(4).
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in possession must be extremely careful to identify property that is cash col-
lateral. Cash collateral in the hands of the farmer might include proceeds
of milk, eggs, or livestock for slaughter sold in the ordinary course of business,
warehouse receipts for stored grain, or grain stored on the farm but subject
to a security interest. The farm debtor's use of cash collateral without either
the secured creditor's consent or court authorization may constitute grounds
for court appointment of a trustee.
4
1
8
Nonetheless, farmers who file bankruptcy in the middle of a crop year
usually face bleak prospects of financing future crops. Such a farmer must
often secure either the crop lender's consent or court authorization to retain
proceeds derived from present crops for use in financing future crops.4"9 To
satisfy the section 363(e) requirement of adequate protection, a farmer might
want to offer the crop creditors a lien on crops produced in future years,
until the original crop loan is paid in full."' In this case, the debtor will assert
that the crop lender will receive adequate protection in the form of a lien
on any crops produced from the use of the cash collateral. In addressing
applications for the use of cash collateral, the court must balance two often
"irreconcilable and conflicting interests." 4" The crop lender wants to be paid
back, or at the very least, to receive adequate protection of his interest in
the crop proceeds. But the purpose of Chapter 11 is to rehabilitate debtors.
4 2
Often access to cash collateral is essential for the continued operation of the
farm business. Therefore, the court must implement a "policy of balancing
the competing interests of a debtor who proposes to use secured property
to contribute to the reorganization plan on the one hand, and the creditor
who wishes to retain the value and safety of its security interest on the
other.
' 4 1 3
408. See id. § 1104(a).
409. Anderson & Rainach, supra note 382, at 476.
410. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 5 Bankr. 667 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1980). The debtor was a beekeeper,
and the creditor had a perfected security interest in the debtor's honey crop. By agreement of
the parties, the debtor sold the honey and placed the money in escrow. The court had allowed
the debtor, under section 363(c)(2)(B), to use the cash to purchase bees and beehives, determin-
ing that the transfer of the creditor's security interest to the property purchased by the debtor
and the debtor's 1980 and 1981 honey crops provided the debtor with adequate protection.
The creditor then sought a stay of the court's order, pending appeal. The court denied the
creditor's request, again finding that the transfer of collateral provided the creditor with adequate
protection. It reasoned that:
Debtor's sole business is as a beekeeper. Debtor has no realistic chance of
rehabilitation without being allowed to purchase more bees and beehives. If this
Court stayed execution of its Order until the completion of the appeal, the effect
on the Debtor would probably result in Debtor having to convert to a liquidation
bankruptcy. Debtor cannot economically survive while litigation on this matter con-
tinues for several months or years.
5 Bankr. at 668.
411. In re Stein, 19 Bankr. 458, 459 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982). See generally Kunkel, supra
note 174, at 315-17.
412. In re Heatron, Inc., 6 Bankr. 493, 496 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
413. In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 1985). See also In re Stein, 19 Bankr. 458,
459 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
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Recent cases suggest that it may be difficult for the debtor in possession
to provide adequate protection for the creditor, particularly when the debtor
proposes to use a lien on future crops to provide the protection. Although
section 361 defines adequate protection for purposes of both section 363 and
section 362, reported decisions reflect an important difference. 4 4 Under sec-
tion 363, collateral is being consumed or used up, whereas in the context of
section 362 the creditor's use of the collateral is merely delayed. Therefore,
the standard for adequate protection under section 363 is strict. 4 1 In some
instances, replacement liens in land or other minimally depreciable assets would
be acceptable.46 The creditor must be protected against depreciation in the
value of farmland and farm equipment used as collateral. 4 7 A number of
decisions indicate that "a lien in future crops is not in and of itself adequate
protection. ' 4 8 A replacement lien in livestock to be purchased is slightly more
acceptable, but will not always suffice.419
414. See In re Berens, 41 Bankr. 524, 527-28 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984):
The issue as to adequate protection is a different one in a § 362 motion to lift
the automatic stay. If the stay is not lifted, the creditor still has a security interest
in the bargained for and existing collateral. If the automatic stay is lifted, the creditor
receives the collateral itself. In a cash collateral hearing under § 363, if the Debtor
is allowed to use the cash collateral, the creditor's security-the collateral-is gone.
No longer does the secured party have the asset it originally bargained for as collateral
available to it. If the use of cash collateral is denied, the secured party has the
collateral, or its cash equivalent, in hand or being held for its benefit. In other
words, in an automatic stay situation, the creditor does not lose its collateral; its
possession of the collateral is merely delayed. In an 11 U.S.C. § 363 Motion, the
collateral is actually used up.
415. See In re Polzin, 49 Bankr. 370, 371-72 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); First Bank of Miller
v. Wieseler (In re Wieseler), 45 Bankr. 871, 876 (D.S.D. 1985); In re Berens, 41 Bankr. 524,
528 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
416. First Bank of Miller v. Wieseler (In re Wieseler), 45 Bankr. 871, 876 (D.S.D. 1985).
417. In re Polzin, 49 Bankr. 370 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). Polzin also suggests that adequate
protection includes providing for the direct costs of foreclosure.
418. In re Serbus, 48 Bankr. 5, 9 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Schaller, 27 Bankr. 959 (W.D.
Wis. 1983). See also First Bank of Miller v. Wieseler (In re Wieseler), 45 Bankr. 871, 876 (D.S.D.
1985): "The uncertainties of the weather, crop prices, and all, the other uncertainties inherent
in farming increase the insecurity of a replacement lien solely in crops to be grown."
In Wieseler, the lack of irrigation made the replacement lien in future crops even less accep-
table. 45 Bankr. at 877 n.5. But see In re Sheehan, 38 Bankr. 859, 866 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984)
(the irrigation system was a proven system that had been operating at least three years).
419. In re Serbus, 48 Bankr. 5, 6, 9 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984), involved the offer of a replace-
ment lien in cattle, which did provide adequate protection. The bank had an interest in the debtor's
dairy herd (as well as in some cash resulting from the sale of cows), and crops growing on the
debtor's home farm. The debtor wanted to use the cash and to sell some other cows; as adequate
protection, he offered the bank a replacement lien in the cows he would purchase. The value
of the cows ($24,000) plus the 1984 crop ($10,500) exceeded the debt owed to the bank ($22,230.19).
The bank had an equity cushion and was adequately protected by the existing crop and the replace-
ment lien. But the court refused to permit the sale of the 1984 crop because a replacement lien
in the future crop would not constitute adequate protection because it is too speculative.
See also First Bank of Miller v. Wieseler (In re Wieseler), 45 Bankr. 871, 878 (D.S.D. 1985),
in which the court recognized that a lien on livestock might, in some circumstances, provide
better protection than a lien on anticipated crops. Nonetheless, the court did not accept Wieseler's
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss4/9
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The question of a replacement lien in future crops was addressed recently
by the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota, in a group of
cases that were then appealed to the Eighth Circuit. In In re Berg,420 the debtors
proposed to sell grain stored on their farm and under loan to the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) to obtain cash for planting their 1984 crop. They
proposed to give the CCC a first lien on the 1984 crop, as well as an assign-
ment of Federal Crop Insurance proceeds. The bankruptcy court had granted
the debtor's motion to sell the grain and use the cash collateral.4 2 ' The CCC
appealed to the district court, which stayed the bankruptcy court's order. On
appeal to the district court, the CCC argued that it would not be adequately
protected by "a lien on crops not yet in existence and that are purely speculative
in nature as well as being subject to the uncertainties of weather and other
natural phenomena. "422 In contrast, the debtors argued that adequate protec-
tion was not designed to be a guaranty but merely protection against
unreasonable risks.
The district court reviewed the statutory language and the legislative history
and concluded that, throughout the case, the court must protect the value
of a creditor's secured position as it existed at the beginning of the case.4 23
Accordingly, the court concluded that a lien on crops to be grown in the
future and an assignment of crop insurance proceeds would not constitute
adequate protection. The debtors provided "a promise of collateral which
may exist in the future. This is, in effect, an offer of no collateral at all." 4 2"
The debtors' offer did not assure the CCC the indubitable equivalent of the
CCC's interest in the cash collateral.
On further appeal of the group of consolidated cases now titled In re
Martin,4 2 the Eighth Circuit provided a valuable analysis of the question of
adequate protection for purposes of s.ection 363(e). 426 The Eighth Circuit first
reviewed legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code and concluded that ade-
quate protection is a question of fact, to be determined on a case-by-case
basis.427 Normally the bankruptcy court's findings of fact should not be over-
turned unless clearly erroneous.4 2 An appellate court, however, does have
the power to correct findings of fact based on misunderstanding of the ap-
offer of livestock as adequate protection because it was too speculative and thus insufficient.
The Wieseler court, however, did not hold that a replacement lien in nonexistent property could
never constitute adequate or partial protection.
420. 42 Bankr. 335 (D.N.D. 1984), remanded sub nom In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985).
421. In re Nikolaisen, 38 Bankr. 267-68 (Bankr. N.D. 1984), rev'd, 42 Bankr. 335 (D.N.D. 1984).
422. 42 Bankr. at 337.
423. Id. at 338.
424. Id.
425. 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985).
426. Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit remanded the cases to the district court, with instructions
to remand to the bankruptcy court, which would correct its misunderstanding of applicable law
and decide the case in light of the Eighth Circuit's opinion. Id. at 478.
427. Id. at 474. See also In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1984).
428. 761 F.2d at 474. See also In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir. 1984).
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plicable law. '29 The Eighth Circuit believed that the bankruptcy court's error
in deciding that the CCC's security interest would be adequately protected
was based on a misunderstanding of the law. 430 In making this judgment,
the court relied on statutory language and legislative history.
Reviewing the language of sections 363 and 361, the court focused on sec-
tion 361(3), which provides that adequate protection can consist of relief that
lets the creditor get the "indubitable equivalent" of its interest.' 3' This con-
cept, the court noted, originated in an early bankruptcy case'" and exists
in the present Code as a result of legislative compromise.' 33 But its inclusion
in the language of section 361(3) led the court to conclude that the debtor
must attempt to give the creditor "the value of his bargained for rights. ' '34
The existence of indubitable equivalence, however, depends on the type of
collateral and the debtor's proposed use of that collateral.
The flexibility inherent in such a standard cannot be distorted to harm the
creditor's interest. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit listed three steps that the
bankruptcy court must follow in making an adequate protection determina-
tion. The court must:
(1) establish the value of the secured creditor's interest, (2) identify
the risks to the secured creditor's value resulting from the debtor's
request for use of cash collateral, and (3) determine whether the
debtor's adequate protection proposal protects value as nearly as
possible against risks to that value consistent with the concept of
indubitable equivalence.
43 5
The bankruptcy court, in the cases appealed as In re Martin, had failed to
establish the value of the CCC's interest through evidence of yields or market
price. Moreover, the bankruptcy court did not identify the risks associated
with "the planting and harvesting of a crop not yet in existence.' ' 36 In this
regard, the Eighth Circuit noted that crop failure could leave CCC's interest
unprotected despite the insurance policy.
437
429. 761 F.2d at 475. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union, 461 U.S. 904 (1984).
430. 761 F.2d at 475. Because of iti remand, the Eighth Circuit did not decide whether the
bankruptcy court's finding was "clearly erroneous." Id. at 475.
431. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1982).
432. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). Judge Learned Hand explained
adequate protection as being "completely compensatory; and . . . a substitute of the most in-
dubitable equivalence." Id. at 942.
433. 761 F.2d at 476.
434. Id. at 476, quoting In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1984).
435. 761 F.2d at 477. On the requirement of a finding as to the value of the creditor's interest,
see also First Bank of Miller v. Wieseler (In re Wieseler), 45 Bankr. 871, 875 (D.S.D. 1985).
436. 761 F.2d at 477.
437. As the Eighth Circuit noted, Federal Crop Insurance covers only crop failures due to
certain "unavoidable consequences" within the meaning of the policy. The policy does not cover,
for example, failure that results from the farmer's neglect or poor husbandry. 761 F.2d at 477.
The court listed a number of factors to be considered in evaluating the value of a lien on crops
to be grown. Id.
636 [Vol. 38:579
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The Eighth Circuit's discussion provides guidance for the bankruptcy court's
evaluation of the value of the creditor's security interest and the risks of the
farm debtor's proposal for adequate protection. The bankruptcy court must
decide whether the debtor's adequate protection proposal provides protection
to the creditor consistent with the concept of indubitable equivalence."38 The
opinion in In re Martin should provide considerable assistance to courts facing
the issue of whether a replacement lien in future crops constitutes adequate
protection for the debtor's use of cash collateral.
Other Considerations Concerning Sale of Estate Property
During the interim period after the bankruptcy petition is filed and before
the reorganization plan is confirmed, the debtor in possession has the power
to use, lease, or sell property of the estate (with the exception of cash col-
lateral) without notice or court order, as long as the transaction is in the
ordinary course of business. Section 363(b) also gives the power to use, sell,
or lease property of the estate, other than in the ordinary course of business."'3
Such use, however, requires notice and a hearing. The requirement ensures
that the creditor will have notice of the debtor in possession's intention to
carry out a transaction involving the property of the estate that is outside
the ordinary course of the debtor's business. The creditor then will have an
opportunity to make any objections known at the required hearing. 4 0
The requirements of section 363(b) apply, however, only before confirma-
tion of the reorganization plan. In re Wood involved a dairy farmer who
had filed a Chapter 11 case." I After confirmation of his plan, which did not
explicitly prohibit the sale of his dairy cattle, Wood arranged for a purported
sale of the cows to obtain cash to redeem some real estate. The cows were
later resold at auction. Creditors claimed that section 363(b) required notice
and hearing of the sales in the bankruptcy court. But the court stated that
section 363 did not apply to either sale because the plan had been confirmed
prior to the sales.
4 2
Sales of property of the estate made under section 363, whether in or out-
438. Id. at 475. The CCC also argued that the debtor's sale of grain and use of the cash
collateral would be inconsistent with statutes and regulations governing the price support pro-
grams. The court rejected this argument. Id. at 478.
439. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). Section 1123(b)(4) (1982) also provides authority
for the sale of "all or substantially all of the property of the estate," pursuant to a plan. See
In re Whet, Inc., 12 Bankr. 743, 750 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
440. According to the rules of construction in section 102, "after notice and a hearing" actually
means notice after an opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate. But an act may occur without
any hearing if notice is given properly and either a party in interest does not make a timely
request for a hearing or there is insufficient time for a hearing before the act must be done.
Id. § 102(1)(A), (B) (1982).
441. 47 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985).
442. Id. at 776. Nonetheless, the court characterized the purported sale as merely a loan. Wood
did not relinquish possession or risk of loss of the animals, nor was there sufficient consideration
for a sale. Id. at 778-79. The buyer had only an unperfected security interest, which had priority
over general creditors. Id. at 780.
19851
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side of the ordinary course of the debtor's business, are free and clear of
any other interest in the property if one of five statutory conditions is met."43
The trustee may sell property free and clear only if applicable nonbankruptcy
law permits sale of the property free and clear of the interest; 44 the entity
with an interest in the property consents;445 the interest is a lien, and the sale
price for the property is greater than the value of all liens on the property; 46
the interest is in dispute;41 or the entity with an interest could be compelled,
in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of the in-
terest.4'
The Code also provides that under certain conditions the trustee (or the
debtor in possession) may sell both the estate's interest and the interest of
any co-owner of property. This provision may apply, for example, in the sale
of jointly owned farm property. Section 363(h) applies to property in which,
immediately before the commencement of the case, the debtor had an un-
divided interest as a tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the
entirety. 449 For the trustee to sell under section 363(h), partition in kind of
the property among the estate and the co-owners must be impracticable. 4"1
In addition, sale of the estate's undivided interest in the property would have
to realize significantly less for the estate than sale of the property free of
the interest of the co-owners.45' Further, the benefit to the estate of a sale
of the property free of the interest of co-owners must outweigh any detriment
to those co-owners. '52 In a related provision, section 363(g) provides that prop-
erty of the estate remains free and clear of any vested or contingent right
of dower or curtesy.
453
If farm property is to be sold under sections 363(g) or 363(h), the co-owner
receives some protection, either before or after consummation of the sale.
First, if the property is jointly owned, subject to dower or curtesy, or com-
munity property, the debtor's spouse or any other co-owner has the right to
purchase the property at the price at which the property is to be sold. 414 Sec-
ond, if the co-owner does not exercise this right, after the sale of the property
the trustee must distribute the proceeds of the sale, less costs and expenses,
according to the interests of the spouse or other co-owners, and of the estate.4"
The Code does not describe how the value of interests in the property sold
443. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
444. Id. § 363(0(1).
445. Id. § 363(f)(2).
446. Id. § 363(f)(3).
447. Id. § 363(f)(4).
448. Id. § 363(f)(5).
449. Id. § 363(h).
450. Id. § 363(h)(1).
451. Id. § 363(h)(2).
452. Id. § 363(h)(3).
453. Id. § 363(g).
454. Id. § 363(i).
455. Id. § 363(). Costs and expenses do not include compensation for the trustee.
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is to be computed. One commentator has suggested that courts are likely to
apply state presumptions that operate in nondeath terminations of joint in-
terests.
4
16
Finally, the validity of a sale is not affected if the authorization under sec-
tion 363 is revised or modified on appeal, as long as the purchase was in
good faith. Whether the purchaser knew of the pendency of the appeal from
the authorization of the trustee to sell is not relevant to the validity of the
purchase, unless the authorization and the sale were stayed pending the
appeal.
4
-
7
Section 364-Obtaining Credit
A farmer who has filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case wants the opportunity
to reorganize the business and continue with the farming operation. In most
instances, the farmer's continued ability to obtain credit to finance that opera-
tion will be crucial to the success of the reorganization. Even if cash col-
lateral is available under section 363, the farmer may need to borrow addi-
tional money for production costs and other expenses. But that farmer may
encounter reluctance from creditors who are not eager to extend new credit
to farmers in bankruptcy.
To accommodate reluctant creditors and to make it possible for reorganiz-
ing debtors to obtain credit, the Code includes section 364. Under certain
circumstances, this section gives special assurance of repayment to lenders
who provide money to Chapter I 1 debtors.
45 8
First, section 364(a) permits the debtor in possession (or the trustee) who
is authorized to operate the business to obtain unsecured credit and incur
unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business, unless the court orders
otherwise. This unsecured credit will then be allowed under section 503(b)(1)
as an administrative expense, payable before other priorities and before other
unsecured creditors.45 9 Thus the farm debtor in possession can incur ordinary
business expenses, like the cost of seed and fertilizer, and can assure creditors
that their debt will receive priority. In addition, the court can authorize
unsecured credit or debt other than under subsection (a)-that is, not in the
ordinary course of business-but only after notice and a hearing. 6 This credit,
too, is allowable as an administrative expense. 6'
In some instances, the mere assurance of administrative expense priority
will not satisfy the farm debtor's suppliers and other creditors. If the debtor
cannot obtain unsecured credit using the administrative expense priority, the
court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize one of three stronger
assurances to the creditor. The new credit authorized by the court may enjoy
456. Ackerly, supra note 132, at 719.
457. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (1982).
458. Id. § 364. This section applies to trustees authorized to operate the business under sec-
tions 721, 1108 or 1304. Thus it has broader application than merely in Chapter 11. Id. § 364(a).
459. Id. § 364(a).
460. See supra note 440 on the meaning of notice and hearing.
461. 11 U.S.C. § 364(b) (1982).
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priority over any or all administrative expenses. 6" Alternatively, the credit
can be secured by a lien on unencumbered property of the estate,'43 or it
can be secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is already sub-
ject to a lien.
4 4
To postpetition creditors, these provisions of section 364 are significant
because they have the effect of putting the new creditors ahead of prepetition
unsecured creditors in the rank of priority. Despite the fact that this postpeti-
tion credit is obtained at the expense of the unsecured prepetition creditor,
the Code does not protect prepetition general creditors through the right to
demand adequate protection. Unsecured creditors have no rights in specific
property of the debtor. Therefore, it appears that there are no constitutional
objections to this statutory scheme.'6 Of course, the debtor must receive value
for the security interest granted to postpetition lenders.
Although creditors who extend postpetition credit are Jikely to accept a lien
on previously unencumbered property under section 364(c), such property may
not always be available. Moreover, creditors may not be willing to extend
credit on the basis of a junior lien 466 or an administrative expense priority.
Recognizing these difficulties, the Code authorizes another method of obtaining
postpetition credit, available only if the trustee or debtor in possession is unable
to obtain credit otherwise.' 61 This method involves a "superpriority" or "prim-
ing lien." After notice and hearing, the court may authorize credit that is
secured by a senior or equal lien on property that is already subject to a lien.461
This superpriority is authorized, however, only when the debtor can offer
adequate protection to the holder of the prepetition lien." 9 Adequate protec-
tion, for purposes of section 364, is defined in section 361, and has already
been discussed.
70
462. Id. § 364(c)(1). This includes priorities under sections 503(b) and 507(b).
463. Id. § 364(c)(2).
-464. Id. § 364(c)(3).
465. See Kunkel, supra note 174, at 317-18. See also Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Redford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 (1935); In re Garland Corp., 6 Bankr. 456, 462-63 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1980).
466. See Landers, supra note 200, at 25.
467. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(A) (1982).
468. Id. § 364(d)(1).
469. Id. § 364(d)(1)(B). The trustee (or debtor in possession) has the burden of proof on the
issue of adequate protection.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 94-105, 410-438. In In re Stratbucker, 4 Bankr. 251,
251-53 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980), the debtor in possession was a farmer without the necessary working
capital to plant his spring crops. To plant the crops, the debtor needed to incur debt in the
following amounts: fuel, $2,500; seed corn, $1,200; herbicide and pesticide, $1,800; tractor overhaul
and repair, $2,000 or more; fertilizer, $4,000. The debtor had debts of $286,456 and property,
chiefly 270 acres of land, valued at $357,447. Most of the debt was for two real estate mortgages
that reserved security interests in rents and profits. The debtor wanted credit to purchase the
necessary supplies to plant crops and proposed to repay the debts ahead of all others out of
the proceeds from the crops.
The court gave the creditor priority under two alternative holdings. First, the mortgagees'
security interests in the crops would not continue, pursuant to section 552(b), to the extent necessary
to grant the new creditors a section 364(c) priority. Second, the new creditors could be granted
640 [Vol. 38:579
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To illustrate with a simplified example, a farm debtor might have a tract
of land worth $150,000, but subject to a $50,000 mortgage. The court, using
section 364(d), could authorize the trustee to incur another $50,000 of debt
to be secured by the granting of a senior lien on that land. The prepetition
lienholder would receive adequate protection because the debtor's equity was
$100,000. Even after the new security interest, a $50,000 cushion would be
available to absorb any fluctuations in the real estate market.
The superpriority provisions of section 364 may allow a lender better security
in bankruptcy than would be possible outside of bankruptcy. With the sec-
tion 364 lender incentives available, Chapter 11 farm debtors may be able
to overcome the initial reluctance of creditors and thus obtain the credit that
is needed to reorganize successfully.
Section 365-Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases
In many instances, the financial difficulties of a farmer who has entered
bankruptcy are due in part to that farmer's obligations under disadvantageous
contracts or leases. In other instances, the farm debtor may be operating under
leases, or may be committed to contracts, that are essential to the successful
continuation of the farm business. For example, a farm debtor may have an
unexpired lease on farm real estate, an installment land contract, unexpired
farm equipment leases, and executory contracts for services or for the sale
or purchase of farm products and supplies. Section 365 of the Code is designed
to give the debtor considerable flexibility in dealing with these executory con-
tracts and unexpired leases.
Section 365 gives the trustee (or the debtor in possession, pursuant to sec-
tion 1107) the power, subject to court approval, to assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. "7 ' Although the Code
a senior lien under section 364(d) because the mortgagees' interests in the crops were adequately
protected. The court explained:
After consideration of the equities of this matter, I have concluded that the priority
should be granted subject to certain limitations. Short of liquidation, the sole chance
for rehabilitation of the debtor lies in carrying on his farming operation. Creditors
who supply the wherewithal to grow the crops should logically receive the first
proceeds, as without such credit no proceeds at all would exist. Moreover, a substan-
tial cushion remains in the estate, so that it is unlikely that existing creditors, secured
or unsecured, will be injured by allowing the debtor to borrow funds for one more
growing season.
4 Bankr. at 253.
In addition, the court noted that adequate protection existed because, unless the crops were
planted, the mortgagees would have no interest requiring protection. The court concluded that:
"Thus, even if the proceeds from the crops are sufficient only to cover the costs of planting,
the lienholders are in as good a position as they would be if the crops were not planted at all." Id.
471. I1 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). Of course, section 365 is available to debtors
other than farmers. Thus, when a party with whom a farmer has business agreements (for exam-
ple, a landlord or a purchaser of farm products) enters bankruptcy, that party will have the
rights under section 365 that are discussed below. For example, as illustrated by a controversial
Missouri grain warehouse bankruptcy, the trustee of a bankrupt grain warehouse may assume
executory contracts with farmers for the purchase of grain, pursuant to section 365. In re Cox
Cotton Co., 8 Bankr. 682, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1981).
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itself provides no definition of executory contract or unexpired lease, legislative
history explains: "Though there is no precise definition of what contracts
are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains
due to some extent on both sides." '4 72 Moreover, a number of courts have
adopted the definition articulated by Professor Vern Countryman. 4" Accord-
ing to this definition, an executory contract is "a contract under which the
obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so
far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." '4 '
In most instances, it will be clear which of the farm debtor's agreements
fit within section 365. Analysis will focus on whether both parties to an agree-
ment must still fulfill substantial and material obligations.'" Normally in the
case of a long-term lease of farm equipment or a contract to sell grain or
livestock in the future, both parties will have unfulfilled obligations. In some
instances, it will be necessary to distinguish a true lease from a lease that
is merely a disguised sale in which the seller retains an interest as security. 76
Moreover, the lease cannot have expired; if the debtor's interest in the lease
expired by the lease terms, there will be no lease for the debtor to assume
or reject. 477 In the cases of leases for the use of farmland, the crop share
lease should be considered unexpired until the crops are harvested; a cash
lease should expire only after the lease term has ended.' 78 Installment land
472. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONa. & AD.
NEws, at 6303; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 39, at 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO.
& AD. NEWS, at 5844.
473. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Klinger (In re Knutson), 563 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977);
In re Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 16 Bankr. 784, 786 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). But see In re
Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 55 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 540-550.
474. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973).
475. See In re Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 16 Bankr. 784, 786 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
476. The lease intended as security can often be distinguished from the true lease by a provi-
sion that allows the lessee to purchase the leased property for a nominal sum at the conclusion
of the lease term. See the U.C.C. definition of "security interest" at § 1-201(37). If a lease
is intended as a security interest (to be determined by the facts of each case), U.C.C. article
9 applies. U.C.C. § 9-102 and comment 1. This type of arrangement should be treated as a
sale secured by collateral, rather than as an executory contract. See Kunkel, supra note 174,
at 319-20. See also In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 59 n.10 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). See generally
Jones, Lease or Secured Transaction-The Saga Continues Under the Bankruptcy Act, 90 Com.
L.J. 281 (1985).
477. See In re Crabb, 48 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985). The court refused to revive
a terminated lease merely because it was essential to reorganization. Id. at 168. The Crabb lease
included an option to extend. The debtor tried to exercise that option a month after the lease
itself had expired, and seven months after the option deadline. The debtor had entered bankruptcy
before the option and lease expired, but the automatic stay did not stop the running of these
contractual deadlines. 1d. at 166-68. See also 11 U.C.C. § 365(c)(3) (Supp. 111984): "The trustee
may not assume ... if-(3) such lease of nonresidential property has been terminated under
applicable nonbankruptcy law prior to the order for relief." This section was added in 1984.
See supra note 71.
478. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 116, at 635.
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contracts are often considered executory contracts for purposes of section 365,
but may raise other issues, to be discussed below. 79
General Provisions
Time Limits. When the debtor is party to an unexpired lease or an executory
contract, the trustee normally has the right to assume or reject that agree-
ment. 8 ' Some time limitations govern this right. In a Chapter 7 case in which
an executory contract or an unexpired lease of residential real estate or per-
sonalty is at issue, the time limit is sixty days from the order for relief. If
the trustee does not assume or reject within the sixty days (or within addi-
tional time that the court grants for cause), then the lease or contract is con-
sidered rejected.48' In many instances, the trustee in Chapter 7 will have little
incentive to assume a contract or lease because the purpose of the proceeding
is to liquidate the debtor's estate, rather than to reorganize. In some instances,
however, section 365 will prove helpful to a trustee who plans to assume a
particularly advantageous contract or lease and make it profitable to the estate
by assigning it to another individual or entity.48
When the debtor is in Chapter 11 or Chapter 13, the trustee or debtor in
possession may assume or reject an executory contract, or an unexpired lease
of residential real estate or personalty, at any time before confirmation of
the plan. The time period from initiation of the bankruptcy may be 120 days,
180 days, or even longer.483 If a party to that contract or lease requests,
however, the court can impose a specific time limit for assumption or rejec-
tion. 4
814
Section 365 includes a special rule for unexpired leases of nonresidential
real property in which the debtor is the lessee. This rule was added by the
1984 Code amendments, in part to protect lessors of shopping centers, but
it also applies in the case of leases of farmland when the tenant is the debtor.
Under this rule, if the lease is not assumed or rejected within sixty days after
the order for relief (or within additional time that the court grants for cause),
the lease is considered rejected, and the trustee must surrender the property
to the lessor. 485 Another new provision requires the trustee to perform obliga-
479. See infra text accompanying notes 521-552.
480. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. 11 1984). The trustee's decision is subject to court approval.
The Code does not provide standards for court approval of the trustee's decision to assume
or reject these contracts. The rule most commonly used is the business judgment rule: "[The
question whether a lease should be rejected and, if not, on what terms it should be assumed
is one of business judgment." Group of Inst. Inv. v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318
U.S. 523, 550 (1943). See also Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43
(2d Cir. 1979) (approving the business judgment rule). See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 330, 365.03.
481. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
482. On assignment, see infra text accompanying notes 500-514.
483. On time limits for submission of the plan, see infra text accompanying notes 554-558
(Chapter I1) and 641-642 (Chapter 13).
484. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
485. Id. § 365(d)(4).
1985]
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tions under unexpired leases of nonresidential real estate (that is, to pay rent,
among other obligations) until the lease is assumed or rejected. 4"
Adequate Assurance. When the debtor has not defaulted on an unexpired
lease or executory contract, the trustee is free to assume that obligation without
giving the other party any particular guarantees of continued performance.487
But if the debtor has defaulted, either before or after the commencement of
bankruptcy,"8 the requirements of section 365(b) apply and trigger the obliga-
tion of "adequate assurance." 4 89 Before the lease or contract may be assumed,
the trustee must cure the default or provide adequate assurance that cure will
occur. The trustee must also compensate the other party to the agreement
for any monetary loss caused by the default. In addition, the trustee must
provide "adequate assurance of future performance" under the contract or
lease.49 The trustee need not cure or provide adequate assurance if the only
default results from an ipso facto clause stating that a default occurs if the
debtor becomes insolvent, enters bankruptcy, or has a trustee or custodian
appointed. 9 '
The term "adequate assurance of future performance" is not a term of
art in section 365. Instead, it has pragmatic significance; what constitutes ade-
quate assurance is to be determined by the facts of each case.49 In evaluating
adequate assurance, a court must be sensitive to the rights of the nondebtor
party in these agreements. As the legislative history of section 365 indicates:
"If the trustee is to assume a contract or lease, the courts will have to insure
that the trustee's performance under the contract or lease gives the other con-
tracting party the full benefit of his bargain. ' 493 Accordingly, a court is likely
to consider both whether the farm debtor will be able to meet his obligations
under the contract or lease, 9 4 and whether the other party to the agreement
will receive the benefit of the bargain. 49 Adequate assurance may involve
a cash payment, 496 or merely the cure of default and the continued payment
of obligations on the contract after bankruptcy.
49 7
486. Id. § 365(d)(3).
487. Id. §§ 365(a), (b). See, e.g., In re Perretta, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1201 (Bankr.
N.D. 11. 1980).
488. See 2 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 332, q1 365.04[1].
489. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
490. Id. §§ 365(b)(l)(A)-(C).
491. Id. §§ 365(b)(2)(A)-(C).
492. In re Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 9 Bankr. 993, 998 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
493. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 6304-05. See also S. REP. No. 989, supra note 39, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5845.
494. E.g., In re Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 9 Bankr. 993, 1000 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
495. E.g., In re Evelyn Byrnes, Inc., 32 Bankr. 825 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (adequate assurance
gives the landlord the "full benefit of his bargain," but eventual assignee may not be required
to comply literally with every lease term, id. at 829).
One court has held that the assumption of a contract should not be permitted when adequate
assurance of future performance would require the complete reworking of procedures set forth
in the contract. In re Luce Indus., Inc., 8 Bankr. 100 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
496. See, e.g., Seidle v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Belize Airways, Ltd.), 5 Bankr.
152 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (adequate assurance predicated on a $75,000 security deposit).
497. See, e.g., In re National Shoes, Inc., 20 Bankr. 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (cure of defaults
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Ipso facto Clauses. A number of contracts include ipso facto or bankruptcy
clauses, which purport to terminate the contract should a party enter bank-
ruptcy or otherwise demonstrate insolvency. By making a potentially valuable
contract unavailable to a debtor trying to reorganize, these clauses would con-
travene the purposes of bankruptcy law. Thus section 365(e) invalidates ipso
facto clauses. After commencement of a bankruptcy case, an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease may not be terminated or modified solely because
of a provision conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the
debtor, the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding, or the appointment
of a trustee or custodian.49 Section 365(e) does not invalidate an ipso facto
clause in a contract entirely, but only during the case. The clause could again
apply, for example, in a new insolvency after the bankruptcy case is closed. 99
Assignment. When the trustee or debtor in possession assumes any executory
contract or unexpired lease, he will either retain possession of rights under
the contract or lease, or assign those rights to some other entity. In a Chapter
11 or Chapter 13 case, the farm debtor in possession is likely to want to re-
tain possession of the contract or lease after assumption; in a Chapter 7
liquidation, the trustee who has assumed a contract or lease can be expected
to assign the debtor's rights under the agreement.
The Code facilitates the assignment of executory contracts and unexpired
leases through section 365(0. Under this section, the trustee or debtor in posses-
sion may assign the contract or lease, under certain circumstances, regardless
of whether a provision in the agreement itself or in applicable state law pro-
hibits, restricts, or conditions that assignment."' 0 Moreover, any provision of
the agreement or of applicable law that would terminate or modify the con-
tract or lease because of assignment is invalidated in bankruptcy."0 ' The trustee
or debtor in 'possession must assign the agreement in accordance with the pro-
visions of section 365.502 The assignee must provide adequate assurance of
future performance, regardless of whether the debtor has defaulted on the
agreement.°
0 3
Despite this fairly broad power to assign executory contracts and unexpired
leases, not all such agreements can be assigned in bankruptcy. Contracts to
make a loan, extend financial accommodations, or issue a security of the debtor
prior to Chapter Il petition and currency of payment after the petition demonstrated adequate
assurance).
498. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982). Section 365(e)(2) states instances in which subparagraph
(1) does not apply: when applicable law excuses the nondebtor party from accepting perfor-
mance from the trustee or an assignee and the party does not consent to assignment; or when
the contract is an agreement to make a loan, to extend financial accommodations, or to issue
a security. Id. § 365(e)(2). Thus, a personal service contract can be terminated at bankruptcy
through an ipso facto clause. This result is consonant with section 365(c)(1), discussed infra.
499. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 349, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 6305.
500. 11 U.S.C. § 365(0(1) (1982).
501. Id. § 365(0(3).
502. Id. § 365(f)(2)(A).
503. Id. § 365(0(2)(B). Compare section 365(b)(1), regarding assumption, which requires adequate
assurance only if the debtor has defaulted.
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cannot be assumed or assigned.504 In addition, the trustee cannot assume or
assign a lease of nonresidential real property that terminated under non-
bankruptcy law prior to the order for relief (that is, prior to the commence-
ment of the case).50
More significantly, personal service contracts are excepted from the general
right to assign contracts and leases. Pursuant to section 365(c), the trustee
may not assume or assign an agreement if applicable law would excuse the
nondebtor party from accepting performance from, or rendering performance
to, the trustee or an assignee. 0 6 Of course, the trustee may assume and assign
such a personal service contract if the nondebtor party consents. 07 Though
the trustee could not assume such a contract without the consent of the non-
debtor party, the debtor in possession could assume the contract; he is the
party with whom the nondebtor originally contracted. But neither the trustee
nor the debtor in possession could assign the contract or lease involving per-
sonal service to another party. 0 8
Farm debtors are likely to be involved in several different agreements that
may be characterized as personal service contracts. Employment contracts fall
within this category and cannot be assigned without consent of the nondebtor
party. In addition, farm debtors who are party to a farm lease must ask
whether the lease is a personal service contract. A landlord will usually choose
a crop-share tenant for his land on the basis of personal characteristics because
the landlord's share of the rent will depend in part on the tenant's knowledge
and diligence. Almost every state court that has faced the issue directly has
held that a crop-share lease is a nonassignable personal service contract. 0 9
Not all courts have addressed the issue, however, and the characterization
of a particular tenancy will depend on a number of factors, including the
nature of the relationship and the party who is debtor °10 If the farm lease
is characterized under state law as a nonassignable personal service contract,
it comes within the provisions of section 365(c) and may not be assigned in
bankruptcy without consent of the nondebtor party.
One issue that may arise when the trustee or debtor in possession wants
to assume and assign an executory contract or an unexpired lease pursuant
504. Id. § 365(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
505. Id. § 365(c)(3). This provision, quoted supra in note 477, was added in 1984.
506. Id. § 365(c)(1)(A).
507. Id. § 365(c)(1)(B).
508. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 116, at 640.
509. E.g., Crump v. Tolbert, 210 Ark. 920, 198 S.W.2d 518 (1946); Edison v. Babka, Ill
Mich. 235, 69 N.W. 499 (1896); Lewis v. Sheldon, 103 Mich. 102, 61 N.W. 269 (1894); Randall
v. Chubb, 46 Mich. 311, 9 N.W. 429 (1881); Greeson v. Byrd, 54 N.C. App. 681, 284 S.E.2d
195 (1981); Myer v. Roberts, 50 Or. 81, 89 P. 1051 (1907); Meyer v. Livesley, 45 Or. 487, 78
P. 670 (1904); Tipton v. Martzell, 21 Wash. 273, 57 P. 806 (1899). See also 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 865 (1951) (crop-share lease is a personal service contract, and tenant has no
power to delegate performance to a substitute). But see Edelman v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 252
Ill. App. 142 (1929); Glanz v. Halperin, 251 Ill. App. 572 (1929); Gillespie v. Fultom Oil &
Gas Co., 236 Iil. 188, 86 N.E. 219 (1908).
510. For more comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Grossman & Fischer, supra note
116, at 640-45.
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to section 365 is whether the agreement must be assumed and assigned strictly
according to its terms, or whether the court may allow modification of the
agreement.II' It is clear from both the Code requirement of adequate assurance
and the legislative history that the nondebtor party must receive the full benefit
of his bargain."1 2 In some respects, the requirement of adequate assurance
may be viewed as a substitute for strict compliance with all the terms of the
agreement. Courts that have addressed this issue have not been consistent.
For example, in situations involving unexpired leases, some courts have refused
to permit the trustee to modify a lease." 3 Others, however, have concluded
that adequate assurance does not require the assignee to comply literally with
every term of the lease as long as the nondebtor party would not suffer actual
and substantial detriment." 4 A farm debtor who wants to assume, or assume
and assign, an executory contract or unexpired lease must ensure that any
proposed change in the literal requirements of the agreement treats the non-
debtor party fairly. Of course, the court approval required under section 365(a)
will protect the nondebtor.
Rejection. When an executory contract or unexpired lease is disadvantageous
or otherwise not useful for the estate, it will normally be rejected pursuant
to section 365.1'" When such an agreement is rejected, the rejection constitutes
a breach of the lease or contract. If the agreement is rejected without having
been assumed, either under section 365 or under a confirmed plan, the date
of breach is immediately before the date of the filing of the petition. ' 6 The
nondebtor party to the agreement will then usually have an unsecured, non-
priority claim for damages, allowable under section 502(g). 117
Leases
Section 365 includes special rules to accommodate the rejection of leases
of real property. Section 365(h) protects the tenant if the trustee rejects an
unexpired lease of real property under which the debtor is the lessor. Thus,
if the landlord under a farm lease enters bankruptcy and rejects the unex-
511. See generally Simpson, Leases and the Bankruptcy Code, 38 Bus. LAw. 61, 75 (1982)
for a discussion of this issue. See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 330, 365.0411].
512. See supra text accompanying notes 492-493.
513. E.g., In re Pin Oaks Apts., 7 Bankr. 364, 367 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980).
514. E.g., In re U.L. Radio Corp., 19 Bankr. 537, 544-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also
In re Evelyn Byrnes, Inc., 32 Bankr. 825 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
515. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982).
516. Id. § 365(g)(1). Subsection (g)(2) provides alternative dates of breach for situations in
which the executory contract or unexpired lease has been assumed. The date varies, depending
on whether the debtor's case has been converted to Chapter 7.
517. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1982) states:
A claim arising from the rejection, under section 365 of this title or under a
plan under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, of an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor that has not been assumed shall be determined, and shall be
allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section or disallowed under subsec-
tion (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date
of the filing of the petition.
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pired farm lease, the tenant has a choice. He can decide to treat the lease
as terminated, yield possession of the property, and claim damages.'1 8 Alter-
natively, the tenant may decide to remain in possession of the property for
the remainder of the lease term and any renewals or extensions that are en-
forceable under nonbankruptcy law. 5" The tenant may offset against the rent
any damages occurring after the rejection because of the landlord-debtor's
nonperformance of any obligations (for example, providing a share of the
production inputs) under the lease. Offset is the tenant's only remedy; he
does not have a claim for damages for the landlord's failure to perform.2
Installment Contracts
Section 365 also includes a special provision to accommodate situations in
which the seller of real property is a debtor, and the trustee rejects the ex-
ecutory contract for the sale of the property.2 ' Because the installment land
contract (or contract for a deed) is often used as a method of financing the
sale of farmland, this provision may have particular relevance in farm
bankruptcies. Consistent with the Countryman definition of an executory con-
tract,122 the installment land sale contract is often characterized as an executory
contract. Under the typical arrangement, the buyer has the duty to make
payments, and the seller has the duty to deliver title to the land after the
buyer's last payment. 2
3
If the trustee rejects the executory installment contract and the buyer is
in possession of the property, that buyer has an alternative under section
365(i). 24 First, he may treat the contract as terminated. 25 If he does so, then
under section 3650) he has a lien on the debtor's interest in the property for
the recovery of any portion of the purchase price that the buyer has paid. 26
518. No limit is placed on the tenant's claim for damages. Compare section 502(b)(6) (Supp.
11 1984), which limits the allowable claim, when the lessor is claiming damages resulting from
the termination- of a lease on real property. See supra note 361. On the issue of ascertaining
damages from breach of farm leases, see Grossman & Fischer, supra note 116, at 657-63.
519. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
520. Id. § 365(h)(2).
521. Id. § 365(i) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
522. For the Countryman definition, see supra text accompanying note 474.
523. The installment land contract is more than a note. "A note is not usually an executory
contract if the only performance that remains is repayment." S. REP. No. 989, supra note 39,
at 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5844.
Despite the fact that the seller must still perform by transferring title after the buyer makes
his last payment, the buyer enjoys most of the incidents of ownership. The seller has retained
title for security in much the same way that a lender might hold a mortgage. Indeed, "[tihe
installment land contract and the purchase money mortgage fulfill the identical economic
function-the financing by the seller of the unpaid portion of the real estate purchase price."
G. OSBORN E, G. NELSON & D. WHImAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAW 79 (3d ed. 1979).
524. At least one decision has stated that sections 365(i) and fi) are exclusive remedies for
parties to executory contracts for the sale of real property. See In re Fisher, 13 Bankr. 286,
287 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
525. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
526. Id. § 3650) (1982).
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Alternatively, the buyer may decide to remain in possession of the proper-
ty."2 7 The buyer who remains in possession must continue to make payments
due under the contract, but may offset any damages caused by the seller's
nonperformance after the date of rejection.5 28 The seller's trustee must deliver
title to the buyer according to the land sale contract, but need not perform
other obligations under the contract..
29
This choice is available only to the buyer who is in possession of the
farmland. The Code does not define "in possession." Although that term
has assumed meaning in state law contexts, a recent bankruptcy court case
suggests that it is inappropriate to construe the term in an abstract way.530
Instead, the term should be construed in light of the language of section 365
and its legislative history. These reflect a congressional concern for buyers,
including farm buyers, with a permanent connection with the land who would
face dislocation through rejection of an installment sale contract. 3 ' Under
this analysis, if the buyer of farmland under an installment land sale contract
actually farmed the land, and perhaps lived on the property, that buyer would
be in possession as required by section 365(i).
The installment purchaser who is not in possession of the property does
not have the option of continuing to purchase the land after the seller rejects
the executory contract. 32 Instead, that buyer will receive a lien on the interest
of the seller-debtor in the property for the recovery of the portion of the
purchase price the buyer paid.
533
In dealing explicitly with the rights of the nondebtor-buyer under an in-
stallment land contract rejected by the trustee, section 365 recognizes the con-
tract as executory. But the protection offered to the buyer in possession under
section 365(i) treats the contract as if it were not executory, but similar to
a purchase money mortgage. Section 365(i) is silent, however, as to the treat-
ment of installment land contracts in bankruptcy when the buyer of the land
is the debtor.
In cases in which the debtor is the purchaser, a threshold issue is whether
the contract is executory at all within the provisions of section 365. Because
an installment land contract is treated as executory if the debtor is a seller,
534
it might follow that the same contract should also be executory when the debtor
is a buyer. If the installment land contract is viewed as executory, even when
the debtor is a buyer, then it may be assumed or rejected as any executory
contract. If the contract is assumed, it must be taken cum onere, that is,
527. Id. § 365(i)(1) (Supp. H 1984).
528. Id. § 365(i)(2)(A) (9182). The buyer has no claim for damages arising after the rejection,
other than the offset.
529. Id. § 365(i)(2)(B).
530. In re Summit Land Co., 13 Bankr. 310, 317 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
531. Id. at 318. See also Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
477, 484 (1973).
532. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
533. Id. § 3650) (1982).
534. Id. § 365(i)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
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as written, with its benefits and burdens."' The bankrupt buyer who rejects
an installment land contract would be deemed to have breached," 6 and the
seller would be entitled to forfeiture. 37 This treatment of installment con-
tracts as executory when the debtor is a buyer, however, would lead to situa-
tions in which the debtor is treated less favorably in bankruptcy than under
state law. Some states treat the installment land contract as a nonexecutory
purchase money mortgage,"3 8 with the seller as mortgagee and the buyer as
mortgagor. In these states, if the buyer defaults, the seller's remedy is
foreclosure instead of forfeiture.
Reflecting this- analysis, several recent bankruptcy court cases have treated
535. See In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 58 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
536. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982).
537. Some states view forfeiture as a penalty. In certain cases, therefore, even though the
installment land contract is treated as an executory contract, the seller still cannot demand forfeiture
as a remedy for a debtor-buyer's breach when the result would be unconscionable. See Note,
Recent Utah Developments on Forfeitures in Real Estate Contracts, 7 UTAH L. REv. 95 (1960).
538. E.g., Chapman v. Britton (In re Britton), 43 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In
re Patch Graphics, 32 Bankr. 373 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983). See generally Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). To avoid
a situation in which the debtor-buyer may be treated less favorably in bankruptcy than under
state law, a bankruptcy court could adopt the law of the state where it sits as the rule of decision
in the case. Where a federal statute like the Code refers to executory contracts, but does not
say whether an installment land contract is executory when the debtor is a buyer, it is beyond
question that the issue is one of federal law. This, however, does not eliminate the possibility
that a federal court might adopt state law as the appropriate authority for the federal rule of
decision in the case. See, e.g., the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 468 (1942).
When an issue is not controlled by any formal expression of the will of Congress, then in
addition to concluding that federal common law must fill the statutory interstice, a court must
also decide what the federal rule should be. In short, Congress acts against the background of
the total corpus juris of the states in much the same way that a state legislature acts against
the background of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation. A. HART
& H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 471 (2d ed. 1973). Because
of concerns of federalism, a court should not displace a state rule if there is no overriding in-
terest in nationwide uniformity on the issue. In other words, federal common law should reflect
state rules of decision in the absence of a showing that some federal interest or regulatory policy
requires a nationwide uniform rule. There is no inflexible rule that federal law governs all ques-
tions in federal government litigation, even in cases involving federal government litigation. See
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), finding that state law supplied the rule of decision
because "there is no overriding interest in nationwide uniformity on the issue." See also Board
of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939), also holding that state law supplied
the rule of decision: "Nothing seems to us more appropriate than due regard for local institu-
tions and local interests."
In the present context, then, the issue at the debtor-buyer's breach becomes why a seller should
have the benefit of a uniform federal rule that dictates the forfeiture of the debtor's equity in
the contract for the sale of real estate when the spirit of the Code, particularly Chapter 11,
is to encourage the rehabilitation of debtors. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 348,-
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws, at 6304. No overriding federal interest seems
to justify the rejection of state law for the adoption of a uniform federal rule that could result
in less favorable treatment for debtors in bankruptcy than they might receive in a state court.
But see infra note 546.
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installment land contracts involving a debtor-buyer as mortgages.5 39 The leading
case in this area is In re Booth,""0 which involved a Chapter 11 debtor who
was buyer under a contract for a deed. Sellers had moved for an order under
section 365(d)(2), directing debtor to assume or reject the contract. The debtor,
however, argued that the contract was not executory, and therefore section
365 did not apply.
514
The bankruptcy court analyzed the Countryman test, which it viewed as
"an index to when assumption or rejection of a contract will 'benefit the
estate' and therefore of when a contract is executory.1 51 2 But the court was
not convinced that the test always defined the benefit to the estate or spoke
to the protection of creditors. Analyzing the purposes of sections 365(i) and
(j), the court recognized that these were intended to mitigate the harsh results
of cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act, when buyers under installment
contracts often lost their land and were relegated to the status of unsecured
creditors when their sellers entered bankruptcy. 3 These sections now give
the debtor-seller some flexibility in designing an effective reorganization, but
not at the expense of the debtor-buyer under a land sale contract.
The Booth court believed that when the debtor is purchaser under a con-
tract for a deed, the contract benefits the estate more when viewed as a lien
rather than as an executory contract. Treatment of the contract as a lien
enhances the value of the estate, furthers the rehabilitation of the debtor,
and makes adequate protection available to creditors.544 Treatment of the con-
tract as a lien treats the seller like other lienors and prevents forfeiture and
loss of the value of equity to the estate.54 5 This treatment is similar to the
approach adopted by a number of states, which now treat installment land
contracts almost like mortgages.54 6 In addition, if the contract is treated as
a lien, the costs of assumption are avoided and the lien can be "dealt with"
in a plan, thus giving the debtor more latitude in reorganization. 47 Moreover,
the seller can receive adequate protection for the value of the lien." 8
The court recognized that sections 365(i) and (j) were enacted to give non-
debtor buyers the protection of mortgagors. Therefore, treating the contract
539. See In re Adolphsen, 38 Bankr. 776 (Bankr. D. Minn.), aff'd 38 Bankr. 780 (Bankr.
D. Minn.) (1983); In re Flores, 32 Bankr. 455 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983); In re Patch Graphics,
32 Bankr. 373 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Cox, 28 Bankr. 588 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983);
In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
540. 19 Bankr. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
541. Id. at 54.
542. Id. at 55.
543. Id., citing Gulf Pet., S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (Ist Cir. 1963); In re Philadelphia
Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1960); In re New York Inv. Mut. Group, 143 F.
Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
544. 19 Bankr. at 58.
545. Id. at 58-59.
546. Id. at 58 n.9. The result in Booth did not depend on state law treatment of the executory
contract. Instead, the court focused on policy implementation.
547. Id. at 60-61.
548. Id. at 61.
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for a deed as a lien when the buyer is the debtor is consonant with the spirit
of those sections. Any other treatment would give nondebtor buyers more
favorable treatment in bankruptcy than debtor-buyers and debtor-sellers better
treatment than debtor-buyers.5,49 Although the court hesitated to depart from
the Countryman test, it believed the strict application of that rule to be in-
consistent with the rationale of sections 365(i) and (j). Thus, to implement
the underlying backruptcy policy it treated the debtor's contract for a deed
as a lien and denied the seller's motion to require assumption or rejection
of the contract.
Although not all courts have agreed with the rationale of Booth,"' other
courts have followed the decision .1' Moreover, the result has been extended
to installment sales contracts that involve personal property."' Thus the debtor
who is party to an installment sale contract involving farmland must consider
the possibility that the contract will be treated as a lien, rather than as an
executory contract to which the provisions of section 365 apply.
The Plan of Reorganization
The debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy does not operate his
farm indefinitely on the authority of the interim provisions prescribed in sec-
tions 363, 364, and 365. These provisions merely facilitate the continued opera-
tion of the debtor's business during the interim period between filing of the
petition and confirmation of a plan. The reorganization plan will establish
provisions for paying both secured and unsecured creditors. In addition, it
will include the debtor's plans for continuing the operation of the farm
business.
The Debtor's Role
A debtor may file a plan with the petition commencing a voluntary case.55 3
Although some debtors may have already negotiated parts of a plan with
lenders, most Chapter 11 debtors do not enter bankruptcy with a plan already
designed. 5 4 Indeed, many file the bankruptcy petition to alleviate pressure
from creditors and gain time to formulate a plan. The farm debtor has the
exclusive right to file a plan for the first 120 days after the order for relief,5 5
549. Id. at 63.
550. E.g., In re Speck, 50 Bankr. 307 (Bankr. S.D. 1985); Shaw v. Dawson (In re Shaw),
48 Bankr. 857 (D.N.M. 1985); In re Roman Crest Fruit, Inc., 35 Bankr. 939 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983).
551. E.g., In re Adolphsen, 38 Bankr. 776 (D. Minn.), aff'd 38 Bankr. 780 (D. Minn. 1983);
In re Flores, 32 Bankr. 455 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983); In re Patch Graphics, 32 Bankr. 373 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Cox, 28 Bankr. 588 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983). Some courts have used
the policy approach espoused by Booth, while others have followed state law treatment of the
installment land contract. Other rationales also apply. Cox used the doctrine of equitable con-
version, and Adolphsen analogized to the promissory note. See Kunkel, supra note 174, at 321.
552. E.g., In re Shada Truck Leasing, Inc., 31 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1983).
553. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (1982).
554. Landers, supra note 200, at 14.
555. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982).
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if a trustee has not been appointed.1 6 If the debtor does file a plan within
the 120-day period, then other parties in interest are precluded from submitting
a plan of their own for another sixty days. 5 " But if the debtor fails to file
a plan in the first 120-day period, or if he fails to gain acceptance of his
plan within 180 days, then any other party in interest may also file a plan."
8
Most individual creditors, however, lack the economic incentive and knowledge
of the farmer's operation needed to file a meaningful plan, so the farm debtor
himself has substantial power to influence the plan even after the 120- to
180-day exclusivity period has expired." 9
It is essential both for the Chapter 11 farm debtor to submit a reorganiza-
tion plan in a timely manner and for that plan to be feasible. If the plan
is not timely and feasible, the court can dismiss the case for cause pursuant
to section 1112(b). In re Becker involved a creditor's motion to dismiss for
cause. 60 The debtors had filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in March 1983.
Thereafter, they made no payments to a number of creditors, including Farmers
Home Administration and the seller under an installment land contract. They
also failed to pay delinquent property taxes. They owed an unscheduled debt
to the Commodity Credit Corporation and had secured that debt by 1981
and 1982 corn stored at the debtors' farm and at an elevator. The corn had
deteriorated after the petition was filed.5 6' In the months since their petition
was filed, the debtors sustained operating losses of $107,000. The equipment
and machinery that served as collateral for several creditors was depreciating
through continued use, and the debtors made no payments to the creditors
to protect their interests. The corn was spoiling, and the farmland, used as
collateral for several creditors, was declining in value. Thus, the estate in
bankruptcy suffered a continuing loss.5 2
The court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood of rehabilita-
tion. The debtors' operation could not "cash flow itself." 63 Moreover, the
debtors had not filed a plan or disclosure statement in the year since they
filed their petition. Many of their creditors were entitled to relief from the
automatic stay under section 362(d)(1), and the debtors would then be left
with little property. These facts led the court to the conclusion that the creditors
were entitled to dismissal for cause under section 1112(b)(2). In addition, the
court believed that debtors who have proceeded under Chapter 11 for a year
without a plan, particularly with debts of nearly a million dollars, caused
unreasonable delay. Section 11 12(b)(3) allows dismissal for "unreasonable delay
556. Id. § 1121(c)(3) (Supp. 11 1984).
557. Id.
558. Id. § I121(c)(2), (3) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The court may lengthen or reduce these
time periods on request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing. Id. at 1121(d)
(Supp. II 1984).
559. Landers, supra note 200, at 18.
560. 38 Bankr. 913 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
561. Id. at 915.
562. Id. at 915-16.
563. Id. at 916.
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by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors.'""' The Beckers' delay, in light
of declining land values, spoiling corn, and deteriorating equipment, had pre-
judiced creditors and justified dismissal under section 1112(b)(3).165
Infeasibility of a Chapter 11 plan submitted by a farm debtor can also result
in dismissal of the case. A plan that is infeasible and inequitable may be re-
jected, and a bankruptcy court finding that the debtor cannot effectuate a
plan that will be confirmable is also a basis for dismissal under section
11 12(b)(2)25
The Creditors' Role
Although the debtor will have best access to the information needed to
formulate a feasible plan, creditors as a group play a significant role in the
formulation of most plans. After the order for relief, the court appoints a
creditors' committee 5 67 which normally consists of the holders of the seven
largest unsecured claims.5 6 8 Once selected, the committee has a number of
duties. The committee consults with the trustee or debtor in possession con-
cerning administration of the case.5 69 It also investigates the debtor's finan-
cial affairs, the operation of the business and desirability of its continuance,
and any other matter relevant to the case or formulation of a plan."10 In ad-
dition, the committee may participate in the formulation of a plan, advise
other creditors of its recommendations regarding any plan, and collect and
file with the court the acceptances of a plan.5 1' Finally, the committee may
request the appointment of a trustee or examiner 7 2 and perform other ser-
vices in the interests of the creditors.
5 73
Regardless of whether the plan is formulated by the farm debtor or by the
creditors, that plan must be favorable enough to the creditors to encourage
them to approve it. Most plans will have one or more classes of secured claims
and at least one class of unsecured claims. A class of claims is a group of
substantially similar claims .5 1  A plan must treat each claim in a particular
class the same, 75 but a plan may treat the various classes differently. One
564. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(3) (1982).
565. 38 Bankr. at 917. The court would have preferred to convert the case to a Chapter 7
liquidation, but section 1112(c) prevents such conversion when the debtor is a farmer.
566. In re Fossum, 764 F.2d 520, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1985). See also In re Anderson, 52 Bankr.
159 (D.S.D. 1985).
567. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1982).
568. Id. § 1102(b)(1) (Supp. I 1984). The committee can be the body organized by the creditors
before commencement of the case, if fairly chosen and representative.
569. Id. § 1103(c)(1) (1982).
570. Id. § 1103(c)(2).
571. Id. § 1103(c)(3) (Supp. 11 1984).
572. Id. § I 103(c)(4). In In re Bel Air Assocs., Ltd., 4 Bankr. 168 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980),
the court held that mere naked allegations of misconduct or incompetence were not enough to
warrant the appointment of an examiner.
573. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5) (1982).
574. Id. § 1122(a).
575. Id. § 1123(a)(4). The holder of a particular claim may consent to receive less favorable
treatment than the class.
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of the potential advantages to the debtor in a Chapter 11 case is that the
plan may incorporate provisions that extend payment time and scale down
debts. In practice, most plans filed will include one or more impaired classes,
576
in which creditors will be asked to accept less than their full claims. Creditors
will cooperate with impairment because they will ordinarily receive more under
the reorganization plan than in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
The court does not actually approve a plan before the debtor in possession
submits the plan to the creditors. Instead, the Code provides that the creditors'
acceptance or rejection of a plan may not be solicited until after the court
agrees that the written disclosure statement to be submitted along with the
plan contains adequate information. 77 "Adequate information" is informa-
tion of a kind, and in sufficient detail, that would enable a hypothetical
reasonable investor to make an informed judgment about the plan. 78 This
requirement ensures that creditors will have access to enough information about
the debtor's financial condition to make an informed judgment about the
plan. What constitutes adequate information is determined on a case-by-case
basis and may be affected in part by factors like the need for investor protec-
tion and the speed of confirmation required.
79
After the plan and written disclosure have been submitted to the creditors,
the creditors vote to accept or reject the plan. Holders of allowed claims or
interests are permitted to vote. 80 A class not impaired under a plan58 is deemed
to accept the plan without voting. 8 2 A class that receives nothing under a
plan is deemed to reject the plan -without voting. 83 A voting class of claims
accepts a plan if creditors holding at least two-thirds in amount and more
than one-half in number of the allowed claims in the class that actually votes
agree to accept the plan.
8
1
Confirmation and Cram Down
Acceptance of the plan by all classes of claims does not automatically put
576. A class is unimpaired if one of three criteria is satisfied. First, the plan may leave unaltered
the legal, equitable, and contractual rights of the holders of claims or interest of a class. Second,
the plan may cure defaults that occurred before or during the bankruptcy proceeding, reinstate
the maturity date of the claim or interest, and compensate the holder for any damages incurred
as a result of the default. Third, the plan may provide that the holders of claims receive cash
equal to the allowed amount of their claims, or that the holders of interests receive cash equal
to the greater of any fixed liquidation preference or any fixed price at which the debtor, under
the terms of the security, may redeem the interest. Id. § 1124 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
577. Id. § 1125(b) (1982).
578. Id. § 1125(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
579. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 409, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 6365.
580. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (1982). Section 502 determines what claims or interests are allowed.
581. See supra note 576.
582. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (Supp. 11 1984).
583. Id. § 1126(g).
584. Id. § 1126(c) (1982). For example, assume that a farm debtor establishes a class with
claims totaling $I00,000 and with twenty creditors. Fifteen creditors holding claims of $75,000
vote. If eight creditors holding claims of more than $52,000 approve the plan, that class has
accepted the plan.
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a plan into effect; the court must still confirm the plan pursuant to section
1129. A plan accepted by every class of claims and interests is generally con-
firmed. 585 But each creditor in an accepting class with impaired claims who
has voted to reject a plan must receive at least the amount that the creditor
would have received if the debtor had been liquidated in Chapter 7.1S6 Also,
a plan must provide that holders of certain priority claims under section 507
receive the full amount of their allowed claims if other classes are to receive
anything. 87 In addition, confirmation of the plan must not be likely to be
followed by liquidation or need for further reorganization.", That is, the plan
must be feasible, with a reasonable prospect for success.589 Of course, the
court cannot guarantee that a plan proposed by a farm debtor, or any other
debtor, will succeed. Predicting crop yields and crop prices always leaves an
element of uncertainty.
In certain circumstances, a court may confirm a plan even though certain
classes have rejected the plan, so long as at least one impaired class approves
the plan.580 Confirmation of a plan over the objection of one or more classes
is called "cram down.""' The law dealing with cram down is quite com-
plex. 92 The plan must not discriminate unfairly and must be fair and equitable
to each class that is impaired and has not accepted the plan. 93 In general,
the holders of secured claims must at least get to retain their liens and receive
payments that have a present value, 94 as of the effective date of the plan,
equal to the value of their collateral. 95 Unsecured claimants must receive at
least the allowed amount of their claim,5 96 plus the assurance that if their
claims are not satisfied in full, creditors in junior classes will not receive or
retain any property.5 97
In re Monnier Brothers was a recent case involving application of the cram-
down provisions in a farm reorganization. 91 Prudential Insurance Company
appealed from the confirmation of the Monnier Brothers' plan. Prudential
585. Id. § 1129(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
586. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
587. Id. § 1129(a)(9).
588. Id. § 1129(a)(11) (1982).
589. See In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1341 (8th Cir. 1985).
590. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (Supp. I 1984).
591. Id. § 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
592. For a thorough analysis of the Code's cram-down provisions, see Klee, All You Ever
Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J.
133 (1979).
593. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982). "Fair and equitable" is a term of art. See In re Monnier
Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1342 (8th Cir. 1985); In re King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1326, 1340
(10th Cir. 1980). See also In re Stoffel, 41 Bankr. 390 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (fair and equitable
standard not met by debtors long delinquent to Federal Land Bank; case dismissed under section11 12(b)(1)).
594. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. 11 1984).
595. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(1I) (1982).
596. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i).
597. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 11 1984).
598. 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985).
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had loaned the debtors $800,000, secured by a mortgage on the debtors'
farmland. Interest was set at 13 percent (15 percent on overdue installments),
with payments over a term of fifteen years. Debtors filed a Chapter 11 peti-
tion before making the first required principal payment to Prudential. Shortly
after the bankruptcy, the value of the farmland was $1,356,000, and the in-
debtedness to Prudential was $1,012,209.599
The Monnier Brothers submitted a plan describing how and when each claim
would be paid and making predictions about future crop yields, prices, and
expenses. Ten classes of creditors accepted the plan, but Prudential rejected
it. The plan provided for an initial payment of $75,000 to Prudential toward
accrued interest and for payment of the remaining indebtedness in amortized
installments over fifteen years. Interest was to accrue at 10.5 percent after
the confirmation date. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan over Pruden-
tial's objections. The district court affirmed confirmation, but fixed the in-
terest rate at the 13 percent established in the original mortgage. 60 Prudential
appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
Under the cram-down provisions of the Code, the deferred cash payments
due to Prudential must total "a value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of at least the value of [Prudential's] interest in the estate's interest" in the
collateral. 60' Prudential had the right to the principal plus interest accrued
up to the date of the plan. Thus the court had to determine the interest rate
needed for Prudential to receive its total value in light of the fifteen-year
amortization of the debt. The Eighth Circuit looked to the indubitable
equivalent standard of section 1129,602 which requires that a substitute for
the creditor's right to get money under a plan must compensate for present
value and ensure the safety of the principal. 60 3 Considering the market value
of the farmland and the fact that Prudential was oversecured, the Eighth Cir-
cuit could find no error in the district court's imposition of the contract in-
terest rate of 13 percent.0 The court also concluded that the treatment of
Prudential under the cram-down provisions had been fair and equitable as
required by section 1129(b)(1). 60 1 Prudential retained its lien; it would receive
repayment over several years; and it was treated fairly in relation to other
secured and unsecured claims.
60 6
599. Id. at 1337.
600. Id. at 1338.
601. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(ll) (1982).
602. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. 11 1984).
603. 755 F.2d at 1339. See also supra text accompanying notes 98 & 431-434 on indubitable
equivalence.
604. 755 F.2d at 1339.
605. Id. at 1342.
606. Prudential raised two additional issues: adequate protection and feasibility of the plan.
On the issue of adequate protection, the Eighth Circuit noted that that standard applies to deci-
sions to terminate the automatic stay, but not to confirmation decisions. Although the issue
was probably moot, the court concluded that Prudential had been adequately protected during
the pendency of the automatic stay. 755 F.2d at 1340.
Prudential also argued that the Monnier Brothers' plan was infeasible under section 1129(a)
19851
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In re Hollanger also focused on the issue of indubitable equivalence." 7 In
the Hollanger case, a farmer and his wholly owned farming corporation filed
under Chapter 11. Pursuant to section 1 129(b)(2)(A), the court approved the
cram down of a plan over the objections of secured creditors with liens on
land with a value that greatly exceeded the value of the liens. Under the plan,
these creditors would retain their liens and receive annual installments pro-
viding full payment of interest, and some reduction of principal, over seven
years. At the end of seven years, the balance of any principal and deferred
arrearages became fully due and payable. The court held that the plan met
the criteria of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). It also held that the plan satisfied the
"indubitable equivalent" standard:
[Wihere a dissenting claimant is receiving payment in full over a
reasonable period of time, with an appropriate interest or discount
factor being paid, that creditor is receiving all that the law requires,
that is-full payment over a reasonable period of time. Such a
dissenting secured claimant is not being deprived of any rights and
is receiving completely compensatory treatment.608
For a Chapter 11 farm debtor, the real estate mortgage is often a major
debt that must be dealt with under the plan. Thus the farm mortgage deserves
special consideration at this point. 60' If the farmer has defaulted on a mortgage
prior to filing, the plan may propose to cure the default and continue the
payments as originally established under the mortgage.6" ' The farmer may
save a mortgage loan at a favorable interest rate, despite both the lender's
acceleration of the full balance of the loan prior to the petition and the initia-
tion of proceedings. 61' If the creditor on the mortgage is oversecured, the
creditor will always receive full payment of his claim. But in this situation,
the plan may extend the repayment schedule.6 2 The farmer's cash flow prob-
lems may be mitigated by the lower annual debt service required under an
extended mortgage.
In some cases, the farm debtor's mortgagee may be undersecured. Because
under section 506(a) the undersecured creditor is unsecured to the extent that
and should not have been confirmed. The court rejected this argument also. The Eighth Circuit
could not say that the feasibility finding was clearly erroneous. Id. at 1341.
607. 15 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981).
608. Id. at 46-47. See also In re Benson, 9 Bankr. 854 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1981), decided under
section 401(11) of the Bankruptcy Act. This case "established the proposition that farmers should
have the right to retain their land, restructure their mortgage debts over a reasonable time, and
pay the mortgage debts out of future earnings." Anderson & Rainach, supra note 382, at 471.
See also section I11lIb) and Klee, supra note 592, at 152-54, 158-59 for discussion of the election
possible to undersecured creditors.
609. See Landers, supra note 200, at 21-22.
610. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The claimant is unimpaired.
611. See In re Hewitt, 16 Bankr. 973 (D. Alaska 1982). But see In re Madison Hotel Assocs.,
749 F.2:i 410 (7th Cir. 1984), for a discussion of the Chapter 11 debtor's ability to cure and
reinstate a foreclosed mortgage.
612. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1982). See In re Hollanger, 15 Bankr. 35, 47 (W.D.
La. 1981).
[Vol. 38:579
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss4/9
1985] FARM DEBTOR UNDER AMENDED CODE
the debt exceeds the value of the collateral, a scale down as well as an exten-
sion of the mortgage debt may be possible. 613 Section 1111 (b), however, gives
some undersecured creditors an option to be secured to the extent their claims
are allowed 6l" in exchange for giving up any deficiency judgment against the
debtor. 6'I If the real estate creditor chooses to be fully secured, then, like
oversecured creditors, he must receive payments whose present value is equal
to his allowed claim. This would prevent a scale down, but if the reorganiza-
tion plan is confirmed and the debtor ultimately fails, the creditor cannot
look beyond the collateral for payment. Section 1111 is also available to
undersecured machinery dealers, but it is less likely that the machinery dealer
will choose to be a fully secured nonrecourse lender simply because machinery
is certain to depreciate in value more quickly than real estate.6 ,6 The risk of
a reorganized farmer failing to meet the plan payments is a great risk for
a machinery dealer to assume.
If all the requirements of section 1129(a) and (b) are met, then the court
will confirm the plan. The debtor and all creditors are bound, even those
creditors who have not accepted the plan.6 7 The property of the estate is
vested in the debtor, subject only to the rights of the creditors as set forth
in the plan.6 8 Immediately upon confirmation, the debtor is discharged from
prepetition debts, except those debts provided for in the plan and, if the deb-
tor is an individual, debts excepted from discharge under section 523. 61 The
debt& then continues to operate the business according to the provisions
established in the plan.
Although the procedure for having a plan accepted and confirmed under
Chapter 11 is fairly straightforward, albeit not always simple, not all debtors
613. The secured claim may be extended as in Hollanger and the unsecured claim may be
scaled down. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). See also Anderson & Rainach,
supra note 382.
614. 11 U.S.C. § l1l1(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). For example, suppose that a class con-
sisted solely of a creditor with a mortgage lien of $600,000 on real property of a farm debtor
valued at $500,000. Pursuant to § 506(a), the creditor would have an allowed secured claim
of $500,000 and an allowed unsecured claim of $100,000. For a court to cram down a plan
over the creditor's rejection, the creditor would have to retain his lien and to receive payments
at least equal as of the effective date of the plan to $500,000. If the creditor made the section
I I II(b)(2) election, however, it would have an allowed secured claim of $600,000 and no unsecured
claim. For a court to cram down a plan over the creditor's rejection now, the creditor would
have to retain his lien and receive payments equal to $600,000.
615. Id. § ll11(b)(l) (1982). If the claim holder did not have recourse originally, then the
election to be secured notwithstanding section 506(a) is unavailable. Id.
616. Landers, supra note 200, at 23 n.43. Professor Landers suggests that Chapter 11 offers
one other advantage to the farm-debtor mortgagor. If a farmer wishes to sell a mortgaged parcel
under a reorganization plan, the due-on-sale clause will not prevent transfer in Chapter 11. 11
U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1984). Even if interest rates have risen, the lender cannot ter-
minate a low-interest loan. The debtor may use the agreement to benefit all the creditors. Landers,
supra, at 22.
617. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
618. Id. § 1141(b)(1982).
619. Id. § 1141(d). Regarding the individual debtor, see section 1141(d)(2). On discharge, see
supra text accompanying notes 44-66.
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succeed in having a plan accepted. Some Chapter 11 farm debtors do not
submit a plan within the requisite 120 days, nor do they apply to the court
for an extension. In some of these cases, litigation has focused on the creditors'
right to propose a liquidating plan for the farm debtor under Chapter 11.
In such cases, the debtors have argued that the Code implicitly exempts farmers
from Chapter 11 liquidations.
In re Button Hook Cattle Co. involved this issue.6 20 The debtor, a family
corporation engaged in the business of raising crops and cattle, filed a Chapter
11 petition. It did not file a reorganization plan within 120 days of its peti-
tion, nor did it apply for an extension. Button Hook's principal creditor then
filed a plan calling for the sale of all the debtor's assets. Button Hook objected,
arguing that it was exempt from involuntary liquidation and relying on three
statutory sections: section 303(a), which precludes an involuntary bankruptcy
petition against a farmer; section 1112(c), which prohibits involuntary con-
version of a farmer's Chapter 11 case to Chapter 7; and section 1112(e), which
prohibits converting a case to a different chapter, unless the debtor could
be a debtor under that chapter.62 '
Relying in part on a case decided by the Fifth Circuit,622 the Eighth Circuit
rejected the debtor's argument. The court recognized that Congress had drafted
section 1121(c) of the Code, which allows creditors to file a plan after the
debtor's 120-day period of exclusivity, to eliminate the debtor's ability to exert
undue bargaining leverage through delay. 22 Congress envisioned the possibility
of liquidating plans proposed by creditors, but did not exempt farmers from
those plans. Farmers receive defensive protection in bankruptcy when they
are protected from both involuntary petitions and involuntary conversions.
But Congress indicated no intent to give them offensive protection through
the "capability to initiate a Chapter 11 proceeding which both stays collec-
tion by creditors and allows [the farmer], by refusing to file, to block the
submission of a plan of liquidation.""62 Thus the court held that after the
120-day period, any party in interest may file a plan, including a liquidation
plan, which can be confirmed even over the objection of the farm debtor.61
Although all courts have not agreed,626 a number of decisions have con-
cluded that creditors can file a liquidating plan over the objection of the
620. 747 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1984).
621. Id. at 485.
622. In re Jasik, 727 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984).
623. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 231, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 6191. See also Bankruptcy Act Revision, Serial No. 27, pt. 3, Hearings on H.R. 31
and H.R. 32 before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), quoted in In re Jasik, 727 F.2d at 1381.
624. Button Hook, 747 F.2d at 486, quoting In re Jasik, 727 F.2d at 1381.
625. 747 F.2d at 486. The debtor need not approve confirmation of the plan. 11 U.S.C. §
1129 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
626. E.g., In re Lange, 39 Bankr. 483 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); In re Blanton Smith Corp.,
7 Bankr. 410 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
[Vol. 38:579
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss4/9
1985] FARM DEBTOR UNDER AMENDED CODE 661
Chapter 11 farm debtor. 627 Even in this event, however, the individual farm
debtor will be able to retain assets exempt under section 522.628
V. Chapter 13: Adjustment of Debts of an Individual
With Regular Income
It is unrealistic to believe that, without significant amendment, Chapter 13
will be a viable bankruptcy alternative for most farmers. The present debt
limitations for that chapter629 are considerably lower than the amount of debt
that burdens the usual farmer who contemplates bankruptcy. 630 Nonetheless,
because some small farmers may qualify as Chapter 13 debtors, a brief over-
view follows. Moreover, proposed amendments to the provisions of the Code
to make Chapter 13 available to family farmers may make that chapter more
relevant in the future.
63'
Roles of Debtor, Creditor, and Trustee
Chapter 13, like Chapter 11, provides a means of financial reorganization
that will permit the farmer to continue the farm operation and pay creditors
over a somewhat extended period of time. Chapter 13 is less expensive-and
less complex, however, and gives the debtor more control over the structure
of the reorganization.
The individual farmer who is eligible for Chapter 13 initiates the case by
filing a petition and paying a fee of $60.6 32 As in Chapter 11, the farmer-
debtor must perform the four basic duties of the debtor specified in section
627. In addition to Jasik and Button Hook, cases include: In re Cassidy Land & Cattle Co.,
747 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1984); In re J.F. Toner & Son, Inc., 40 Bankr. 461 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1984); In re Tinsley, 36 Bankr. 807 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984).
628. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 1123(c) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). See Kunkel, Creditors' Liquidating
Plans in Farm Bankruptcies, 2 Aosuc. L. UPDATE. No. 2 at 1-2 (Nov. 1984).
629. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. On Chapter 13 and the farmer, see generally
Dole, supra note 9.
630. The following statement from a Bankruptcy Judge from the Middle District of Tennessee
indicates the extent of indebtedness of farm debtors:
Since ... October of 1981, this district has handled approximately 34 Chapter
11 cases involving family farmers. Of these cases, 19 are still pending, eight have
been converted to Chapter 7 and seven have been dismissed. In approximate figures,
the total statistics are as follows: Secured debt, $29,985,850; Unsecured debt,
$5,642,650; and 10,410 acres of farmland valued at $19,354,300. Our average family
farmer would therefore have approximately $881,935 in secured debt; $170,990 in
unsecured debt; 336 acres of farmland valued at $645,145.
Statement of George C. Paine II, on H.R. 1397 and H.R. 1399, Mar. 27, 1985.
631. See H.R. 1397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1399, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
H.R. 1399, for example, would amend section 101 of the Code to define "family farmer" as
an individual (or a family-owned corporation) who received more than 50 percent of his gross
income from farming. In addition, it would raise the Chapter 13 debt limitations, for cases in-
volving family farmers, to $1 million of noncontingent, liquidated, secured, and unsecured debt.
The family farmer's plan could extend ten years.
632. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (1982).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
521, as well as attend the meeting of creditors prescribed by section 341."'
Also, subject to any limitations imposed by the court, the Chapter 13 debtor
who is engaged in business may continue the operations after filing the peti-
tion. 3" A "debtor engaged in business" is a debtor who is self-employed and
who incurs trade credit in the production of income from his self-
employment. 63. Most farm debtors, if otherwise eligible for Chapter 13, should
be able to continue to operate their farms during the bankruptcy proceedings.
Under Chapter 13, the debtor's estate is defined expansively. It includes
prepetition property normally considered part of the bankrupt estate under
section 541 .636 In addition, it includes property that the debtor acquires after
he files the bankruptcy petition and before the case is closed, dismissed, or
converted to Chapter 7 or 11.637 The debtor's postpetition earnings are also
part of the estate. 63' Unless the plan or a court order specifies otherwise, the
debtor will retain possession of property of the estate.
6 9
The Chapter 13 farm debtor, like other Chapter 13 debtors, has the advan-
tage of two special protective provisions. First, in Chapter 13, only the debtor
may file a plan. Unlike in Chapter 11, the creditors have no right to file a
plan. 6'0 The debtor has the exclusive right and must file the plan either with
the petition or within the time prescribed by bankruptcy rules." ' Unless the
court grants an extension for cause, the plan must be filed within fifteen
days. 642 Although this time limit is short, the debtor, rather than creditors,
will control the development of the reorganization.
Second, Chapter 13 includes a provision that stays any actions of creditors
to collect any part of a consumer debt of the debtor from a codebtor. 643 This
stay against codebtors does not apply if the codebtor secured or became liable
on the debt in the ordinary course of his business, or if the case is dismissed,
closed, or converted to a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 case. The court may
grant relief from the stay if the codebtor actually received consideration, if
the plan proposes not to pay the claim, or if the stay would irreparably harm
the creditor.' Although the stay is only temporary and the codebtor may
633. See supra text accompanying notes 326-330.
634. 11 U.S.C. § 1304(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
635. Id. §-1304(a) (1982).
636. Id. §§ 1306(a), 541. See supra text accompanying notes 106-117.
637. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (1982).
638. Id. § 1306(a)(2). Earnings from services are included until the case is closed, dismissed,
or converted to Chapter 7 or 11.
639. Id. § 1306(b).
640. Id. § 1321.
641. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 428, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONC. &
AD. NEws, at 6383.
642. Bankr. Rule 3015.
643. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1982). Although a loan primarily for business purposes is not a
consumer debt under this section, In re Demaree, 27 Bankr. I (Bankr. D. Or. 1982), in some
instances funds from a consumer debt may find their way into a business operation, In re
Lindamood, 21 Bankr. 473 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982).
644. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
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eventually be required to pay the debt, 65 the stay may be useful to the farm
debtor, especially when members of the family or friends are codebtors. It
protects the debtor from pressure exerted from those who may have cosigned
on a consumer debt.
In part because creditors cannot file a plan, they play a less important role
in Chapter 13 cases than under Chapter 11. The trustee's role in Chapter 13
is also unique. Normally, the trustee does not take possession of the debtor's
property. 46 Instead, the trustee acts as a financial counselor and as a disburs-
ing agent. The trustee performs many of the normal trustee's duties specified
in section 704.647 He participates in hearings concerning the debtor's plan,
gives the debtor nonlegal advice and assistance, and ensures that the debtor
begins to make timely payments under the plan.64 8 In addition, under the deb-
tor's plan, the trustee must supervise and control that part of the debtor's
future income needed to carry out the plan.649 Unless the plan or a court
order provides otherwise, the trustee will also make payments to creditors
under the plan.6"'
The Plan
Although only the debtor may submit a plan, the debtor's plan must con-
form to the requirements of Chapter 13. Three requirements are paramount.65'
The plan must provide for submission of all or part of the debtor's future
earnings or income to the trustee as needed to execute the plan. It must pro-
vide for full payment of all claims with priority under section 507, unless
the holder agrees otherwise. In addition, if the plan classifies claims, it must
provide the same treatment for each claim within a particular class.
652
Beyond these three requirements, the plan may include any appropriate pro-
vision that is not inconsistent with the Code. 6 3 The Code lists a number of
645. Id. § 524(e). See also S. REp. No. 989, supra note 39, at 138, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5924.
646. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1982).
647. Id. § 1302(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
648. Id. § 1302(b)(2), (4), (5).
649. Id. § 1322(a)(1).
650. Id. § 1326(c).
651. Id. § 1322(a).
652. Courts have generally held that a Chapter 13 plan cannot classify claims according to
whether the underlying debt is guaranteed by a codebtor. In re McKenzie, 4 Bankr. 88 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Utter, 3 Bankr. 369 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980). But see section 1322(b)(1)
(concerning consumer debts when an individual is liable with the debtor). A plan can classify
a claim separately when the underlying debt is a child support obligation. In re Haag, 3 Bankr.
649 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979). One court has
warned that definitions in and interpretations of section 1122 are irrelevant to classification prob-
lems in a Chapter 13 plan because of the different contexts of Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases.
In re Hill, 4 Bankr. 694 (D. Kan. 1980).
653. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10) (1982). For example, in In re Simmons, 23 Bankr. 364 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1982), the court confirmed a plan that reinstated a foreclosed mortgage and provided
for payment of mortgage arrearages within twenty-four months. The issue was whether a foreclosed
mortgage could be reinstated in a Chapter 13 plan, and if so, whether the payment of a sum
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provisions that may be included in the plan. 6" 4 The debtor may classify
unsecured claims, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class." The
debtor may modify the rights of holders of unsecured and secured claims,
but cannot modify claims secured only by a mortgage on the debtor's prin-
cipal residence.56 Under a plan the debtor may cure or waive any default,
and he may assume or reject executory contracts or unexpired leases under
section 3 6 5 . 6S The Chapter 13 plan is subject to fewer requirements than a
Chapter 11 plan; thus it offers more flexibility to the debtor. One important
restriction in Chapter 13, however, is the time limitation. The plan usually
may not provide for payments over a period longer than three years, although
the court may approve a period not to exceed five years.
6
1'
After the debtor files the plan under Chapter 13, secured creditors have
an opportunity to accept the plan. Pursuant to sections 1324 and 1325, the
court must evaluate and confirm the plan. The court will hold a confirmation
hearing, at which parties in interest may object to the confirmation of the
plan. 659 Generally, the court will confirm the plan if it meets the requirements
of section 1325. Under that section, the debtor must be able to carry out
the plan,660 which must comply with the provisions of the Code 66 ' and the
less than the judgment amount resulted in lack of adequate protection and was cause for lifting
the stay under section 362(d). The court concluded that:
Chapter 13 debtors may reinstate their mortgages and arrange for repayment of
arrearages over a reasonable period of time and keep current on payments due
under the terms of the reinstated mortgage. Whether the entire judgment amount
must be paid to provide adequate protection to creditor need only be addressed
where the creditor has met his burden of proof on the issue of equity. Once the
creditor has met this burden, it is then, and only then, incumbent upon the debtor
to establish that the creditor is adequately protected, the property is necessary to
an effective reorganization and that there is a reasonable possibility of a successful
reorganization.
23 Bankr. at 366 (citations omitted). The court found that the debtors had equity in the property
and thus that cause for lifting the stay did not exist. See also In re Fulks, 48 Bankr. 20 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1984) (foreclosure sale not stayed by debtor's Chapter 13 petition because debtor did
not have record title).
654. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
655. Id. § 1322(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
656. Id. § 1322(b)(2). Several courts have indicated, however, that the Chapter 13 debtor may
cure a default on a mortgage secured by a principal residence. Clark v. Federal Land Bank,
738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1984) (petition tiled after foreclosure; debtor can cure in part because
title did not pass under Wisconsin law until foreclosure sale); Grubbs v. Houston First Am.
Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (default may be cured; past due amounts
may be paid during term of the plan); Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1982).
657. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(3), (7) (Supp. 11 1984).
658. Id. § 1322(c) (1982).
659. Id. § 1324 (Supp. 11 1984). No objection need be made, however, for a court to deny
confirmation of a plan that does not meet the criteria set forth in section 1325(a) (1982 & Supp.
11 1984). In re Williams, 3 Bankr. 728 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1980).
660. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1982). See General Motors Accep. Corp. v. Ryals (In re Ryals),
3 Bankr. 522 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980), for an example of the factors a court may consider
in determining whether the debtor will be able to carry out the plan. See also Goeb v. Heid
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plan must have been proposed in good faith. 661 Unsecured creditors should
receive at least the amount they would have been paid in a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion case. 6 For secured claimants, there are three possibilities. Holders of
allowed secured claims may accept the plan. 66 Alternatively, the secured
claimants will retain their liens and receive property under the plan with a
present value of at least the allowed amount of such claims. 65 Or the debtor
could surrender the property securing the claims to the claimholders.
666
Once the plan is confirmed, it binds the debtor and each creditor, regardless
of whether the creditor's claim is provided for by the plan.667 Unless the plan
provides otherwise, confirmation vests all of the property of the estate in the
debtor, free and clear of creditors' claims or interests. 66 After confirmation,
the debtor will continue to run the farm business, unless the -court orders
otherwise, and has the same rights and powers as after the order for relief
and before confirmation. Both before and after confirmation, the farmer must
file periodic reports of the operation of the business, including a statement
of receipts and disbursements. 669 While the debtor is running the business,
he normally remits payments under the plan to the trustee, who in turn
distributes the payments to the creditors.
67 °
Upon completion of payments under the plan, the court must discharge
the debtor, as described above. 67' Normally in Chapter 13, a creditor cannot
object to discharge of a debtor, though a creditor may challenge the debtor's
good faith by objecting to confirmation of the plan.672 Chapter 13 also pro-
(In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d
426 (7th Cir. 1982).
661. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
662. Id. § 1325(a)(3) (1982). Courts have disagreed considerably as to when a Chapter 13 plan
is proposed in good faith. Some courts have required no or only minimal payments to unsecured
creditors, while others have held that the plan was not proposed in good faith because the payments
were too low. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1325.01 (L. King ed., 15th ed. Cum. Supp.
1980) and cases cited therein. Courts have also disagreed on whether the plan must represent
the debtor's best efforts and on the effect of fraud on the part of the debtor. Id. In addition,
some courts have found that a plan was not proposed in good faith because the debtor would
not be able to make all of the payments under the plan. Id.
663. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982). If unsecured creditors object to confirmation, the court
cannot approve the plan unless the value of property to be distributed is not less than the amount
of the claim. Alternatively, the plan must provide that all of the debtor's disposable income
to be received during the three-year plan period will be used for payments under the plan. Id.
§ 1325(b) (Supp. I 1984). Subsection (b) was added by the 1984 amendments.
664. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (1982).
665. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
666. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
667. Id. § 1327(a).
668. Id. §§ 1327(b), (c).
669. 11 U.S.C. § 1304(c) (Supp. II 1984).
670. Id. § 1326.
671. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
672. Eastern Wrecker Sales, Inc. v. Parker (In re Parker), 49 Bankr. 61 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985), citing 11 U.S.C. § 103(b). See also In re Ponteri, 31 Bankr. 859 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983).
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vides for a hardship discharge, 67 3 which may be especially important to farmers
because of the unpredictability of farming. Because of the vagaries of weather
conditions or prices, or because of government policies, such as embargos
and changes in price-support programs,6 74 the Chapter 13 farm debtor may
be unable to complete payments on a plan that seemed reasonable when con-
firmed. In most instances, however, modification of the Chatper 13 plan
would be more advantageous than the hardship discharge to the farmer, if
he can perform under the modified plan.
The Chapter 13 debtor who must eventually file a Chapter 7 liquidation
case receives special consideration. Normally, a debtor can be discharged in
bankruptcy only once every six years. The debtor who has been discharged under
section 1328 within six years before the Chapter 7 petition cannot receive a
discharge in the Chapter 7 case, unless payments under the Chapter 13 plan
totaled at least 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims, or 70 percent
of the allowed unsecured claims and the plan was proposed by the debtor
in good faith and was the debtor's best effort.6 7 No similar relaxation of
the six-year rule is made for debtors who receive a discharge in a Chapter
7 or 11 case.
6 76
Conclusion
The nature of farming, which is subject to unpredictable weather condi-
tions and uncontrollable commodity prices, makes the farmer particularly
vulnerable to financial stress. Moreover, the recent combination of high debt
loads, bad weather, low crop prices, and declining land values has led to in-
solvency for an increasing number of farmers. Others have managed to sur-
vive, only to face failure after another crop year.
Many of these farmers in financial crisis face the difficult prospect of
bankruptcy. Once a decision to file a bankruptcy petition has been made,
most often because no other option can succeed, the farmer and his attorney
must comply with the often complex requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.
As the above discussion has indicated, some provisions protect the farmer;
most require compliance, cooperation, and financial sacrifice from the already-
stressed farmer.
The nature of the farming profession raises some unique issues in bank-
ruptcy. This article has focused on these important issues within the framework
of a general discussion of farm bankruptcy. The unprecedented number of
farmers entering bankruptcy, and the recent amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code, have made a clear understanding of this subject crucial to attorneys
with farm clients. It is hoped that this analysis of these issues will help at-
torneys to guide bankrupt farmers successfully through these troubled times.
673. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
674. 2 JUERGENSUaEYER & WADILEY, supra note 16, at 384; Looney, supra note 16, at 520.
675. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (1982).
676. Id. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. 11 1984).
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